1787 Federalist 85 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 85

2Concluding Remarks

3From MCLEAN's Edition, New York.

4HAMILTON

5To the People of the State of New York:

6ACCORDING to the formal division

7 of the subject of these papers,

8 announced in my first number,

9 there would appear still to remain for discussion

10 two points:

11 "the analogy of the proposed government

12 to your own State constitution,"

13 and "the additional security which its adoption

14 will afford to republican government,

15 to liberty, and to property."

16But these heads have been so fully anticipated

17 and exhausted in the progress of the work,

18 that it would now scarcely be possible

19 to do any thing more than repeat,

20 in a more dilated form,

21 what has been heretofore said,

22 which the advanced stage of the question,

23 and the time already spent upon it,

24 conspire to forbid.

25It is remarkable,

26 that the resemblance of the plan of the convention

27 to the act which organizes the government

28 of this State

29 holds, not less with regard

30 to many of the supposed defects,

31 than to the real excellences of the former.

32Among the pretended defects

33 are the re-eligibility of the Executive,

34 the want of a council,

35 the omission of a formal bill of rights,

36 the omission of a provision

37 respecting the liberty of the press.

38These and several others

39 which have been noted in the course of our inquiries

40 are as much chargeable

41 on the existing constitution of this State,

42 as on the one proposed for the Union;

43 and a man must have slender pretensions to consistency,

44 who can rail at the latter for imperfections

45 which he finds no difficulty

46 in excusing in the former.

47Nor indeed can there be a better proof

48 of the insincerity and affectation

49 of some of the zealous adversaries

50 of the plan of the convention among us,

51 who profess to be the devoted admirers

52 of the government under which they live,

53 than the fury with which they have attacked

54 that plan,

55 for matters in regard to which our own constitution

56 is equally or perhaps more vulnerable.

57The additional securities to republican government,

58 to liberty and to property,

59 to be derived from the adoption of the plan

60 under consideration,

61 consist chiefly in the restraints

62 which the preservation of the Union will impose

63 on local factions and insurrections,

64 and on the ambition of powerful individuals

65 in single States,

66 who may acquire credit and influence enough,

67 from leaders and favorites,

68 to become the despots of the people;

69 in the diminution of the opportunities

70 to foreign intrigue,

71 which the dissolution of the Confederacy

72 would invite and facilitate;

73 in the prevention of extensive military establishments,

74 which could not fail to grow out of wars

75 between the States in a disunited situation;

76 in the express guaranty of a republican form

77 of government

78 to each;

79 in the absolute and universal exclusion

80 of titles of nobility;

81 and in the precautions against the repetition

82 of those practices on the part

83 of the State governments

84 which have undermined the foundations

85 of property and credit,

86 have planted mutual distrust

87 in the breasts of all classes of citizens,

88 and have occasioned an almost universal

89 prostration of morals.

90Thus have I, fellow-citizens,

91 executed the task I had assigned to myself;

92 with what success, your conduct must determine.

93I trust at least you will admit

94 that I have not failed in the assurance I gave you

95 respecting the spirit

96 with which my endeavors should be conducted.

97I have addressed myself purely to your judgments,

98 and have studiously avoided those asperities

99 which are too apt to disgrace political disputants

100 of all parties,

101 and which have been not a little provoked

102 by the language and conduct

103 of the opponents of the Constitution.

104The charge of a conspiracy

105 against the liberties of the people,

106 which has been indiscriminately brought

107 against the advocates of the plan,

108 has something in it too wanton and too malignant,

109 not to excite the indignation of every man

110 who feels in his own bosom

111 a refutation of the calumny.

112The perpetual changes which have been rung

113 upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great,

114 have been such as to inspire the disgust

115 of all sensible men.

116And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations

117 which have been in various ways practiced

118 to keep the truth from the public eye,

119 have been of a nature

120 to demand the reprobation of all honest men.

121It is not impossible

122 that these circumstances may have occasionally

123 betrayed me into intemperances of expression

124 which I did not intend;

125 it is certain that I have frequently felt a struggle

126 between sensibility and moderation;

127 and if the former has in some instances prevailed,

128 it must be my excuse

129 that it has been neither often nor much.

130Let us now pause and ask ourselves

131 whether, in the course of these papers,

132 the proposed Constitution has not been

133 satisfactorily vindicated

134 from the aspersions thrown upon it;

135 and whether it has not been shown

136 to be worthy of the public approbation,

137 and necessary to the public safety and prosperity.

138Every man is bound to answer these questions to himself,

139 according to the best of his conscience

140 and understanding,

141 and to act agreeably to the genuine and sober dictates

142 of his judgment.

143This is a duty from which nothing

144 can give him a dispensation.

145'T is one that he is called upon, nay, constrained

146 by all the obligations that form the bands of society,

147 to discharge sincerely and honestly.

148No partial motive, no particular interest,

149 no pride of opinion,

150 no temporary passion or prejudice,

151 will justify to himself, to his country,

152 or to his posterity,

153 an improper election of the part he is to act.

154Let him beware of an obstinate adherence to party;

155 let him reflect that the object

156 upon which he is to decide

157 is not a particular interest of the community,

158 but the very existence of the nation;

159 and let him remember

160 that a majority of America has already given

161 its sanction to the plan

162 which he is to approve or reject.

163I shall not dissemble

164 that I feel an entire confidence

165 in the arguments which recommend

166 the proposed system to your adoption,

167 and that I am unable to discern any real force

168 in those by which it has been opposed.

169I am persuaded that it is the best

170 which our political situation, habits, and opinions

171 will admit,

172 and superior to any the revolution has produced.

173Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan,

174 that it has not a claim to absolute perfection,

175 have afforded matter of no small triumph

176 to its enemies.

177"Why," say they, "should we adopt an imperfect thing?

178Why not amend it and make it perfect

179 before it is irrevocably established?"

180This may be plausible enough, but it is only plausible.

181In the first place I remark,

182 that the extent of these concessions

183 has been greatly exaggerated.

184They have been stated as amounting to an admission

185 that the plan is radically defective,

186 and that without material alterations

187 the rights and the interests of the community

188 cannot be safely confided to it.

189This, as far as I have understood the meaning

190 of those who make the concessions,

191 is an entire perversion of their sense.

192No advocate of the measure can be found,

193 who will not declare as his sentiment,

194 that the system, though it may not be perfect

195 in every part, is, upon the whole, a good one;

196 is the best that the present views

197 and circumstances

198 of the country will permit;

199 and is such an one as promises every species

200 of security

201 which a reasonable people can desire.

202I answer in the next place,

203 that I should esteem it the extreme of imprudence

204 to prolong the precarious state

205 of our national affairs,

206 and to expose the Union to the jeopardy

207 of successive experiments,

208 in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan.

209I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man.

210The result of the deliberations of all collective bodies

211 must necessarily be a compound,

212 as well of the errors and prejudices,

213 as of the good sense and wisdom,

214 of the individuals of whom they are composed.

215The compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States

216 in a common bond of amity and union,

217 must as necessarily be a compromise

218 of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations.

219How can perfection spring from such materials?

220The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet

221 lately published in this city, 1

222 are unanswerable to show the utter improbability

223 of assembling a new convention,

224 under circumstances in any degree so favorable

225 to a happy issue,

226 as those in which the late convention met,

227 deliberated, and concluded.

228I will not repeat the arguments there used,

229 as I presume the production itself

230 has had an extensive circulation.

231It is certainly well worthy the perusal

232 of every friend to his country.

233There is, however, one point of light

234 in which the subject of amendments

235 still remains to be considered,

236 and in which it has not yet been exhibited

237 to public view.

238I cannot resolve to conclude

239 without first taking a survey of it in this aspect.

240It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration,

241 that it will be far more easy

242 to obtain subsequent than previous amendments

243 to the Constitution.

244The moment an alteration is made in the present plan,

245 it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one,

246 and must undergo a new decision of each State.

247To its complete establishment throughout the Union,

248 it will therefore require the concurrence

249 of thirteen States.

250If, on the contrary,

251 the Constitution proposed should once be ratified

252 by all the States as it stands,

253 alterations in it may at any time

254 be effected by nine States.

255Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to nine 2

256 in favor of subsequent amendment,

257 rather than of the original adoption

258 of an entire system.

259This is not all.

260Every Constitution for the United States

261 must inevitably consist of a great variety

262 of particulars,

263 in which thirteen independent States

264 are to be accommodated

265 in their interests or opinions of interest.

266We may of course expect to see,

267 in any body of men charged with its original formation,

268 very different combinations of the parts

269 upon different points.

270Many of those who form a majority on one question,

271 may become the minority on a second,

272 and an association dissimilar to either

273 may constitute the majority on a third.

274Hence the necessity of moulding and arranging

275 all the particulars which are to compose the whole,

276 in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties

277 to the compact;

278 and hence, also, an immense multiplication

279 of difficulties and casualties

280 in obtaining the collective assent to a final act.

281The degree of that multiplication must evidently be

282 in a ratio to the number of particulars

283 and the number of parties.

284But every amendment to the Constitution,

285 if once established, would be a single proposition,

286 and might be brought forward singly.

287There would then be no necessity

288 for management or compromise,

289 in relation to any other point

290 no giving nor taking.

291The will of the requisite number

292 would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue.

293And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States,

294 were united in the desire of a particular amendment,

295 that amendment must infallibly take place.

296There can, therefore, be no comparison

297 between the facility of affecting an amendment,

298 and that of establishing in the first instance

299 a complete Constitution.

300In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments,

301 it has been urged

302 that the persons delegated to the administration

303 of the national government

304 will always be disinclined to yield up

305 any portion of the authority

306 of which they were once possessed.

307For my own part I acknowledge a thorough conviction

308 that any amendments which may,

309 upon mature consideration,

310 be thought useful,

311 will be applicable to the organization

312 of the government, not to the mass of its powers;

313 and on this account alone,

314 I think there is no weight

315 in the observation just stated.

316I also think there is little weight in it

317 on another account.

318The intrinsic difficulty of governing thirteen States

319 at any rate,

320 independent of calculations

321 upon an ordinary degree of public spirit

322 and integrity,

323 will, in my opinion constantly impose

324 on the national rulers the necessity

325 of a spirit of accommodation

326 to the reasonable expectations

327 of their constituents.

328But there is yet a further consideration,

329 which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt,

330 that the observation is futile.

331It is this that the national rulers,

332 whenever nine States concur,

333 will have no option upon the subject.

334By the fifth article of the plan,

335 the Congres will be obliged

336 "on the application of the legislatures

337 of two thirds of the States

338 (which at present amount to nine),

339 to call a convention for proposing amendments,

340 which shall be valid,

341 to all intents and purposes,

342 as part of the Constitution,

343 when ratified by the legislatures

344 of three fourths of the States,

345 or by conventions in three fourths thereof."

346The words of this article are peremptory.

347The Congress "shall call a convention."

348Nothing in this particular

349 is left to the discretion of that body.

350And of consequence,

351 all the declamation about the disinclination

352 to a change

353 vanishes in air.

354Nor however difficult it may be supposed

355 to unite two thirds or three fourths

356 of the State legislatures,

357 in amendments which may affect local interests,

358 can there be any room to apprehend

359 any such difficulty

360 in a union on points

361 which are merely relative

362 to the general liberty or security of the people.

363We may safely rely on the disposition

364 of the State legislatures

365 to erect barriers against the encroachments

366 of the national authority.

367If the foregoing argument is a fallacy,

368 certain it is that I am myself deceived by it,

369 for it is, in my conception,

370 one of those rare instances

371 in which a political truth can be brought

372 to the test of a mathematical demonstration.

373Those who see the matter in the same light with me,

374 however zealous they may be for amendments,

375 must agree in the propriety of a previous adoption,

376 as the most direct road to their own object.

377The zeal for attempts to amend,

378 prior to the establishment of the Constitution,

379 must abate in every man

380 who is ready to accede to the truth

381 of the following observations

382 of a writer equally solid and ingenious:

383 "To balance a large state or society (says he),

384 whether monarchical or republican, on general laws,

385 is a work of so great difficulty,

386 that no human genius, however comprehensive,

387 is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection,

388 to effect it.

389 The judgments of many must unite in the work;

390 experience must guide their labor;

391 time must bring it to perfection,

392 and the feeling of inconveniences

393 must correct the mistakes

394 which they INEVITABLY fall into

395 in their first trials and experiments." 3

396These judicious reflections contain a lesson of moderation

397 to all the sincere lovers of the Union,

398 and ought to put them upon their guard

399 against hazarding anarchy, civil war,

400 a perpetual alienation of the States

401 from each other,

402 and perhaps the military despotism

403 of a victorious demagogue,

404 in the pursuit of what they are not

405 likely to obtain,

406 but from time and experience.

407It may be in me a defect of political fortitude,

408 but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain

409 an equal tranquillity with those

410 who affect to treat the dangers

411 of a longer continuance in our present situation

412 as imaginary.

413A nation, without a national government,

414 is, in my view, an awful spectacle.

415The establishment of a Constitution,

416 in time of profound peace,

417 by the voluntary consent of a whole people,

418 is a prodigy,

419 to the completion of which I look forward

420 with trembling anxiety.

421I can reconcile it to no rules of prudence

422 to let go the hold we now have,

423 in so arduous an enterprise,

424 upon seven out of the thirteen States,

425 and after having passed over

426 so considerable a part of the ground,

427 to recommence the course.

428I dread the more the consequences of new attempts,

429 because I know that powerful individuals,

430 in this and in other States,

431 are enemies to a general national government

432 in every possible shape.

433PUBLIUS.

4341 Entitled "An Address to the People

435 of the State of New York."

4362 It may rather be said TEN,

437 for though two thirds may set on foot the measure,

438 three fourths must ratify.

4393 Hume's "Essays,'' vol. i., page 128:

440 "The Rise of Arts and Sciences."