1787 Federalist 59 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 59

2Concerning the Power of Congress

3to Regulate the Election of Members

4From the New York Packet.

5Friday, February 22, 1788.

6HAMILTON

7To the People of the State of New York:

8THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider,

9 in this place,

10 that provision of the Constitution

11 which authorizes the national legislature

12 to regulate, in the last resort,

13 the election of its own members.

14It is in these words:

15"The TIMES, PLACES, and MANNER

16 of holding elections for senators and representatives

17 shall be prescribed in each State

18 by the legislature thereof;

19 but the Congress may, at any time, by law,

20 make or alter SUCH REGULATIONS,

21 except as to the PLACES of choosing senators." 1

22This provision has not only been declaimed against

23 by those who condemn the Constitution in the gross,

24 but it has been censured

25 by those who have objected

26 with less latitude and greater moderation;

27 and, in one instance it has been thought exceptionable

28 by a gentleman who has declared himself

29 the advocate of every other part of the system.

30I am greatly mistaken, notwithstanding,

31 if there be any article in the whole plan

32 more completely defensible than this.

33Its propriety rests upon the evidence

34 of this plain proposition,

35 that EVERY GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO CONTAIN IN ITSELF

36 THE MEANS OF ITS OWN PRESERVATION.

37Every just reasoner will, at first sight,

38 approve an adherence to this rule,

39 in the work of the convention;

40 and will disapprove every deviation from it

41 which may not appear to have been dictated

42 by the necessity of incorporating into the work

43 some particular ingredient,

44 with which a rigid conformity to the rule

45 was incompatible.

46Even in this case, though he may acquiesce

47 in the necessity,

48 yet he will not cease to regard and to regret

49 a departure from so fundamental a principle,

50 as a portion of imperfection in the system

51 which may prove the seed of future weakness,

52 and perhaps anarchy.

53It will not be alleged,

54 that an election law could have been framed

55 and inserted in the Constitution,

56 which would have been always applicable

57 to every probable change

58 in the situation of the country;

59 and it will therefore not be denied,

60 that a discretionary power over elections

61 ought to exist somewhere.

62It will, I presume, be as readily conceded,

63 that there were only three ways

64 in which this power could have been reasonably

65 modified and disposed:

66 that it must either have been lodged wholly

67 in the national legislature,

68 or wholly in the State legislatures,

69 or primarily in the latter

70 and ultimately in the former.

71The last mode has, with reason,

72 been preferred by the convention.

73They have submitted the regulation of elections

74 for the federal government, in the first instance,

75 to the local administrations;

76 which, in ordinary cases,

77 and when no improper views prevail,

78 may be both more convenient and more satisfactory;

79 but they have reserved to the national authority

80 a right to interpose,

81 whenever extraordinary circumstances

82 might render that interposition necessary

83 to its safety.

84Nothing can be more evident,

85 than that an exclusive power of regulating elections

86 for the national government,

87 in the hands of the State legislatures,

88 would leave the existence of the Union

89 entirely at their mercy.

90They could at any moment annihilate it,

91 by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons

92 to administer its affairs.

93It is to little purpose to say,

94 that a neglect or omission of this kind

95 would not be likely to take place.

96The constitutional possibility of the thing,

97 without an equivalent for the risk,

98 is an unanswerable objection.

99Nor has any satisfactory reason been yet assigned

100 for incurring that risk.

101The extravagant surmises of a distempered jealousy

102 can never be dignified with that character.

103If we are in a humor to presume abuses of power,

104 it is as fair to presume them

105 on the part of the State governments

106 as on the part of the general government.

107And as it is more consonant to the rules of a just theory,

108 to trust the Union with the care of its own existence,

109 than to transfer that care to any other hands,

110 if abuses of power are to be hazarded

111 on the one side or on the other,

112 it is more rational to hazard them

113 where the power would naturally be placed,

114 than where it would unnaturally be placed.

115Suppose an article had been introduced

116 into the Constitution,

117 empowering the United States

118 to regulate the elections

119 for the particular States,

120 would any man have hesitated to condemn it,

121 both as an unwarrantable transposition of power,

122 and as a premeditated engine

123 for the destruction of the State governments?

124The violation of principle, in this case,

125 would have required no comment;

126 and, to an unbiased observer,

127 it will not be less apparent

128 in the project of subjecting the existence

129 of the national government,

130 in a similar respect,

131 to the pleasure of the State governments.

132An impartial view of the matter cannot fail

133 to result in a conviction,

134 that each, as far as possible,

135 ought to depend on itself

136 for its own preservation.

137As an objection to this position,

138 it may be remarked

139 that the constitution of the national Senate

140 would involve, in its full extent,

141 the danger which it is suggested might flow

142 from an exclusive power in the State legislatures

143 to regulate the federal elections.

144It may be alleged,

145 that by declining the appointment of Senators,

146 they might at any time

147 give a fatal blow to the Union;

148 and from this it may be inferred,

149 that as its existence would be

150 thus rendered dependent

151 upon them in so essential a point,

152 there can be no objection

153 to intrusting them with it

154 in the particular case under consideration.

155The interest of each State, it may be added,

156 to maintain its representation

157 in the national councils,

158 would be a complete security against an abuse

159 of the trust.

160This argument, though specious,

161 will not, upon examination, be found solid.

162It is certainly true

163 that the State legislatures,

164 by forbearing the appointment of senators,

165 may destroy the national government.

166But it will not follow that,

167 because they have a power to do this in one instance,

168 they ought to have it in every other.

169There are cases

170 in which the pernicious tendency of such a power

171 may be far more decisive,

172 without any motive equally cogent

173 with that which must have regulated

174 the conduct of the convention

175 in respect to the formation of the Senate,

176 to recommend their admission into the system.

177So far as that construction may expose the Union

178 to the possibility of injury

179 from the State legislatures,

180 it is an evil;

181 but it is an evil which could not have been avoided

182 without excluding the States,

183 in their political capacities,

184 wholly from a place

185 in the organization of the national government.

186If this had been done,

187 it would doubtless have been interpreted

188 into an entire dereliction

189 of the federal principle;

190 and would certainly have deprived the State governments

191 of that absolute safeguard

192 which they will enjoy under this provision.

193But however wise it may have been

194 to have submitted in this instance to an inconvenience,

195 for the attainment of a necessary advantage

196 or a greater good,

197 no inference can be drawn from thence

198 to favor an accumulation of the evil,

199 where no necessity urges,

200 nor any greater good invites.

201It may be easily discerned also

202 that the national government would run

203 a much greater risk

204 from a power in the State legislatures

205 over the elections of its House of Representatives,

206 than from their power of appointing

207 the members of its Senate.

208The senators are to be chosen

209 for the period of six years;

210 there is to be a rotation,

211 by which the seats of a third part of them

212 are to be vacated and replenished every two years;

213 and no State is to be entitled

214 to more than two senators;

215 a quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen members.

216The joint result of these circumstances would be,

217 that a temporary combination of a few States

218 to intermit the appointment of senators,

219 could neither annul the existence

220 nor impair the activity of the body;

221 and it is not from a general and permanent combination

222 of the States

223 that we can have any thing to fear.

224The first might proceed from sinister designs

225 in the leading members

226 of a few of the State legislatures;

227 the last would suppose

228 a fixed and rooted disaffection

229 in the great body of the people,

230 which will either never exist at all,

231 or will, in all probability,

232 proceed from an experience of the inaptitude

233 of the general government

234 to the advancement of their happiness

235 in which event no good citizen

236 could desire its continuance.

237But with regard to the federal House of Representatives,

238 there is intended to be a general election of members

239 once in two years.

240If the State legislatures were to be invested

241 with an exclusive power of regulating these elections,

242 every period of making them

243 would be a delicate crisis

244 in the national situation,

245 which might issue in a dissolution of the Union,

246 if the leaders of a few

247 of the most important States

248 should have entered into a previous conspiracy

249 to prevent an election.

250I shall not deny,

251 that there is a degree of weight in the observation,

252 that the interests of each State,

253 to be represented in the federal councils,

254 will be a security against the abuse

255 of a power over its elections

256 in the hands of the State legislatures.

257But the security will not be considered as complete,

258 by those who attend to the force

259 of an obvious distinction

260 between the interest of the people

261 in the public felicity,

262 and the interest of their local rulers

263 in the power and consequence of their offices.

264The people of America may be warmly attached

265 to the government of the Union,

266 at times when the particular rulers

267 of particular States,

268 stimulated by the natural rivalship of power,

269 and by the hopes of personal aggrandizement,

270 and supported by a strong faction

271 in each of those States,

272 may be in a very opposite temper.

273This diversity of sentiment

274 between a majority of the people,

275 and the individuals who have the greatest credit

276 in their councils,

277 is exemplified in some of the States

278 at the present moment,

279 on the present question.

280The scheme of separate confederacies,

281 which will always nultiply the chances of ambition,

282 will be a never failing bait

283 to all such influential characters

284 in the State administrations

285 as are capable of preferring

286 their own emolument and advancement

287 to the public weal.

288With so effectual a weapon in their hands

289 as the exclusive power of regulating elections

290 for the national government,

291 a combination of a few such men,

292 in a few of the most considerable States,

293 where the temptation will always be the strongest,

294 might accomplish the destruction of the Union,

295 by seizing the opportunity

296 of some casual dissatisfaction among the people

297 (and which perhaps they may

298 themselves have excited),

299 to discontinue the choice of members

300 for the federal House of Representatives.

301It ought never to be forgotten,

302 that a firm union of this country,

303 under an efficient government,

304 will probably be an increasing object of jealousy

305 to more than one nation of Europe;

306 and that enterprises to subvert it

307 will sometimes originate

308 in the intrigues of foreign powers,

309 and will seldom fail to be patronized and abetted

310 by some of them.

311Its preservation, therefore ought in no case

312 that can be avoided,

313 to be committed to the guardianship of any

314 but those whose situation will uniformly beget

315 an immediate interest

316 in the faithful and vigilant performance

317 of the trust.

318PUBLIUS.

3191 Ist clause, 4th section, of the Ist article.