1787 Federalist 63 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 63

2The Senate Continued

3For the Independent Journal.

4HAMILTON OR MADISON

5To the People of the State of New York:

6A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate,

7 is the want of a due sense of national character.

8Without a select and stable member of the government,

9 the esteem of foreign powers will not only be forfeited

10 by an unenlightened and variable policy,

11 proceeding from the causes already mentioned,

12 but the national councils will not possess

13 that sensibility to the opinion of the world,

14 which is perhaps not less necessary

15 in order to merit, than it is to obtain,

16 its respect and confidence.

17An attention to the judgment of other nations

18 is important to every government for two reasons:

19 the one is, that, independently of the merits

20 of any particular plan or measure,

21 it is desirable, on various accounts,

22 that it should appear to other nations

23 as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy;

24 the second is, that in doubtful cases,

25 particularly where the national councils

26 may be warped by some strong passion

27 or momentary interest,

28 the presumed or known opinion

29 of the impartial world

30 may be the best guide that can be followed.

31What has not America lost

32 by her want of character with foreign nations;

33 and how many errors and follies

34 would she not have avoided,

35 if the justice and propriety of her measures had,

36 in every instance, been previously tried

37 by the light in which they would probably appear

38 to the unbiased part of mankind?

39Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be,

40 it is evident that it can never

41 be sufficiently possessed

42 by a numerous and changeable body.

43It can only be found in a number so small

44 that a sensible degree of the praise and blame

45 of public measures

46 may be the portion of each individual;

47 or in an assembly so durably invested

48 with public trust,

49 that the pride and consequence of its members

50 may be sensibly incorporated

51 with the reputation and prosperity

52 of the community.

53The half-yearly representatives of Rhode Island

54 would probably have been little affected

55 in their deliberations

56 on the iniquitous measures of that State,

57 by arguments drawn from the light

58 in which such measures would be viewed

59 by foreign nations, or even by the sister States;

60 whilst it can scarcely be doubted

61 that if the concurrence of a select and stable body

62 had been necessary,

63 a regard to national character alone

64 would have prevented the calamities

65 under which that misguided people is now laboring.

66I add, as a SIXTH defect

67 the want, in some important cases,

68 of a due responsibility in the government

69 to the people,

70 arising from that frequency of elections

71 which in other cases produces this responsibility.

72This remark will, perhaps, appear not only new,

73 but paradoxical.

74It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained,

75 to be as undeniable as it is important.

76Responsibility, in order to be reasonable,

77 must be limited to objects

78 within the power of the responsible party,

79 and in order to be effectual,

80 must relate to operations of that power,

81 of which a ready and proper judgment

82 can be formed by the constituents.

83The objects of government may be divided

84 into two general classes:

85 the one depending on measures

86 which have singly an immediate

87 and sensible operation;

88 the other depending on a succession

89 of well-chosen and well-connected measures,

90 which have a gradual

91 and perhaps unobserved operation.

92The importance of the latter description

93 to the collective and permanent welfare

94 of every country, needs no explanation.

95And yet it is evident

96 that an assembly elected for so short a term

97 as to be unable to provide more

98 than one or two links

99 in a chain of measures,

100 on which the general welfare

101 may essentially depend,

102 ought not to be answerable for the final result,

103 any more than a steward or tenant,

104 engaged for one year,

105 could be justly made to answer

106 for places or improvements

107 which could not be accomplished

108 in less than half a dozen years.

109Nor is it possible for the people to estimate

110 the SHARE of influence

111 which their annual assemblies

112 may respectively have on events

113 resulting from the mixed transactions

114 of several years.

115It is sufficiently difficult

116 to preserve a personal responsibility

117 in the members of a NUMEROUS body,

118 for such acts of the body

119 as have an immediate, detached,

120 and palpable operation on its constituents.

121The proper remedy for this defect

122 must be an additional body

123 in the legislative department,

124 which, having sufficient permanency

125 to provide for such objects

126 as require a continued attention,

127 and a train of measures,

128 may be justly and effectually answerable

129 for the attainment of those objects.

130Thus far I have considered the circumstances

131 which point out the necessity

132 of a well-constructed Senate

133 only as they relate

134 to the representatives of the people.

135To a people as little blinded by prejudice

136 or corrupted by flattery

137 as those whom I address,

138 I shall not scruple to add,

139 that such an institution may be sometimes necessary

140 as a defense to the people

141 against their own temporary errors and delusions.

142As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought,

143 in all governments,

144 and actually will, in all free governments,

145 ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers;

146 so there are particular moments in public affairs

147 when the people,

148 stimulated by some irregular passion,

149 or some illicit advantage,

150 or misled by the artful misrepresentations

151 of interested men,

152 may call for measures

153 which they themselves will afterwards

154 be the most ready to lament and condemn.

155In these critical moments,

156 how salutary will be the interference

157 of some temperate and respectable body of citizens,

158 in order to check the misguided career,

159 and to suspend the blow

160 meditated by the people against themselves,

161 until reason, justice, and truth

162 can regain their authority over the public mind?

163What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens

164 have often escaped

165 if their government had contained so provident

166 a safeguard against the tyranny

167 of their own passions?

168Popular liberty might then have escaped

169 the indelible reproach

170 of decreeing to the same citizens

171 the hemlock on one day and statues on the next.

172It may be suggested,

173 that a people spread over an extensive region

174 cannot, like the crowded inhabitants

175 of a small district,

176 be subject to the infection of violent passions,

177 or to the danger of combining

178 in pursuit of unjust measures.

179I am far from denying

180 that this is a distinction of peculiar importance.

181I have, on the contrary, endeavored in a former paper

182 to show, that it is one of the principal

183 recommendations

184 of a confederated republic.

185At the same time,

186 this advantage ought not to be considered

187 as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions.

188It may even be remarked,

189 that the same extended situation,

190 which will exempt the people of America

191 from some of the dangers incident

192 to lesser republics,

193 will expose them to the inconveniency

194 of remaining for a longer time

195 under the influence of those misrepresentations

196 which the combined industry of interested men

197 may succeed in distributing among them.

198It adds no small weight to all these considerations,

199 to recollect that history informs us

200 of no long-lived republic which had not a senate.

201Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact,

202 the only states to whom that character can be applied.

203In each of the two first there was a senate for life.

204The constitution of the senate in the last is less known.

205Circumstantial evidence makes it probable

206 that it was not different in this particular

207 from the two others.

208It is at least certain,

209 that it had some quality or other

210 which rendered it an anchor

211 against popular fluctuations;

212 and that a smaller council, drawn out of the senate,

213 was appointed not only for life,

214 but filled up vacancies itself.

215These examples, though as unfit for the imitation,

216 as they are repugnant to the genius, of America,

217 are, notwithstanding,

218 when compared with the fugitive

219 and turbulent existence

220 of other ancient republics,

221 very instructive proofs of the necessity

222 of some institution

223 that will blend stability with liberty.

224I am not unaware of the circumstances

225 which distinguish the American

226 from other popular governments,

227 as well ancient as modern;

228 and which render extreme circumspection necessary,

229 in reasoning from the one case to the other.

230But after allowing due weight to this consideration,

231 it may still be maintained,

232 that there are many points of similitude

233 which render these examples

234 not unworthy of our attention.

235Many of the defects, as we have seen,

236 which can only be supplied by a senatorial institution,

237 are common to a numerous assembly

238 frequently elected by the people,

239 and to the people themselves.

240There are others peculiar to the former,

241 which require the control of such an institution.

242The people can never wilfully betray their own interests;

243 but they may possibly be betrayed

244 by the representatives of the people;

245 and the danger will be evidently greater

246 where the whole legislative trust

247 is lodged in the hands of one body of men,

248 than where the concurrence

249 of separate and dissimilar bodies

250 is required in every public act.

251The difference most relied on,

252 between the American and other republics,

253 consists in the principle of representation;

254 which is the pivot on which the former move,

255 and which is supposed to have been

256 unknown to the latter,

257 or at least to the ancient part of them.

258The use which has been made of this difference,

259 in reasonings contained in former papers,

260 will have shown that I am disposed

261 neither to deny its existence

262 nor to undervalue its importance.

263I feel the less restraint, therefore, in observing,

264 that the position concerning the ignorance

265 of the ancient governments

266 on the subject of representation,

267 is by no means precisely true

268 in the latitude commonly given to it.

269Without entering into a disquisition

270 which here would be misplaced,

271 I will refer to a few known facts,

272 in support of what I advance.

273In the most pure democracies of Greece,

274 many of the executive functions were performed,

275 not by the people themselves,

276 but by officers elected by the people,

277 and REPRESENTING the people

278 in their EXECUTIVE capacity.

279Prior to the reform of Solon,

280 Athens was governed by nine Archons,

281 annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE AT LARGE.

282The degree of power delegated to them

283 seems to be left in great obscurity.

284Subsequent to that period,

285 we find an assembly, first of four,

286 and afterwards of six hundred members,

287 annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE;

288 and PARTIALLY representing them

289 in their LEGISLATIVE capacity,

290 since they were not only associated with the people

291 in the function of making laws,

292 but had the exclusive right

293 of originating legislative propositions

294 to the people.

295The senate of Carthage, also,

296 whatever might be its power,

297 or the duration of its appointment,

298 appears to have been ELECTIVE

299 by the suffrages of the people.

300Similar instances might be traced

301 in most, if not all the popular

302 governments of antiquity.

303Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori,

304 and in Rome with the Tribunes;

305 two bodies, small indeed in numbers,

306 but annually ELECTED

307 BY THE WHOLE BODY OF THE PEOPLE,

308 and considered as the REPRESENTATIVES

309 of the people,

310 almost in their PLENIPOTENTIARY capacity.

311The Cosmi of Crete were also annually

312 ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE,

313 and have been considered by some authors

314 as an institution analogous

315 to those of Sparta and Rome,

316 with this difference only,

317 that in the election of that representative body

318 the right of suffrage was communicated

319 to a part only of the people.

320From these facts, to which many others might be added,

321 it is clear that the principle of representation

322 was neither unknown to the ancients

323 nor wholly overlooked

324 in their political constitutions.

325The true distinction between these

326 and the American governments,

327 lies IN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE PEOPLE,

328 IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITY,

329 from any share in the LATTER,

330 and not in the TOTAL EXCLUSION

331 OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE

332 from the administration of the FORMER.

333The distinction, however, thus qualified,

334 must be admitted to leave a most

335 advantageous superiority

336 in favor of the United States.

337But to insure to this advantage its full effect,

338 we must be careful not to separate it

339 from the other advantage,

340 of an extensive territory.

341For it cannot be believed,

342 that any form of representative government

343 could have succeeded

344 within the narrow limits occupied

345 by the democracies of Greece.

346In answer to all these arguments,

347 suggested by reason, illustrated by examples,

348 and enforced by our own experience,

349 the jealous adversary of the Constitution

350 will probably content himself with repeating,

351 that a senate appointed not immediately

352 by the people,

353 and for the term of six years,

354 must gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence

355 in the government,

356 and finally transform it

357 into a tyrannical aristocracy.

358To this general answer,

359 the general reply ought to be sufficient,

360 that liberty may be endangered

361 by the abuses of liberty

362 as well as by the abuses of power;

363 that there are numerous instances of the former

364 as well as of the latter;

365 and that the former, rather than the latter,

366 are apparently most to be apprehended

367 by the United States.

368But a more particular reply may be given.

369Before such a revolution can be effected,

370 the Senate, it is to be observed,

371 must in the first place corrupt itself;

372 must next corrupt the State legislatures;

373 must then corrupt the House of Representatives;

374 and must finally corrupt the people at large.

375It is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted

376 before it can attempt an establishment of tyranny.

377Without corrupting the State legislatures,

378 it cannot prosecute the attempt,

379 because the periodical change of members

380 would otherwise regenerate the whole body.

381Without exerting the means of corruption

382 with equal success on the House of Representatives,

383 the opposition of that coequal branch

384 of the government

385 would inevitably defeat the attempt;

386 and without corrupting the people themselves,

387 a succession of new representatives

388 would speedily restore all things

389 to their pristine order.

390Is there any man who can seriously persuade himself

391 that the proposed Senate can,

392 by any possible means

393 within the compass of human address,

394 arrive at the object of a lawless ambition,

395 through all these obstructions?

396If reason condemns the suspicion,

397 the same sentence is pronounced by experience.

398The constitution of Maryland

399 furnishes the most apposite example.

400The Senate of that State is elected,

401 as the federal Senate will be,

402 indirectly by the people,

403 and for a term less by one year only

404 than the federal Senate.

405It is distinguished, also,

406 by the remarkable prerogative

407 of filling up its own vacancies

408 within the term of its appointment,

409 and, at the same time,

410 is not under the control of any such rotation

411 as is provided for the federal Senate.

412There are some other lesser distinctions,

413 which would expose the former to colorable objections,

414 that do not lie against the latter.

415If the federal Senate, therefore,

416 really contained the danger

417 which has been so loudly proclaimed,

418 some symptoms at least of a like danger

419 ought by this time to have been betrayed

420 by the Senate of Maryland,

421 but no such symptoms have appeared.

422On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained

423 by men of the same description

424 with those who view with terror

425 the correspondent part of the federal Constitution,

426 have been gradually extinguished

427 by the progress of the experiment;

428 and the Maryland constitution is daily deriving,

429 from the salutary operation of this part of it,

430 a reputation in which it will probably

431 not be rivalled

432 by that of any State in the Union.

433But if any thing could silence the jealousies

434 on this subject, it ought to be the British example.

435The Senate there

436 instead of being elected for a term of six years,

437 and of being unconfined

438 to particular families or fortunes,

439 is an hereditary assembly of opulent nobles.

440The House of Representatives,

441 instead of being elected for two years,

442 and by the whole body of the people,

443 is elected for seven years,

444 and, in very great proportion,

445 by a very small proportion of the people.

446Here, unquestionably, ought to be seen in full display

447 the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny

448 which are at some future period

449 to be exemplified in the United States.

450Unfortunately, however, for the anti-federal argument,

451 the British history informs us

452 that this hereditary assembly

453 has not been able to defend itself

454 against the continual encroachments

455 of the House of Representatives;

456 and that it no sooner lost the support of the monarch,

457 than it was actually crushed

458 by the weight of the popular branch.

459As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject,

460 its examples support the reasoning

461 which we have employed.

462In Sparta, the Ephori,

463 the annual representatives of the people,

464 were found an overmatch for the senate for life,

465 continually gained on its authority

466 and finally drew all power into their own hands.

467The Tribunes of Rome,

468 who were the representatives of the people,

469 prevailed, it is well known,

470 in almost every contest with the senate for life,

471 and in the end gained the most complete triumph

472 over it.

473The fact is the more remarkable,

474 as unanimity was required in every act of the Tribunes,

475 even after their number was augmented to ten.

476It proves the irresistible force

477 possessed by that branch of a free government,

478 which has the people on its side.

479To these examples might be added that of Carthage,

480 whose senate, according to the testimony of Polybius,

481 instead of drawing all power into its vortex,

482 had, at the commencement of the second Punic War,

483 lost almost the whole of its original portion.

484Besides the conclusive evidence

485 resulting from this assemblage of facts,

486 that the federal Senate will never be able

487 to transform itself, by gradual usurpations,

488 into an independent and aristocratic body,

489 we are warranted in believing,

490 that if such a revolution should ever happen

491 from causes which the foresight of man

492 cannot guard against,

493 the House of Representatives,

494 with the people on their side,

495 will at all times be able

496 to bring back the Constitution

497 to its primitive form and principles.

498Against the force of the immediate representatives

499 of the people,

500 nothing will be able to maintain

501 even the constitutional authority of the Senate,

502 but such a display of enlightened policy,

503 and attachment to the public good,

504 as will divide with that branch of the legislature

505 the affections and support

506 of the entire body of the people themselves.

507PUBLIUS.