1801 Examination 11 · Founding Made Plain

1THE EXAMINATION.

2Number XI.

3[New York, February 3, 1802]

4The Message observes that

5 "in our care of the public contributions

6 entrusted to our direction,

7 it would be prudent

8 to multiply barriers

9 against the dissipation of public money,

10 appropriating specific sums

11 to every specific purpose,

12 susceptible of definition;

13 by disallowing all applications of money

14 varying from the appropriation

15 in object,

16 or transcending it in amount

17 by reducing the undefined field

18 of contingencies,

19 and thereby circumscribing

20 discretionary powers over money,

21 and by bringing back

22 to a single department

23 all accountabilities for money

24 where the examination may be prompt,

25 efficacious and uniform."

26In this recommendation

27 we can be at no loss to discover

28 additional proof

29 of a deliberate design

30 in the present Chief Magistrate

31 to arraign the former administrations.

32All these suggestions imply in them

33 a former either negligent

34 or defective attention

35 to the object recommended;

36 some of them go further

37 and insinuate

38 that there had been at least

39 a departure from correct plans

40 which had before been instituted.

41The censure intended to be conveyed

42 is as unjust

43 as the conceptions

44 which have dictated it,

45 are crude and chimerical.

46In all matters of this nature

47 the question turns

48 upon the proper boundaries

49 of the precautions to be observed;

50 how far they ought to go;

51 where they should stop;

52 how much is necessary

53 for security and order;

54 what qualifications of general rules

55 are to be admitted

56 to adapt them to practice,

57 and to attain the ends

58 of the public service.

59It is certainly possible

60 to do too much as well as too little;

61 to embarrass, if not defeat

62 the end intended,

63 by attempting more

64 than is practicable;

65 or to overbalance the good,

66 by evils accruing

67 from an excess of regulation.

68Men of business know this to be the case

69 in the ordinary affairs of life:

70 how much more must it be so,

71 in the extensive and complicated

72 concerns of an empire?

73To reach and not to pass

74 the salutary medium

75 is the province of sound judgment.

76To miss the point,

77 will ever be the lot of those,

78 who, enveloped all their lives

79 in the mist of theory,

80 are constantly seeking

81 for an ideal perfection,

82 which never was

83 and never will be attainable

84 in reality.

85It is about this medium,

86 not about general principles

87 that those in power

88 in our government have differed;

89 and to experience,

90 not to the malevolent insinuations

91 of rivals,

92 must be the appeal,

93 whether the one

94 or the other description of persons

95 have judged most accurately.

96Yet discerning men

97 may form no imperfect opinion

98 of the merits of the controversy

99 between them,

100 by even a cursory view

101 of the distinctions

102 on which it has turned.

103Nothing, for instance,

104 is more just or proper

105 than the position

106 that the Legislature

107 ought to appropriate specific sums,

108 for specific purposes;

109 but nothing is more wild

110 or of more inconvenient tendency

111 than to attempt to appropriate

112 "a specific sum

113 for each specific purpose,

114 susceptible of definition;"

115 as the Message preposterously recommends.

116Thus

117 (to take a familiar example)

118 in providing for the transportation

119 of an army;

120 oats and hay

121 for the subsistence of horses,

122 are each susceptible

123 of a definition, and an estimate,

124 and a precise sum

125 may be appropriated

126 for each separately;

127 yet in the operations of an army,

128 it will often happen

129 that more than a sufficient quantity

130 of the one article may be obtained,

131 and not a sufficient quantity

132 of the other:

133 if the appropriations be distinct,

134 and the officer

135 who is to make the provision,

136 be not at liberty

137 to divert the fund

138 from one of these objects

139 to the other

140 (as the doctrine of the Message implies),

141 the horses of the army

142 may in such a case starve;

143 and its movements be arrested—

144 in some situations,

145 even the army itself

146 may likewise be starved,

147 by a failure

148 of the means of transportation.

149If it be said,

150 that the inconvenience here suggested

151 may be avoided,

152 by making the appropriations

153 for forage generally,

154 and not for the items

155 which compose it separately—

156 the answer is, first,

157 that this, by uniting and blending

158 different things,

159 susceptible each

160 of a precise definition,

161 is an abandonment

162 of the principle of the Message;

163 secondly,

164 that it would be only a partial cure

165 for the mischiefs incident

166 to that rigorous principle.

167It might happen

168 that the badness of roads

169 would injure the wagons of the army

170 more than was anticipated,

171 and so much more,

172 as to exhaust the specific fund

173 appropriated for their repairs;

174 it might also have happened,

175 from various causes,

176 that at an earlier period

177 of the campaign,

178 the consumption of forage

179 had been less than was calculated,

180 so that there would be a surplus

181 of the fund destined for this object;

182 if, in such a case,

183 the public agent

184 could not transfer that surplus

185 to the repairs of the wagons,

186 the motions of the army might,

187 in this way, be suspended,

188 and in the event,

189 famine and ruin produced.

190This analysis might be pursued,

191 so as to prove

192 that similar evils

193 are inseparable

194 from a much more qualified application

195 of the principle in the Message,

196 and to demonstrate

197 that nothing more

198 can safely or reasonably be attempted,

199 than to distribute the public expenses,

200 into a certain number

201 of convenient subdivisions

202 or departments;

203 to require from the proper officers,

204 estimates of the items,

205 which are to compose

206 each head of expense;

207 and after examining these

208 with due care,

209 to adapt the appropriations

210 to the respective aggregates;

211 applying a specific sum

212 to the amount

213 of each great subdivision:—

214 the pay of the army;

215 military stores;

216 quartermaster stores, &c., &c.

217This, with even more detail

218 than could be well executed,

219 has been uniformly done,

220 under the past administrations

221 of the present government

222 from the very beginning

223 of its proceedings.

224More will in the experiment

225 be found impracticable and injurious;

226 especially in seasons and in situations,

227 when the public service

228 demands activity and exertion.

229In like manner,

230 the former practice of the government

231 has corresponded with the rule,

232 taken in its true and just sense,

233 of "disallowing all applications of money,

234 varying from the appropriation

235 in object,

236 or transcending it in amount."

237It is confidently believed,

238 that whoever shall allege

239 or insinuate to the contrary,

240 may be challenged

241 to point out the instance

242 in which money

243 has been issued from the Treasury

244 for any purpose

245 which was not sanctioned

246 by a regular appropriation,

247 or which exceeded

248 the appropriated amount;

249 or where there was

250 an expenditure of money allowed,

251 that was not strictly within the limits

252 of such an appropriation;

253 except, indeed,

254 upon the impracticable idea

255 of minutely separating,

256 and distinguishing the items,

257 which form the aggregate

258 of some general head

259 of expenditure.

260It is likewise material

261 to have it well understood that,

262 generally speaking,

263 the distinction

264 between the appropriations

265 for different objects

266 can only be strictly observed

267 at the Treasury itself;

268 which can easily take care

269 that more money shall not go out

270 for any purpose

271 than is authorized by law;

272 and can see

273 that this money is fairly expended

274 by the proper officer,

275 in conformity

276 with the general spirit

277 of the appropriation

278 prescribed by the law.

279But it is in most cases impossible

280 for the officer,

281 charged with a particular branch

282 of the public service,

283 to separate nicely

284 in the details of expenditure,

285 the different funds

286 which may have been placed

287 in his hands.

288Thus

289 (still drawing our examples

290 from the military department,

291 where the danger of misapplication

292 is always the greatest)

293 if several sums be placed

294 in the hands

295 of the Quartermaster-General,

296 for different objects,

297 he must, of necessity,

298 distribute a large proportion of them

299 among his principal deputies,

300 and these again

301 among subordinate agents.

302Unless this distribution

303 be pursued

304 through the remotest ramifications,

305 down to the moment

306 of final expenditure,

307 it is evident

308 that it must fail throughout;

309 and it is no less evident

310 that it cannot be so far pursued.

311But to this,

312 the accountantship only

313 would be an insuperable obstacle;

314 it would require

315 in every the most inferior agent,

316 a profound knowledge of accounts,

317 and would impose,

318 both on principals and subordinates,

319 the duty of keeping

320 such a multiplicity of them,

321 as, if even practicable,

322 would exhaust the funds

323 issued for the public service,

324 in mere clerkship.

325Another most mischievous consequence

326 would ensue.

327The exigencies of the public service

328 are often so variable,

329 that a public agent

330 would frequently find himself

331 full-handed for one purpose,

332 empty-handed for another,

333 and if forbidden to make a transfer,

334 not only the service would suffer,

335 but an opportunity,

336 with very strong temptation,

337 would be given,

338 to traffic with the public money

339 for private gain;

340 while the business of the government

341 would be stagnated

342 by the injudicious and absurd impediments

343 of an over-driven caution.

344Happily, it is not very material

345 that the principle

346 of distinct appropriations

347 for separate objects,

348 should be carried

349 through all the details.

350The essential ends of it are answered,

351 if it be strictly pursued,

352 in the issuing of money

353 from the Treasury,

354 and if this department be careful

355 that the principal lines

356 of discrimination

357 are not transgressed.

358The theory of the Message

359 plainly contemplates,

360 that in no case

361 shall the actual money

362 appertaining to one fund,

363 be expended

364 for the purpose of another;

365 though each fund

366 may be sufficient for its object,

367 and though there may be

368 an appropriation for each object.

369This is another excess of theory;

370 which, with a full treasury,

371 would often disable the government

372 from fulfilling its engagements,

373 and from carrying on

374 the public business.

375To execute this plan,

376 consistently with the exigencies

377 of national expenditure,

378 would probably require, in ordinary,

379 a triplication of the revenues,

380 or a capital necessary

381 for the whole amount

382 of that expenditure,

383 and would very often lock up

384 from circulation large sums,

385 which might be of great importance

386 to the activity of trade and industry.

387Such are the endless blessings

388 to be expected

389 from the notable schemes

390 of a philosophic projector!

391 Strict to a fault,

392 where relaxation is necessary;

393 lax to a vice,

394 where strictness is essential!

395As to "reducing the undefined field

396 of contingencies,

397 and circumscribing

398 discretionary powers over money,"

399 observations similar

400 to those which have been already made,

401 occur.

402The term reducing, implies,

403 that the thing must exist in a degree;

404 and indeed it is manifest,

405 that all the minute casualties

406 of expenditure,

407 especially in the naval

408 and military departments,

409 cannot be foreseen and defined.

410The question then must be,

411 have not the limits

412 been sufficiently narrow

413 for the situation of the government,

414 in the scenes

415 through which it has passed;

416 comprehending for a great part

417 of the time

418 Indian wars

419 and foreign hostilities?

420Certainly, if viewed

421 on a proportionable scale,

422 the extent appears to have been

423 as moderate as could have been desired;

424 and no blame can justly attach

425 to the administration,

426 on this account.

427As to "bringing back

428 to a single department

429 all accountabilities for money,"

430 there never has been a deviation

431 from that system.

432The department of the Treasury

433 has uniformly preserved

434 a vigilant superintendence

435 over all accountabilities

436 for public money.

437A particular accountant, indeed,

438 has been appointed

439 in the War and Navy departments,

440 but he has been subordinate

441 to the Treasury department,

442 which has prescribed regulations

443 for his conduct,

444 and has constantly revised

445 his proceedings.

446It is true,

447 that by his connection

448 with the particular department

449 for which he is accountant,

450 there are cases

451 in which he is to be guided

452 by the directions

453 of the head of that department;

454 but though these directions,

455 if not plainly contrary

456 to the rules prescribed

457 by the Treasury,

458 would exempt him

459 from responsibility,

460 the directions themselves

461 pass under the review

462 of the Treasury,

463 as a check

464 upon the head of the department

465 to which he is attached;

466 and in case of abuse,

467 they would serve to establish

468 a responsibility of the principal.

469To say that this interferes

470 with a prompt examination of accounts,

471 is to affirm

472 that a division of labor

473 is injurious to dispatch;

474 a position contrary to all experience.

475The fact, without doubt, is,

476 that it essentially contributes

477 to dispatch;

478 and that whatever new modification

479 may be adopted,

480 either the accounts

481 of the other departments

482 will never keep pace

483 with the current of business

484 in times of activity,

485 or that modification

486 must adhere to the principle

487 of employing distinct organs.

488If it be the design to exclude,

489 in every case,

490 the intervention

491 of the head

492 of the particular department,

493 some or all of these evils will follow:

494 The service of that department

495 will suffer

496 by unduly restricting its head,

497 in cases in which he must be

498 the most competent judge;

499 and by obliging him,

500 in order to avoid eventual difficulties,

501 to resort, in the first instance,

502 to another department,

503 less alive than himself

504 to the exigencies of his own,

505 for a cautious and slow,

506 perhaps a reluctant acquiescence

507 in arrangements

508 which require promptness;

509 if in the spirit

510 of confidence and accommodation,

511 the officers of the Treasury

512 yield a ready compliance

513 with the wishes

514 of the head of such department,

515 they may inadvertently co-operate

516 in measures

517 which they would have disapproved

518 and corrected

519 on a deliberate

520 and impartial revision.

521If this spirit be not shown,

522 not only the immediate service

523 of the department

524 may be improperly impeded,

525 but sensations unfriendly

526 to the due harmony

527 of the different members

528 of the administration

529 may be engendered.

530On one side of the dilemma

531 stands collusion,

532 on the other discord.

533The existing plan

534 steers a middle and a prudent course;

535 neither fettering too much

536 the heads of the other departments

537 nor relinquishing too far

538 the requisite control

539 of the Treasury.

540Its opposite supposes

541 all trust may be placed

542 in one department—

543 none in the others.

544The extravagant jealousy

545 of the overbearing influence

546 of the Treasury department,

547 which was so conspicuous

548 in the times

549 of the two former secretaries,

550 has of a sudden given way

551 to unlimited confidence!

552The intention seems to be

553 to surround the brow

554 of their immaculate successor

555 with the collected rays

556 of legislative and executive favor!

557But vain will be the attempt

558 to add lustre

559 to the dim luminary

560 of a benighted administration!

561Lucius Crassus.

562New-York Evening Post, February 3, 1802.