1787 Federalist 68 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 68

2The Mode of Electing the President

3From the New York Packet.

4Friday, March 14, 1788.

5HAMILTON

6To the People of the State of New York:

7THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate

8 of the United States

9 is almost the only part of the system,

10 of any consequence,

11 which has escaped without severe censure,

12 or which has received the slightest

13 mark of approbation

14 from its opponents.

15The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print,

16 has even deigned to admit

17 that the election of the President

18 is pretty well guarded. 1

19I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm,

20 that if the manner of it be not perfect,

21 it is at least excellent.

22It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages,

23 the union of which was to be wished for.

24It was desirable that the sense of the people

25 should operate in the choice of the person

26 to whom so important a trust was to be confided.

27This end will be answered

28 by committing the right of making it,

29 not to any preestablished body,

30 but to men chosen by the people

31 for the special purpose,

32 and at the particular conjuncture.

33It was equally desirable,

34 that the immediate election should be made

35 by men most capable of analyzing the qualities

36 adapted to the station,

37 and acting under circumstances

38 favorable to deliberation,

39 and to a judicious combination

40 of all the reasons and inducements

41 which were proper to govern their choice.

42A small number of persons,

43 selected by their fellow-citizens

44 from the general mass,

45 will be most likely to possess

46 the information and discernment

47 requisite to such complicated investigations.

48It was also peculiarly desirable

49 to afford as little opportunity as possible

50 to tumult and disorder.

51This evil was not least to be dreaded

52 in the election of a magistrate,

53 who was to have so important an agency

54 in the administration of the government

55 as the President of the United States.

56But the precautions which have been so happily concerted

57 in the system under consideration,

58 promise an effectual security against this mischief.

59The choice of SEVERAL,

60 to form an intermediate body of electors,

61 will be much less apt to convulse the community

62 with any extraordinary or violent movements,

63 than the choice of ONE

64 who was himself to be the final object

65 of the public wishes.

66And as the electors, chosen in each State,

67 are to assemble and vote in the State

68 in which they are chosen,

69 this detached and divided situation

70 will expose them much less to heats and ferments,

71 which might be communicated

72 from them to the people,

73 than if they were all to be convened at one time,

74 in one place.

75Nothing was more to be desired

76 than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed

77 to cabal, intrigue, and corruption.

78These most deadly adversaries of republican government

79 might naturally have been expected

80 to make their approaches

81 from more than one querter,

82 but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers

83 to gain an improper ascendant in our councils.

84How could they better gratify this,

85 than by raising a creature of their own

86 to the chief magistracy of the Union?

87But the convention have guarded against all danger

88 of this sort,

89 with the most provident and judicious attention.

90They have not made the appointment of the President

91 to depend on any preexisting bodies of men,

92 who might be tampered with beforehand

93 to prostitute their votes;

94 but they have referred it in the first instance

95 to an immediate act of the people of America,

96 to be exerted in the choice of persons

97 for the temporary and sole purpose

98 of making the appointment.

99And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust,

100 all those who from situation

101 might be suspected of too great devotion

102 to the President in office.

103No senator, representative,

104 or other person holding a place of trust or profit

105 under the United States,

106 can be of the numbers of the electors.

107Thus without corrupting the body of the people,

108 the immediate agents in the election

109 will at least enter upon the task

110 free from any sinister bias.

111Their transient existence, and their detached situation,

112 already taken notice of,

113 afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so,

114 to the conclusion of it.

115The business of corruption,

116 when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men,

117 requires time as well as means.

118Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them,

119 dispersed as they would be over thirteen States,

120 in any combinations founded upon motives,

121 which though they could not properly

122 be denominated corrupt,

123 might yet be of a nature to mislead them

124 from their duty.

125Another and no less important desideratum was,

126 that the Executive should be independent

127 for his continuance in office

128 on all but the people themselves.

129He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty

130 to his complaisance for those

131 whose favor was necessary

132 to the duration of his official consequence.

133This advantage will also be secured,

134 by making his re-election to depend

135 on a special body of representatives,

136 deputed by the society

137 for the single purpose

138 of making the important choice.

139All these advantages will happily combine

140 in the plan devised by the convention;

141 which is, that the people of each State

142 shall choose a number of persons as electors,

143 equal to the number of senators and representatives

144 of such State in the national government,

145 who shall assemble within the State,

146 and vote for some fit person as President.

147Their votes, thus given,

148 are to be transmitted to the seat

149 of the national government,

150 and the person who may happen to have a majority

151 of the whole number of votes

152 will be the President.

153But as a majority of the votes

154 might not always happen to centre in one man,

155 and as it might be unsafe

156 to permit less than a majority to be conclusive,

157 it is provided that, in such a contingency,

158 the House of Representatives shall select

159 out of the candidates

160 who shall have the five highest number of votes,

161 the man who in their opinion

162 may be best qualified for the office.

163The process of election affords a moral certainty,

164 that the office of President will never fall

165 to the lot of any man

166 who is not in an eminent degree endowed

167 with the requisite qualifications.

168Talents for low intrigue,

169 and the little arts of popularity,

170 may alone suffice to elevate a man

171 to the first honors in a single State;

172 but it will require other talents,

173 and a different kind of merit,

174 to establish him in the esteem and confidence

175 of the whole Union,

176 or of so considerable a portion of it

177 as would be necessary to make him

178 a successful candidate

179 for the distinguished office

180 of President of the United States.

181It will not be too strong to say,

182 that there will be a constant probability

183 of seeing the station filled

184 by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue.

185And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation

186 of the Constitution,

187 by those who are able to estimate the share

188 which the executive in every government

189 must necessarily have

190 in its good or ill administration.

191Though we cannot acquiesce

192 in the political heresy of the poet who says:

193 "For forms of government let fools contest

194 That which is best administered is best,"

195 yet we may safely pronounce,

196 that the true test of a good government

197 is its aptitude and tendency

198 to produce a good administration.

199The Vice-President is to be chosen

200 in the same manner with the President;

201 with this difference,

202 that the Senate is to do, in respect to the former,

203 what is to be done by the House of Representatives,

204 in respect to the latter.

205The appointment of an extraordinary person,

206 as Vice-President,

207 has been objected to as superfluous,

208 if not mischievous.

209It has been alleged,

210 that it would have been preferable

211 to have authorized the Senate

212 to elect out of their own body

213 an officer answering that description.

214But two considerations seem to justify

215 the ideas of the convention in this respect.

216One is, that to secure at all times

217 the possibility of a definite resolution of the body,

218 it is necessary that the President

219 should have only a casting vote.

220And to take the senator of any State

221 from his seat as senator,

222 to place him in that of President of the Senate,

223 would be to exchange, in regard to the State

224 from which he came,

225 a constant for a contingent vote.

226The other consideration is,

227 that as the Vice-President may occasionally become

228 a substitute for the President,

229 in the supreme executive magistracy,

230 all the reasons which recommend

231 the mode of election prescribed for the one,

232 apply with great if not with equal force

233 to the manner of appointing the other.

234It is remarkable that in this,

235 as in most other instances,

236 the objection which is made

237 would lie against the constitution of this State.

238We have a Lieutenant-Governor,

239 chosen by the people at large,

240 who presides in the Senate,

241 and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor,

242 in casualties similar to those

243 which would authorize the Vice-President

244 to exercise the authorities

245 and discharge the duties of the President.

246PUBLIUS.

2471 Vide FEDERAL FARMER.