1787 Federalist 62 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 62

2The Senate

3For the Independent Journal.

4HAMILTON OR MADISON

5To the People of the State of New York:

6HAVING examined the constitution

7 of the House of Representatives,

8 and answered such of the objections against it

9 as seemed to merit notice,

10 I enter next on the examination of the Senate.

11The heads into which this member of the government

12 may be considered are:

131. The qualification of senators;

142. The appointment of them by the State legislatures;

153. The equality of representation in the Senate;

164. The number of senators,

17 and the term for which they are to be elected;

185. The powers vested in the Senate.

191.

20The qualifications proposed for senators,

21 as distinguished from those of representatives,

22 consist in a more advanced age

23 and a longer period of citizenship.

24A senator must be thirty years of age at least;

25 as a representative must be twenty-five.

26And the former must have been a citizen nine years;

27 as seven years are required for the latter.

28The propriety of these distinctions

29 is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust,

30 which, requiring greater extent of information

31 and tability of character,

32 requires at the same time

33 that the senator should have reached

34 a period of life most likely

35 to supply these advantages;

36 and which, participating immediately

37 in transactions with foreign nations,

38 ought to be exercised by none

39 who are not thoroughly weaned

40 from the prepossessions and habits

41 incident to foreign birth and education.

42The term of nine years appears to be

43 a prudent mediocrity

44 between a total exclusion of adopted citizens,

45 whose merits and talents may claim a share

46 in the public confidence,

47 and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them,

48 which might create a channel for foreign influence

49 on the national councils.

502.

51It is equally unnecessary to dilate

52 on the appointment of senators

53 by the State legislatures.

54Among the various modes

55 which might have been devised

56 for constituting this branch of the government,

57 that which has been proposed by the convention

58 is probably the most congenial

59 with the public opinion.

60It is recommended by the double advantage

61 of favoring a select appointment,

62 and of giving to the State governments

63 such an agency in the formation

64 of the federal government

65 as must secure the authority of the former,

66 and may form a convenient link

67 between the two systems.

683.

69The equality of representation in the Senate

70 is another point,

71 which, being evidently the result of compromise

72 between the opposite pretensions

73 of the large and the small States,

74 does not call for much discussion.

75If indeed it be right,

76 that among a people thoroughly incorporated

77 into one nation,

78 every district ought to have a PROPORTIONAL share

79 in the government,

80 and that among independent and sovereign States,

81 bound together by a simple league,

82 the parties, however unequal in size,

83 ought to have an EQUAL share

84 in the common councils,

85 it does not appear to be without some reason

86 that in a compound republic,

87 partaking both of the national

88 and federal character,

89 the government ought to be founded

90 on a mixture of the principles

91 of proportional and equal representation.

92But it is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory,

93 a part of the Constitution

94 which is allowed on all hands

95 to be the result, not of theory,

96 but "of a spirit of amity,

97 and that mutual deference and concession

98 which the peculiarity of our political situation

99 rendered indispensable."

100A common government, with powers equal to its objects,

101 is called for by the voice,

102 and still more loudly by the political situation,

103 of America.

104A government founded on principles more consonant

105 to the wishes of the larger States,

106 is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States.

107The only option, then, for the former,

108 lies between the proposed government

109 and a government still more objectionable.

110Under this alternative,

111 the advice of prudence must be

112 to embrace the lesser evil;

113 and, instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation

114 of the possible mischiefs which may ensue,

115 to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences

116 which may qualify the sacrifice.

117In this spirit it may be remarked,

118 that the equal vote allowed to each State

119 is at once a constitutional recognition

120 of the portion of sovereignty

121 remaining in the individual States,

122 and an instrument for preserving

123 that residuary sovereignty.

124So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable

125 to the large than to the small States;

126 since they are not less solicitous

127 to guard, by every possible expedient,

128 against an improper consolidation of the States

129 into one simple republic.

130Another advantage accruing

131 from this ingredient

132 in the constitution of the Senate is,

133 the additional impediment it must prove

134 against improper acts of legislation.

135No law or resolution can now be passed

136 without the concurrence, first,

137 of a majority of the people,

138 and then, of a majority of the States.

139It must be acknowledged

140 that this complicated check on legislation

141 may in some instances be injurious

142 as well as beneficial;

143 and that the peculiar defense

144 which it involves in favor of the smaller States,

145 would be more rational,

146 if any interests common to them,

147 and distinct from those of the other States,

148 would otherwise be exposed to peculiar danger.

149But as the larger States will always be able,

150 by their power over the supplies,

151 to defeat unreasonable exertions

152 of this prerogative of the lesser States,

153 and as the faculty and excess of law-making

154 seem to be the diseases

155 to which our governments are most liable,

156 it is not impossible

157 that this part of the Constitution

158 may be more convenient in practice

159 than it appears to many in contemplation.

1604.

161The number of senators,

162 and the duration of their appointment,

163 come next to be considered.

164In order to form an accurate judgment

165 on both of these points,

166 it will be proper to inquire

167 into the purposes which are to be answered

168 by a senate;

169 and in order to ascertain these,

170 it will be necessary to review the inconveniences

171 which a republic must suffer

172 from the want of such an institution.

173First. It is a misfortune incident

174 to republican government,

175 though in a less degree than to other governments,

176 that those who administer it

177 may forget their obligations to their constituents,

178 and prove unfaithful to their important trust.

179In this point of view, a senate,

180 as a second branch of the legislative assembly,

181 distinct from, and dividing

182 the power with, a first,

183 must be in all cases a salutary check

184 on the government.

185It doubles the security to the people,

186 by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies

187 in schemes of usurpation or perfidy,

188 where the ambition or corruption of one

189 would otherwise be sufficient.

190This is a precaution founded on such clear principles,

191 and now so well understood in the United States,

192 that it would be more than superfluous

193 to enlarge on it.

194I will barely remark,

195 that as the improbability of sinister combinations

196 will be in proportion to the dissimilarity

197 in the genius of the two bodies,

198 it must be politic to distinguish them from each other

199 by every circumstance

200 which will consist with a due harmony

201 in all proper measures,

202 and with the genuine principles

203 of republican government.

204Secondly. The necessity of a senate

205 is not less indicated

206 by the propensity of all single

207 and numerous assemblies

208 to yield to the impulse

209 of sudden and violent passions,

210 and to be seduced by factious leaders

211 into intemperate and pernicious resolutions.

212Examples on this subject might be cited without number;

213 and from proceedings within the United States,

214 as well as from the history of other nations.

215But a position that will not be contradicted,

216 need not be proved.

217All that need be remarked is,

218 that a body which is to correct this infirmity

219 ought itself to be free from it,

220 and consequently ought to be less numerous.

221It ought, moreover, to possess great firmness,

222 and consequently ought to hold its authority

223 by a tenure of considerable duration.

224Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate

225 lies in a want of due acquaintance

226 with the objects and principles of legislation.

227It is not possible

228 that an assembly of men

229 called for the most part

230 from pursuits of a private nature,

231 continued in appointment for a short time,

232 and led by no permanent motive

233 to devote the intervals of public occupation

234 to a study of the laws, the affairs,

235 and the comprehensive interests of their country,

236 should, if left wholly to themselves,

237 escape a variety of important errors

238 in the exercise of their legislative trust.

239It may be affirmed, on the best grounds,

240 that no small share of the present embarrassments

241 of America

242 is to be charged on the blunders

243 of our governments;

244 and that these have proceeded from the heads

245 rather than the hearts

246 of most of the authors of them.

247What indeed are all the repealing, explaining,

248 and amending laws,

249 which fill and disgrace our voluminous codes,

250 but so many monuments of deficient wisdom;

251 so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding

252 against each preceding session;

253 so many admonitions to the people,

254 of the value of those aids

255 which may be expected

256 from a well-constituted senate?

257A good government implies two things:

258 first, fidelity to the object of government,

259 which is the happiness of the people;

260 secondly, a knowledge of the means

261 by which that object can be best attained.

262Some governments are deficient in both these qualities;

263 most governments are deficient in the first.

264I scruple not to assert,

265 that in American governments

266 too little attention has been paid to the last.

267The federal Constitution avoids this error;

268 and what merits particular notice,

269 it provides for the last in a mode

270 which increases the security for the first.

271Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils

272 arising from a rapid succession of new members,

273 however qualified they may be,

274 points out, in the strongest manner,

275 the necessity of some stable institution

276 in the government.

277Every new election in the States

278 is found to change one half of the representatives.

279From this change of men must proceed

280 a change of opinions;

281 and from a change of opinions, a change of measures.

282But a continual change even of good measures

283 is inconsistent with every rule of prudence

284 and every prospect of success.

285The remark is verified in private life,

286 and becomes more just, as well as more important,

287 in national transactions.

2885.

289To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government

290 would fill a volume.

291I will hint a few only,

292 each of which will be perceived

293 to be a source of innumerable others.

294In the first place,

295 it forfeits the respect and confidence

296 of other nations,

297 and all the advantages connected

298 with national character.

299An individual who is observed to be inconstant

300 to his plans,

301 or perhaps to carry on his affairs

302 without any plan at all,

303 is marked at once, by all prudent people,

304 as a speedy victim

305 to his own unsteadiness and folly.

306His more friendly neighbors may pity him,

307 but all will decline to connect

308 their fortunes with his;

309 and not a few will seize the opportunity

310 of making their fortunes out of his.

311One nation is to another

312 what one individual is to another;

313 with this melancholy distinction perhaps,

314 that the former,

315 with fewer of the benevolent emotions

316 than the latter,

317 are under fewer restraints also

318 from taking undue advantage

319 from the indiscretions of each other.

320Every nation, consequently,

321 whose affairs betray a want of wisdom and stability,

322 may calculate on every loss

323 which can be sustained

324 from the more systematic policy

325 of their wiser neighbors.

326But the best instruction on this subject

327 is unhappily conveyed to America

328 by the example of her own situation.

329She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends;

330 that she is the derision of her enemies;

331 and that she is a prey to every nation

332 which has an interest in speculating

333 on her fluctuating councils

334 and embarrassed affairs.

335The internal effects of a mutable policy

336 are still more calamitous.

337It poisons the blessing of liberty itself.

338It will be of little avail to the people,

339 that the laws are made by men of their own choice,

340 if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read,

341 or so incoherent that they cannot be understood;

342 if they be repealed or revised

343 before they are promulgated,

344 or undergo such incessant changes

345 that no man, who knows what the law is to-day,

346 can guess what it will be to-morrow.

347Law is defined to be a rule of action;

348 but how can that be a rule,

349 which is little known, and less fixed?

350Another effect of public instability

351 is the unreasonable advantage it gives

352 to the sagacious, the enterprising,

353 and the moneyed few

354 over the industrious and uniformed mass

355 of the people.

356Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue,

357 or in any way affecting the value

358 of the different species of property,

359 presents a new harvest

360 to those who watch the change,

361 and can trace its consequences;

362 a harvest, reared not by themselves,

363 but by the toils and cares

364 of the great body of their fellow-citizens.

365This is a state of things

366 in which it may be said with some truth

367 that laws are made for the FEW, not for the MANY.

368In another point of view,

369 great injury results from an unstable government.

370The want of confidence in the public councils

371 damps every useful undertaking,

372 the success and profit of which

373 may depend on a continuance

374 of existing arrangements.

375What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes

376 in any new branch of commerce

377 when he knows not

378 but that his plans may be rendered unlawful

379 before they can be executed?

380What farmer or manufacturer

381 will lay himself out

382 for the encouragement given

383 to any particular cultivation or establishment,

384 when he can have no assurance

385 that his preparatory labors and advances

386 will not render him a victim

387 to an inconstant government?

388In a word,

389 no great improvement or laudable enterprise

390 can go forward

391 which requires the auspices

392 of a steady system of national policy.

393But the most deplorable effect of all

394 is that diminution of attachment and reverence

395 which steals into the hearts of the people,

396 towards a political system

397 which betrays so many marks of infirmity,

398 and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes.

399No government, any more than an individual,

400 will long be respected without being truly respectable;

401 nor be truly respectable,

402 without possessing a certain portion

403 of order and stability.

404PUBLIUS.