1787 Federalist 70 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 70

2The Executive Department Further Considered

3From the New York Packet.

4Tuesday, March 18, 1788.

5HAMILTON

6To the People of the State of New York:

7THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates,

8 that a vigorous Executive is inconsistent

9 with the genius of republican government.

10The enlightened well-wishers to this species of government

11 must at least hope

12 that the supposition is destitute of foundation;

13 since they can never admit its truth,

14 without at the same time admitting

15 the condemnation of their own principles.

16Energy in the Executive

17 is a leading character in the definition

18 of good government.

19It is essential to the protection of the community

20 against foreign attacks;

21 it is not less essential

22 to the steady administration of the laws;

23 to the protection of property

24 against those irregular

25 and high-handed combinations

26 which sometimes interrupt

27 the ordinary course of justice;

28 to the security of liberty

29 against the enterprises and assaults of ambition,

30 of faction, and of anarchy.

31Every man the least conversant in Roman story,

32 knows how often that republic was obliged

33 to take refuge in the absolute power

34 of a single man,

35 under the formidable title of Dictator,

36 as well against the intrigues

37 of ambitious individuals

38 who aspired to the tyranny,

39 and the seditions of whole classes of the community

40 whose conduct threatened

41 the existence of all government,

42 as against the invasions of external enemies

43 who menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.

44There can be no need, however,

45 to multiply arguments or examples on this head.

46A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution

47 of the government.

48A feeble execution is but another phrase

49 for a bad execution;

50 and a government ill executed,

51 whatever it may be in theory,

52 must be, in practice, a bad government.

53Taking it for granted, therefore,

54 that all men of sense will agree

55 in the necessity of an energetic Executive,

56 it will only remain to inquire,

57 what are the ingredients

58 which constitute this energy?

59How far can they be combined

60 with those other ingredients

61 which constitute safety in the republican sense?

62And how far does this combination characterize

63 the plan which has been reported by the convention?

64The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive

65 are, first, unity;

66 secondly, duration;

67 thirdly, an adequate provision for its support;

68 fourthly, competent powers.

69The ingredients which constitute safety

70 in the repub lican sense are,

71 first, a due dependence on the people,

72 secondly, a due responsibility.

73Those politicians and statesmen

74 who have been the most celebrated

75 for the soundness of their principles

76 and for the justice of their views,

77 have declared in favor of a single Executive

78 and a numerous legislature.

79They have with great propriety,

80 considered energy as the most necessary qualification

81 of the former,

82 and have regarded this as most applicable

83 to power in a single hand,

84 while they have, with equal propriety,

85 considered the latter

86 as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom,

87 and best calculated

88 to conciliate the confidence of the people

89 and to secure their privileges and interests.

90That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed.

91Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch

92 will generally characterize the proceedings of one man

93 in a much more eminent degree

94 than the proceedings of any greater number;

95 and in proportion as the number is increased,

96 these qualities will be diminished.

97This unity may be destroyed in two ways:

98 either by vesting the power

99 in two or more magistrates

100 of equal dignity and authority;

101 or by vesting it ostensibly in one man,

102 subject, in whole or in part,

103 to the control and co-operation of others,

104 in the capacity of counsellors to him.

105Of the first,

106 the two Consuls of Rome may serve as an example;

107 of the last, we shall find examples

108 in the constitutions of several of the States.

109New York and New Jersey, if I recollect right,

110 are the only States which have intrusted

111 the executive authority wholly to single men. 1

112Both these methods of destroying the unity

113 of the Executive have their partisans;

114 but the votaries of an executive council

115 are the most numerous.

116They are both liable, if not to equal,

117 to similar objections,

118 and may in most lights be examined in conjunction.

119The experience of other nations

120 will afford little instruction on this head.

121As far, however, as it teaches any thing,

122 it teaches us not to be enamoured

123 of plurality in the Executive.

124We have seen that the Achaeans,

125 on an experiment of two Praetors,

126 were induced to abolish one.

127The Roman history records many instances

128 of mischiefs to the republic

129 from the dissensions between the Consuls,

130 and between the military Tribunes,

131 who were at times substituted for the Consuls.

132But it gives us no specimens

133 of any peculiar advantages derived to the state

134 from the circumstance of the plurality

135 of those magistrates.

136That the dissensions between them

137 were not more frequent or more fatal,

138 is a matter of astonishment,

139 until we advert to the singular position

140 in which the republic

141 was almost continually placed,

142 and to the prudent policy

143 pointed out by the circumstances of the state,

144 and pursued by the Consuls,

145 of making a division

146 of the government between them.

147The patricians engaged in a perpetual struggle

148 with the plebeians

149 for the preservation of their ancient authorities

150 and dignities;

151 the Consuls, who were generally chosen

152 out of the former body,

153 were commonly united by the personal interest

154 they had in the defense

155 of the privileges of their order.

156In addition to this motive of union,

157 after the arms of the republic

158 had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire,

159 it became an established custom with the Consuls

160 to divide the administration between themselves

161 by lot one of them remaining at Rome

162 to govern the city and its environs,

163 the other taking the command

164 in the more distant provinces.

165This expedient must, no doubt,

166 have had great influence

167 in preventing those collisions and rivalships

168 which might otherwise have embroiled

169 the peace of the republic.

170But quitting the dim light of historical research,

171 attaching ourselves purely

172 to the dictates of reason and good se se,

173 we shall discover much greater cause to reject

174 than to approve the idea of plurality

175 in the Executive,

176 under any modification whatever.

177Wherever two or more persons are engaged

178 in any common enterprise or pursuit,

179 there is always danger of difference of opinion.

180If it be a public trust or office,

181 in which they are clothed

182 with equal dignity and authority,

183 there is peculiar danger of personal emulation

184 and even animosity.

185From either, and especially from all these causes,

186 the most bitter dissensions are apt to spring.

187Whenever these happen,

188 they lessen the respectability,

189 weaken the authority,

190 and distract the plans and operation

191 of those whom they divide.

192If they should unfortunately assail

193 the supreme executive magistracy of a country,

194 consisting of a plurality of persons,

195 they might impede or frustrate

196 the most important measures of the government,

197 in the most critical emergencies of the state.

198And what is still worse,

199 they might split the community

200 into the most violent and irreconcilable factions,

201 adhering differently to the different individuals

202 who composed the magistracy.

203Men often oppose a thing,

204 merely because they have had no agency in planning it,

205 or because it may have been planned

206 by those whom they dislike.

207But if they have been consulted,

208 and have happened to disapprove,

209 opposition then becomes, in their estimation,

210 an indispensable duty of self-love.

211They seem to think themselves bound in honor,

212 and by all the motives of personal infallibility,

213 to defeat the success of what has been resolved upon

214 contrary to their sentiments.

215Men of upright, benevolent tempers

216 have too many opportunities of remarking, with horror,

217 to what desperate lengths

218 this disposition is sometimes carried,

219 and how often the great interests of society

220 are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit,

221 and to the obstinacy of individuals,

222 who have credit enough

223 to make their passions and their caprices

224 interesting to mankind.

225Perhaps the question now before the public may,

226 in its consequences, afford melancholy proofs

227 of the effects of this despicable frailty,

228 or rather detestable vice,

229 in the human character.

230Upon the principles of a free government,

231 inconveniences from the source just mentioned

232 must necessarily be submitted to

233 in the formation of the legislature;

234 but it is unnecessary, and therefore unwise,

235 to introduce them into the constitution

236 of the Executive.

237It is here too that they may be most pernicious.

238In the legislature,

239 promptitude of decision is oftener an evil

240 than a benefit.

241The differences of opinion,

242 and the jarrings of parties

243 in that department of the government,

244 though they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans,

245 yet often promote deliberation and circumspection,

246 and serve to check excesses in the majority.

247When a resolution too is once taken,

248 the opposition must be at an end.

249That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable.

250But no favorable circumstances

251 palliate or atone for the disadvantages

252 of dissension in the executive department.

253Here, they are pure and unmixed.

254There is no point at which they cease to operate.

255They serve to embarrass and weaken the execution

256 of the plan or measure to which they relate,

257 from the first step to the final conclusion of it.

258They constantly counteract those qualities

259 in the Executive

260 which are the most necessary ingredients

261 in its composition, vigor and expedition,

262 and this without anycounterbalancing good.

263In the conduct of war,

264 in which the energy of the Executive

265 is the bulwark of the national security,

266 every thing would be to be apprehended

267 from its plurality.

268It must be confessed

269 that these observations apply with principal weight

270 to the first case supposed

271 that is, to a plurality of magistrates

272 of equal dignity and authority

273 a scheme, the advocates for which

274 are not likely to form a numerous sect;

275 but they apply, though not with equal,

276 yet with considerable weight

277 to the project of a council,

278 whose concurrence is made

279 constitutionally necessary

280 to the operations of the ostensible Executive.

281An artful cabal in that council

282 would be able to distract and to enervate

283 the whole system of administration.

284If no such cabal should exist,

285 the mere diversity of views and opinions

286 would alone be sufficient

287 to tincture the exercise of the executive authority

288 with a spirit of habitual feebleness

289 and dilatoriness.

290But one of the weightiest objections

291 to a plurality in the Executive,

292 and which lies as much against the last

293 as the first plan,

294 is, that it tends to conceal faults

295 and destroy responsibility.

296Responsibility is of two kinds

297 to censure and to punishment.

298The first is the more important of the two,

299 especially in an elective office.

300Man, in public trust,

301 will much oftener act in such a manner

302 as to render him unworthy

303 of being any longer trusted,

304 than in such a manner

305 as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment.

306But the multiplication of the Executive

307 adds to the difficulty of detection in either case.

308It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations,

309 to determine on whom the blame or the punishment

310 of a pernicious measure,

311 or series of pernicious measures,

312 ought really to fall.

313It is shifted from one to another

314 with so much dexterity,

315 and under such plausible appearances,

316 that the public opinion is left in suspense

317 about the real author.

318The circumstances which may have led

319 to any national miscarriage or misfortune

320 are sometimes so complicated

321 that, where there are a number of actors

322 who may have had different degrees

323 and kinds of agency,

324 though we may clearly see upon the whole

325 that there has been mismanagement,

326 yet it may be impracticable to pronounce

327 to whose account the evil

328 which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.

329"I was overruled by my council.

330The council were so divided in their opinions

331 that it was impossible to obtain

332 any better resolution on the point."

333These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand,

334 whether true or false.

335And who is there that will either take the trouble

336 or incur the odium,

337 of a strict scrunity

338 into the secret springs of the transaction?

339Should there be found a citizen

340 zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task,

341 if there happen to be collusion

342 between the parties concerned,

343 how easy it is to clothe the circumstances

344 with so much ambiguity,

345 as to render it uncertain

346 what was the precise conduct

347 of any of those parties?

348In the single instance

349 in which the governor of this State

350 is coupled with a council

351 that is, in the appointment to offices,

352 we have seen the mischiefs of it

353 in the view now under consideration.

354Scandalous appointments to important offices

355 have been made.

356Some cases, indeed, have been so flagrant

357 that ALL PARTIES have agreed

358 in the impropriety of the thing.

359When inquiry has been made,

360 the blame has been laid by the governor

361 on the members of the council,

362 who, on their part,

363 have charged it upon his nomination;

364 while the people remain altogether at a loss

365 to determine, by whose influence

366 their interests have been committed

367 to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper.

368In tenderness to individuals,

369 I forbear to descend to particulars.

370It is evident from these considerations,

371 that the plurality of the Executive

372 tends to deprive the people

373 of the two greatest securities they can have

374 for the faithful exercise of any delegated power,

375 first, the restraints of public opinion,

376 which lose their efficacy,

377 as well on account of the division of the censure

378 attendant on bad measures among a number,

379 as on account of the uncertainty

380 on whom it ought to fall;

381 and, secondly, the opportunity of discovering

382 with facility and clearness

383 the misconduct of the persons they trust,

384 in order either to their removal from office

385 or to their actual punishment

386 in cases which admit of it.

387In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate;

388 and it is a maxim which has obtained

389 for the sake of the pub lic peace,

390 that he is unaccountable for his administration,

391 and his person sacred.

392Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom,

393 than to annex to the king a constitutional council,

394 who may be responsible to the nation

395 for the advice they give.

396Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever

397 in the executive department

398 an idea inadmissible in a free government.

399But even there the king is not bound

400 by the resolutions of his council,

401 though they are answerable for the advice they give.

402He is the absolute master of his own conduct

403 in the exercise of his office,

404 and may observe or disregard the counsel given to him

405 at his sole discretion.

406But in a republic,

407 where every magistrate ought to be

408 personally responsible

409 for his behavior in office

410 the reason which in the British Constitution

411 dictates the propriety of a council,

412 not only ceases to apply,

413 but turns against the institution.

414In the monarchy of Great Britain,

415 it furnishes a substitute

416 for the prohibited responsibility

417 of the chief magistrate,

418 which serves in some degree as a hostage

419 to the national justice for his good behavior.

420In the American republic,

421 it would serve to destroy,

422 or would greatly diminish,

423 the intended and necessary responsibility

424 of the Chief Magistrate himself.

425The idea of a council to the Executive,

426 which has so generally obtained

427 in the State constitutions,

428 has been derived from that maxim of republican jealousy

429 which considers power as safer

430 in the hands of a number of men

431 than of a single man.

432If the maxim should be admitted

433 to be applicable to the case,

434 I should contend

435 that the advantage on that side

436 would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages

437 on the opposite side.

438But I do not think the rule at all applicable

439 to the executive power.

440I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular,

441 with a writer whom the celebrated Junius

442 pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious,"

443 that "the executive power is more easily confined

444 when it is ONE"; 2

445 that it is far more safe

446 there should be a single object

447 for the jealousy and watchfulness of the people;

448 and, in a word,

449 that all multiplication of the Executive

450 is rather dangerous than friendly to liberty.

451A little consideration will satisfy us,

452 that the species of security sought for

453 in the multiplication of the Executive,

454 is nattainable.

455Numbers must be so great

456 as to render combination difficult,

457 or they are rather a source of danger than of security.

458The united credit and influence of several individuals

459 must be more formidable to liberty,

460 than the credit and influence

461 of either of them separately.

462When power, therefore, is placed

463 in the hands of so small a number of men,

464 as to admit of their interests and views

465 being easily combined in a common enterprise,

466 by an artful leader,

467 it becomes more liable to abuse,

468 and more dangerous when abused,

469 than if it be lodged in the hands of one man;

470 who, from the very circumstance of his being alone,

471 will be more narrowly watched

472 and more readily suspected,

473 and who cannot unite so great a mass of influence

474 as when he is associated with others.

475The Decemvirs of Rome,

476 whose name denotes their number, 3

477 were more to be dreaded in their usurpation

478 than any ONE of them would have been.

479No person would think of proposing an Executive

480 much more numerous than that body;

481 from six to a dozen have been suggested

482 for the number of the council.

483The extreme of these numbers,

484 is not too great for an easy combination;

485 and from such a combination America

486 would have more to fear,

487 than from the ambition of any single individual.

488A council to a magistrate,

489 who is himself responsible for what he does,

490 are generally nothing better

491 than a clog upon his good intentions,

492 are often the instruments

493 and accomplices of his bad

494 and are almost always a cloak to his faults.

495I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense;

496 though it be evident

497 that if the council should be numerous enough

498 to answer the principal end aimed at

499 by the institution,

500 the salaries of the members,

501 who must be drawn from their homes

502 to reside at the seat of government,

503 would form an item

504 in the catalogue of public expenditures

505 too serious to be incurred

506 for an object of equivocal utility.

507I will only add that,

508 prior to the appearance of the Constitution,

509 I rarely met with an intelligent man

510 from any of the States,

511 who did not admit, as the result of experience,

512 that the UNITY of the executive of this State

513 was one of the best of the distinguishing features

514 of our constitution.

515PUBLIUS.

5161 New York has no council

517 except for the single purpose of appointing to offices;

518 New Jersey has a council whom the governor may consult.

519But I think, from the terms of the constitution,

520 their resolutions do not bind him.

5212 De Lolme.

5223 Ten.