1787 Federalist 60 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 60

2The Same Subject Continued

3(Concerning the Power of Congress

4to Regulate the Election of Members)

5From the New York Packet.

6Tuesday, February 26, 1788.

7HAMILTON

8To the People of the State of New York:

9WE HAVE seen,

10 that an uncontrollable power over the elections

11 to the federal government

12 could not, without hazard,

13 be committed to the State legislatures.

14Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other side;

15 that is, from confiding the ultimate right

16 of regulating its own elections

17 to the Union itself.

18It is not pretended,

19 that this right would ever be used

20 for the exclusion of any State

21 from its share in the representation.

22The interest of all would, in this respect at least,

23 be the security of all.

24But it is alleged,

25 that it might be employed in such a manner

26 as to promote the election

27 of some favorite class of men

28 in exclusion of others,

29 by confining the places of election

30 to particular districts,

31 and rendering it impracticable

32 to the citizens at large to partake in the choice.

33Of all chimerical suppositions,

34 this seems to be the most chimerical.

35On the one hand,

36 no rational calculation of probabilities

37 would lead us to imagine

38 that the disposition which a conduct

39 so violent and extraordinary would imply,

40 could ever find its way into the national councils;

41 and on the other, it may be concluded with certainty,

42 that if so improper a spirit

43 should ever gain admittance into them,

44 it would display itself in a form

45 altogether different and far more decisive.

46The improbability of the attempt

47 may be satisfactorily inferred

48 from this single reflection,

49 that it could never be made

50 without causing an immediate revolt

51 of the great body of the people,

52 headed and directed by the State governments.

53It is not difficult to conceive

54 that this characteristic right of freedom may,

55 in certain turbulent and factious seasons,

56 be violated, in respect to a particular class

57 of citizens,

58 by a victorious and overbearing majority;

59 but that so fundamental a privilege,

60 in a country so situated and enlightened,

61 should be invaded to the prejudice

62 of the great mass of the people,

63 by the deliberate policy of the government,

64 without occasioning a popular revolution,

65 is altogether inconceivable and incredible.

66In addition to this general reflection,

67 there are considerations of a more precise nature,

68 which forbid all apprehension on the subject.

69The dissimilarity in the ingredients

70 which will compose the national government,

71 and still more in the manner

72 in which they will be brought into action

73 in its various branches,

74 must form a powerful obstacle

75 to a concert of views

76 in any partial scheme of elections.

77There is sufficient diversity

78 in the state of property,

79 in the genius, manners, and habits of the people

80 of the different parts of the Union,

81 to occasion a material diversity of disposition

82 in their representatives

83 towards the different ranks and conditions

84 in society.

85And though an intimate intercourse

86 under the same government

87 will promote a gradual assimilation

88 in some of these respects,

89 yet there are causes, as well physical as moral,

90 which may, in a greater or less degree,

91 permanently nourish different propensities

92 and inclinations in this respect.

93But the circumstance

94 which will be likely to have the greatest influence

95 in the matter,

96 will be the dissimilar modes of constituting

97 the several component parts of the government.

98The House of Representatives

99 being to be elected immediately by the people,

100 the Senate by the State legislatures,

101 the President by electors chosen for that purpose

102 by the people,

103 there would be little probability of a common interest

104 to cement these different branches

105 in a predilection

106 for any particular class of electors.

107As to the Senate, it is impossible

108 that any regulation of "time and manner,"

109 which is all that is proposed

110 to be submitted to the national government

111 in respect to that body,

112 can affect the spirit

113 which will direct the choice of its members.

114The collective sense of the State legislatures

115 can never be influenced

116 by extraneous circumstances of that sort;

117 a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us

118 that the discrimination apprehended

119 would never be attempted.

120For what inducement could the Senate have

121 to concur in a preference

122 in which itself would not be included?

123Or to what purpose would it be established,

124 in reference to one branch of the legislature,

125 if it could not be extended to the other?

126The composition of the one would in this case

127 counteract that of the other.

128And we can never suppose

129 that it would embrace the appointments to the Senate,

130 unless we can at the same time suppose

131 the voluntary co-operation

132 of the State legislatures.

133If we make the latter supposition,

134 it then becomes immaterial

135 where the power in question is placed

136 whether in their hands or in those of the Union.

137But what is to be the object

138 of this capricious partiality

139 in the national councils?

140Is it to be exercised in a discrimination

141 between the different departments of industry,

142 or between the different kinds of property,

143 or between the different degrees of property?

144Will it lean in favor of the landed interest,

145 or the moneyed interest, or the mercantile interest,

146 or the manufacturing interest?

147Or, to speak in the fashionable language

148 of the adversaries to the Constitution,

149 will it court the elevation

150 of "the wealthy and the well-born,"

151 to the exclusion and debasement

152 of all the rest of the society?

153If this partiality is to be exerted

154 in favor of those who are concerned

155 in any particular description

156 of industry or property,

157 I presume it will readily be admitted,

158 that the competition for it

159 will lie between landed men and merchants.

160And I scruple not to affirm,

161 that it is infinitely less likely

162 that either of them should gain an ascendant

163 in the national councils,

164 than that the one or the other of them

165 should predominate in all the local councils.

166The inference will be,

167 that a conduct tending to give an undue preference

168 to either

169 is much less to be dreaded from the former

170 than from the latter.

171The several States are in various degrees

172 addicted to agriculture and commerce.

173In most, if not all of them, agriculture is predominant.

174In a few of them, however,

175 commerce nearly divides its empire,

176 and in most of them has a considerable

177 share of influence.

178In proportion as either prevails,

179 it will be conveyed into the national representation;

180 and for the very reason,

181 that this will be an emanation

182 from a greater variety of interests,

183 and in much more various proportions,

184 than are to be found in any single State,

185 it will be much less apt

186 to espouse either of them

187 with a decided partiality,

188 than the representation of any single State.

189In a country consisting chiefly

190 of the cultivators of land,

191 where the rules of an equal representation obtain,

192 the landed interest must, upon the whole,

193 preponderate in the government.

194As long as this interest prevails

195 in most of the State legislatures,

196 so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority

197 in the national Senate,

198 which will generally be a faithful copy

199 of the majorities of those assemblies.

200It cannot therefore be presumed,

201 that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class

202 will ever be a favorite object

203 of this branch of the federal legislature.

204In applying thus particularly to the Senate

205 a general observation

206 suggested by the situation of the country,

207 I am governed by the consideration,

208 that the credulous votaries of State power cannot,

209 upon their own principles, suspect,

210 that the State legislatures

211 would be warped from their duty

212 by any external influence.

213But in reality the same situation

214 must have the same effect,

215 in the primative composition at least

216 of the federal House of Representatives:

217 an improper bias towards the mercantile class

218 is as little to be expected from this quarter

219 as from the other.

220In order, perhaps, to give countenance

221 to the objection at any rate,

222 it may be asked,

223 is there not danger of an opposite bias

224 in the national government,

225 which may dispose it to endeavor

226 to secure a monopoly of the federal administration

227 to the landed class?

228As there is little likelihood

229 that the supposition of such a bias

230 will have any terrors

231 for those who would be immediately injured by it,

232 a labored answer to this question

233 will be dispensed with.

234It will be sufficient to remark, first,

235 that for the reasons elsewhere assigned,

236 it is less likely that any decided partiality

237 should prevail in the councils of the Union

238 than in those of any of its members.

239Secondly, that there would be no temptation

240 to violate the Constitution

241 in favor of the landed class,

242 because that class would,

243 in the natural course of things,

244 enjoy as great a preponderancy

245 as itself could desire.

246And thirdly, that men accustomed to investigate

247 the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale,

248 must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce,

249 to be inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound

250 as would result from the entire exclusion

251 of those who would best understand its interest

252 from a share in the management of them.

253The importance of commerce, in the view of revenue alone,

254 must effectually guard it against the enmity of a body

255 which would be continually importuned in its favor,

256 by the urgent calls of public necessity.

257I the rather consult brevity

258 in discussing the probability of a preference

259 founded upon a discrimination

260 between the different kinds

261 of industry and property,

262 because, as far as I understand the meaning

263 of the objectors,

264 they contemplate a discrimination of another kind.

265They appear to have in view,

266 as the objects of the preference

267 with which they endeavor to alarm us,

268 those whom they designate by the description

269 of "the wealthy and the well-born."

270These, it seems, are to be exalted

271 to an odious pre-eminence

272 over the rest of their fellow-citizens.

273At one time, however, their elevation

274 is to be a necessary consequence

275 of the smallness of the representative body;

276 at another time it is to be effected

277 by depriving the people at large

278 of the opportunity of exercising

279 their right of suffrage

280 in the choice of that body.

281But upon what principle is the discrimination

282 of the places of election to be made,

283 in order to answer the purpose

284 of the meditated preference?

285Are "the wealthy and the well-born," as they are called,

286 confined to particular spots in the several States?

287Have they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight,

288 set apart in each of them a common place of residence?

289Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities?

290Or are they, on the contrary,

291 scattered over the face of the country

292 as avarice or chance may have happened

293 to cast their own lot

294 or that of their predecessors?

295If the latter is the case,

296 (as every intelligent man knows it to be,) 1

297 is it not evident

298 that the policy of confining the places of election

299 to particular districts

300 would be as subversive of its own aim

301 as it would be exceptionable

302 on every other account?

303The truth is,

304 that there is no method of securing to the rich

305 the preference apprehended,

306 but by prescribing qualifications of property

307 either for those who may elect or be elected.

308But this forms no part of the power

309 to be conferred upon the national government.

310Its authority would be expressly restricted

311 to the regulation of the TIMES, the PLACES,

312 the MANNER of elections.

313The qualifications of the persons

314 who may choose or be chosen,

315 as has been remarked upon other occasions,

316 are defined and fixed in the Constitution,

317 and are unalterable by the legislature.

318Let it, however, be admitted, for argument sake,

319 that the expedient suggested might be successful;

320 and let it at the same time

321 be equally taken for granted

322 that all the scruples

323 which a sense of duty

324 or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment

325 might inspire,

326 were overcome in the breasts

327 of the national rulers,

328 still I imagine it will hardly be pretended

329 that they could ever hope

330 to carry such an enterprise into execution

331 without the aid of a military force

332 sufficient to subdue the resistance

333 of the great body of the people.

334The improbability of the existence of a force

335 equal to that object

336 has been discussed and demonstrated

337 in different parts of these papers;

338 but that the futility of the objection

339 under consideration

340 may appear in the strongest light,

341 it shall be conceded for a moment

342 that such a force might exist,

343 and the national government shall be supposed

344 to be in the actual possession of it.

345What will be the conclusion?

346With a disposition to invade

347 the essential rights of the community,

348 and with the means of gratifying that disposition,

349 is it presumable that the persons

350 who were actuated by it

351 would amuse themselves

352 in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws

353 for securing a preference

354 to a favorite class of men?

355Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct

356 better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement?

357Would they not rather boldly resolve

358 to perpetuate themselves in office

359 by one decisive act of usurpation,

360 than to trust to precarious expedients

361 which, in spite of all the precautions

362 that might accompany them,

363 might terminate in the dismission, disgrace,

364 and ruin of their authors?

365Would they not fear that citizens,

366 not less tenacious than conscious of their rights,

367 would flock from the remote extremes

368 of their respective States

369 to the places of election,

370 to voerthrow their tyrants,

371 and to substitute men

372 who would be disposed to avenge

373 the violated majesty of the people?

374PUBLIUS.

3751 Particularly in the Southern States and in this State.