1787 Federalist 61 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 61

2The Same Subject Continued

3(Concerning the Power of Congress

4to Regulate the Election of Members)

5From the New York Packet.

6Tuesday, February 26, 1788.

7HAMILTON

8To the People of the State of New York:

9THE more candid opposers of the provision

10 respecting elections,

11 contained in the plan of the convention,

12 when pressed in argument,

13 will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision;

14 with this qualification, however,

15 that it ought to have been accompanied

16 with a declaration,

17 that all elections should be had in the counties

18 where the electors resided.

19This, say they, was a necessary precaution

20 against an abuse of the power.

21A declaration of this nature

22 would certainly have been harmless;

23 so far as it would have had the effect

24 of quieting apprehensions,

25 it might not have been undesirable.

26But it would, in fact, have afforded little or no

27 additional security against the danger apprehended;

28 and the want of it will never be considered,

29 by an impartial and judicious examiner,

30 as a serious, still less as an insuperable,

31 objection to the plan.

32The different views taken of the subject

33 in the two preceding papers

34 must be sufficient to satisfy

35 all dispassionate and discerning men,

36 that if the public liberty

37 should ever be the victim

38 of the ambition of the national rulers,

39 the power under examination, at least,

40 will be guiltless of the sacrifice.

41If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only,

42 would exercise it in a careful inspection

43 of the several State constitutions,

44 they would find little less room

45 for disquietude and alarm,

46 from the latitude which most of them allow

47 in respect to elections,

48 than from the latitude which is proposed

49 to be allowed to the national government

50 in the same respect.

51A review of their situation, in this particular,

52 would tend greatly to remove any ill impressions

53 which may remain in regard to this matter.

54But as that view would lead

55 into long and tedious details,

56 I shall content myself

57 with the single example of the State

58 in which I write.

59The constitution of New York

60 makes no other provision for LOCALITY of elections,

61 than that the members of the Assembly

62 shall be elected in the COUNTIES;

63 those of the Senate,

64 in the great districts into which the State

65 is or may be divided:

66 these at present are four in number,

67 and comprehend each from two to six counties.

68It may readily be perceived

69 that it would not be more difficult

70 to the legislature of New York

71 to defeat the suffrages

72 of the citizens of New York,

73 by confining elections to particular places,

74 than for the legislature of the United States

75 to defeat the suffrages

76 of the citizens of the Union,

77 by the like expedient.

78Suppose, for instance,

79 the city of Albany was to be appointed

80 the sole place of election

81 for the county and district of which it is a part,

82 would not the inhabitants of that city

83 speedily become the only electors

84 of the members both of the Senate and Assembly

85 for that county and district?

86Can we imagine that the electors

87 who reside in the remote subdivisions

88 of the counties of Albany,

89 Saratoga, Cambridge, etc.,

90 or in any part of the county of Montgomery,

91 would take the trouble to come to the city of Albany,

92 to give their votes

93 for members of the Assembly or Senate,

94 sooner than they would repair

95 to the city of New York,

96 to participate in the choice

97 of the members of the federal

98 House of Representatives?

99The alarming indifference discoverable

100 in the exercise of so invaluable a privilege

101 under the existing laws,

102 which afford every facility to it,

103 furnishes a ready answer to this question.

104And, abstracted from any experience on the subject,

105 we can be at no loss to determine,

106 that when the place of election

107 is at an INCONVENIENT DISTANCE from the elector,

108 the effect upon his conduct will be the same

109 whether that distance be twenty miles

110 or twenty thousand miles.

111Hence it must appear,

112 that objections to the particular modification

113 of the federal power of regulating elections

114 will, in substance, apply with equal force

115 to the modification of the like power

116 in the constitution of this State;

117 and for this reason it will be impossible

118 to acquit the one, and to condemn the other.

119A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion

120 in respect to the constitutions

121 of most of the other States.

122If it should be said

123 that defects in the State constitutions

124 furnish no apology for those

125 which are to be found in the plan proposed,

126 I answer, that as the former have never been thought

127 chargeable with inattention

128 to the security of liberty,

129 where the imputations thrown on the latter

130 can be shown to be applicable to them also,

131 the presumption is that they are rather

132 the cavilling refinements

133 of a predetermined opposition,

134 than the well-founded inferences

135 of a candid research after truth.

136To those who are disposed to consider,

137 as innocent omissions in the State constitutions,

138 what they regard as unpardonable blemishes

139 in the plan of the convention,

140 nothing can be said;

141 or at most, they can only be asked

142 to assign some substantial reason

143 why the representatives of the people

144 in a single State

145 should be more impregnable to the lust of power,

146 or other sinister motives,

147 than the representatives of the people

148 of the United States?

149If they cannot do this,

150 they ought at least to prove to us

151 that it is easier to subvert the liberties

152 of three millions of people,

153 with the advantage of local governments

154 to head their opposition,

155 than of two hundred thousand people

156 who are destitute of that advantage.

157And in relation to the point immediately

158 under consideration,

159 they ought to convince us

160 that it is less probable

161 that a predominant faction

162 in a single State should,

163 in order to maintain its superiority,

164 incline to a preference

165 of a particular class of electors,

166 than that a similar spirit should take possession

167 of the representatives of thirteen States,

168 spread over a vast region,

169 and in several respects distinguishable

170 from each other

171 by a diversity of local circumstances,

172 prejudices, and interests.

173Hitherto my observations have only aimed

174 at a vindication of the provision in question,

175 on the ground of theoretic propriety,

176 on that of the danger of placing the power elsewhere,

177 and on that of the safety

178 of placing it in the manner proposed.

179But there remains to be mentioned a positive advantage

180 which will result from this disposition,

181 and which could not as well have been obtained

182 from any other:

183 I allude to the circumstance of uniformity

184 in the time of elections

185 for the federal House of Representatives.

186It is more than possible

187 that this uniformity may be found by experience

188 to be of great importance to the public welfare,

189 both as a security against the perpetuation

190 of the same spirit in the body,

191 and as a cure for the diseases of faction.

192If each State may choose its own time of election,

193 it is possible there may be at least

194 as many different periods

195 as there are months in the year.

196The times of election in the several States,

197 as they are now established for local purposes,

198 vary between extremes as wide as March and November.

199The consequence of this diversity would be

200 that there could never happen

201 a total dissolution or renovation of the body

202 at one time.

203If an improper spirit of any kind

204 should happen to prevail in it,

205 that spirit would be apt to infuse itself

206 into the new members,

207 as they come forward in succession.

208The mass would be likely to remain nearly the same,

209 assimilating constantly to itself

210 its gradual accretions.

211There is a contagion in example

212 which few men have sufficient force of mind to resist.

213I am inclined to think

214 that treble the duration in office,

215 with the condition of a total dissolution

216 of the body at the same time,

217 might be less formidable to liberty

218 than one third of that duration

219 subject to gradual and successive alterations.

220Uniformity in the time of elections

221 seems not less requisite

222 for executing the idea of a regular rotation

223 in the Senate,

224 and for conveniently assembling the legislature

225 at a stated period in each year.

226It may be asked,

227 Why, then, could not a time have been fixed

228 in the Constitution?

229As the most zealous adversaries of the plan

230 of the convention in this State are, in general,

231 not less zealous admirers

232 of the constitution of the State,

233 the question may be retorted,

234 and it may be asked,

235 Why was not a time for the like purpose

236 fixed in the constitution of this State?

237No better answer can be given

238 than that it was a matter

239 which might safely be entrusted

240 to legislative discretion;

241 and that if a time had been appointed,

242 it might, upon experiment,

243 have been found less convenient

244 than some other time.

245The same answer may be given

246 to the question put on the other side.

247And it may be added

248 that the supposed danger of a gradual change

249 being merely speculative,

250 it would have been hardly advisable

251 upon that speculation to establish,

252 as a fundamental point,

253 what would deprive several States

254 of the convenience of having the elections

255 for their own governments

256 and for the national government

257 at the same epochs.

258PUBLIUS.