1787 Federalist 58 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 58

2Objection That The Number of Members

3Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress

4of Population Demands Considered

5MADISON

6To the People of the State of New York:

7THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives,

8 which I am to examine,

9 is grounded on a supposition

10 that the number of members

11 will not be augmented from time to time,

12 as the progress of population may demand.

13It has been admitted,

14 that this objection, if well supported,

15 would have great weight.

16The following observations will show that,

17 like most other objections against the Constitution,

18 it can only proceed from a partial view of the subject,

19 or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures

20 every object which is beheld.

211.

22Those who urge the objection seem not to have recollected

23 that the federal Constitution will not suffer

24 by a comparison with the State constitutions,

25 in the security provided

26 for a gradual augmentation

27 of the number of representatives.

28The number which is to prevail in the first instance

29 is declared to be temporary.

30Its duration is limited to the short term of three years.

31Within every successive term of ten years

32 a census of inhabitants is to be repeated.

33The unequivocal objects of these regulations are,

34 first, to readjust, from time to time,

35 the apportionment of representatives

36 to the number of inhabitants,

37 under the single exception

38 that each State shall have

39 one representative at least;

40 secondly, to augment the number of representatives

41 at the same periods,

42 under the sole limitation

43 that the whole number shall not exceed

44 one for every thirty thousand inhabitants.

45If we review the constitutions of the several States,

46 we shall find that some of them contain

47 no determinate regulations on this subject,

48 that others correspond pretty much on this point

49 with the federal Constitution,

50 and that the most effectual security in any of them

51 is resolvable into a mere directory provision.

522.

53As far as experience has taken place on this subject,

54 a gradual increase of representatives

55 under the State constitutions

56 has at least kept pace

57 with that of the constituents,

58 and it appears that the former have been as ready

59 to concur in such measures

60 as the latter have been to call for them.

613.

62There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution

63 which insures a watchful attention

64 in a majority both of the people

65 and of their representatives

66 to a constitutional augmentation of the latter.

67The peculiarity lies in this,

68 that one branch of the legislature

69 is a representation of citizens,

70 the other of the States:

71 in the former, consequently,

72 the larger States will have most weight;

73 in the latter, the advantage

74 will be in favor of the smaller States.

75From this circumstance it may with certainty be inferred

76 that the larger States will be strenuous advocates

77 for increasing the number and weight

78 of that part of the legislature

79 in which their influence predominates.

80And it so happens

81 that four only of the largest

82 will have a majority of the whole votes

83 in the House of Representatives.

84Should the representatives or people, therefore,

85 of the smaller States oppose at any time

86 a reasonable addition of members,

87 a coalition of a very few States

88 will be sufficient to overrule the opposition;

89 a coalition which,

90 notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices

91 which might prevent it on ordinary occasions,

92 would not fail to take place,

93 when not merely prompted by common interest,

94 but justified by equity

95 and the principles of the Constitution.

96It may be alleged, perhaps,

97 that the Senate would be prompted by like motives

98 to an adverse coalition;

99 and as their concurrence would be indispensable,

100 the just and constitutional views

101 of the other branch might be defeated.

102This is the difficulty

103 which has probably created

104 the most serious apprehensions

105 in the jealous friends

106 of a numerous representation.

107Fortunately it is among the difficulties which,

108 existing only in appearance,

109 vanish on a close and accurate inspection.

110The following reflections will, if I mistake not,

111 be admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory

112 on this point.

113Notwithstanding the equal authority

114 which will subsist between the two houses

115 on all legislative subjects,

116 except the originating of money bills,

117 it cannot be doubted

118 that the House,

119 composed of the greater number of members,

120 when supported by the more powerful States,

121 and speaking the known and determined sense

122 of a majority of the people,

123 will have no small advantage

124 in a question depending

125 on the comparative firmness of the two houses.

126This advantage must be increased

127 by the consciousness, felt by the same side

128 of being supported in its demands

129 by right, by reason, and by the Constitution;

130 and the consciousness, on the opposite side,

131 of contending against the force

132 of all these solemn considerations.

133It is farther to be considered,

134 that in the gradation between the smallest

135 and largest States,

136 there are several,

137 which, though most likely in general

138 to arrange themselves among the former

139 are too little removed in extent and population

140 from the latter,

141 to second an opposition

142 to their just and legitimate pretensions.

143Hence it is by no means certain

144 that a majority of votes, even in the Senate,

145 would be unfriendly to proper augmentations

146 in the number of representatives.

147It will not be looking too far to add,

148 that the senators from all the new States

149 may be gained over to the just views

150 of the House of Representatives,

151 by an expedient too obvious to be overlooked.

152As these States will, for a great length of time,

153 advance in population with peculiar rapidity,

154 they will be interested in frequent reapportionments

155 of the representatives

156 to the number of inhabitants.

157The large States, therefore,

158 who will prevail in the House of Representatives,

159 will have nothing to do

160 but to make reapportionments and augmentations

161 mutually conditions of each other;

162 and the senators from all the most growing States

163 will be bound to contend for the latter,

164 by the interest which their States

165 will feel in the former.

166These considerations seem to afford ample security

167 on this subject,

168 and ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears

169 which have been indulged with regard to it.

170Admitting, however,

171 that they should all be insufficient

172 to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller States,

173 or their predominant influence

174 in the councils of the Senate,

175 a constitutional and infallible resource still remains

176 with the larger States,

177 by which they will be able at all times

178 to accomplish their just purposes.

179The House of Representatives cannot only refuse,

180 but they alone can propose,

181 the supplies requisite

182 for the support of government.

183They, in a word, hold the purse

184 that powerful instrument

185 by which we behold,

186 in the history of the British Constitution,

187 an infant and humble representation of the people

188 gradually enlarging the sphere

189 of its activity and importance,

190 and finally reducing,

191 as far as it seems to have wished,

192 all the overgrown prerogatives

193 of the other branches of the government.

194This power over the purse may, in fact,

195 be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon

196 with which any constitution can arm

197 the immediate representatives of the people,

198 for obtaining a redress of every grievance,

199 and for carrying into effect

200 every just and salutary measure.

201But will not the House of Representatives

202 be as much interested as the Senate

203 in maintaining the government

204 in its proper functions,

205 and will they not therefore be unwilling

206 to stake its existence or its reputation

207 on the pliancy of the Senate?

208Or, if such a trial of firmness

209 between the two branches were hazarded,

210 would not the one be as likely first to yield

211 as the other?

212These questions will create no difficulty

213 with those who reflect

214 that in all cases the smaller the number,

215 and the more permanent and conspicuous the station,

216 of men in power,

217 the stronger must be the interest

218 which they will individually feel

219 in whatever concerns the government.

220Those who represent the dignity of their country

221 in the eyes of other nations,

222 will be particularly sensible

223 to every prospect of public danger,

224 or of dishonorable stagnation in public affairs.

225To those causes we are to ascribe

226 the continual triumph of the British House of Commons

227 over the other branches of the government,

228 whenever the engine of a money bill

229 has been employed.

230An absolute inflexibility on the side of the latter,

231 although it could not have failed

232 to involve every department of the state

233 in the general confusion,

234 has neither been apprehended nor experienced.

235The utmost degree of firmness

236 that can be displayed

237 by the federal Senate or President,

238 will not be more than equal to a resistance

239 in which they will be supported

240 by constitutional and patriotic principles.

241In this review of the Constitution

242 of the House of Representatives,

243 I have passed over the circumstances of economy,

244 which, in the present state of affairs,

245 might have had some effect

246 in lessening the temporary

247 number of representatives,

248 and a disregard of which would probably have been

249 as rich a theme of declamation

250 against the Constitution

251 as has been shown

252 by the smallness of the number proposed.

253I omit also any remarks

254 on the difficulty which might be found,

255 under present circumstances,

256 in engaging in the federal service

257 a large number of such characters

258 as the people will probably elect.

259One observation, however, I must be permitted to add

260 on this subject as claiming, in my judgment,

261 a very serious attention.

262It is, that in all legislative assemblies

263 the greater the number composing them may be,

264 the fewer will be the men

265 who will in fact direct their proceedings.

266In the first place,

267 the more numerous an assembly may be,

268 of whatever characters composed,

269 the greater is known to be the ascendency

270 of passion over reason.

271In the next place, the larger the number,

272 the greater will be the proportion of members

273 of limited information and of weak capacities.

274Now, it is precisely on characters of this description

275 that the eloquence and address of the few

276 are known to act with all their force.

277In the ancient republics,

278 where the whole body of the people assembled in person,

279 a single orator, or an artful statesman,

280 was generally seen to rule

281 with as complete a sway

282 as if a sceptre had been placed in his single hand.

283On the same principle,

284 the more multitudinous a representative assembly

285 may be rendered,

286 the more it will partake of the infirmities

287 incident to collective meetings of the people.

288Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning,

289 and passion the slave of sophistry and declamation.

290The people can never err more

291 than in supposing that by multiplying

292 their representatives

293 beyond a certain limit,

294 they strengthen the barrier

295 against the government of a few.

296Experience will forever admonish them

297 that, on the contrary,

298 AFTER SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER

299 FOR THE PURPOSES OF SAFETY,

300 OF LOCAL INFORMATION,

301 AND OF DIFFUSIVE SYMPATHY WITH THE WHOLE SOCIETY,

302 they will counteract their own views

303 by every addition to their representatives.

304The countenance of the government

305 may become more democratic,

306 but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic.

307The machine will be enlarged,

308 but the fewer, and often the more secret,

309 will be the springs

310 by which its motions are directed.

311As connected with the objection

312 against the number of representatives,

313 may properly be here noticed,

314 that which has been suggested

315 against the number made competent

316 for legislative business.

317It has been said

318 that more than a majority ought to have been required

319 for a quorum;

320 and in particular cases, if not in all,

321 more than a majority of a quorum for a decision.

322That some advantages might have resulted

323 from such a precaution, cannot be denied.

324It might have been an additional shield

325 to some particular interests,

326 and another obstacle generally

327 to hasty and partial measures.

328But these considerations are outweighed

329 by the inconveniences in the opposite scale.

330In all cases where justice or the general good

331 might require new laws to be passed,

332 or active measures to be pursued,

333 the fundamental principle of free government

334 would be reversed.

335It would be no longer the majority that would rule:

336 the power would be transferred to the minority.

337Were the defensive privilege limited to particular cases,

338 an interested minority might take advantage of it

339 to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices

340 to the general weal,

341 or, in particular emergencies,

342 to extort unreasonable indulgences.

343Lastly, it would facilitate and foster

344 the baneful practice of secessions;

345 a practice which has shown itself even in States

346 where a majority only is required;

347 a practice subversive of all the principles

348 of order and regular government;

349 a practice which leads more directly

350 to public convulsions,

351 and the ruin of popular governments,

352 than any other which has yet been displayed

353 among us.

354PUBLIUS.