1787 Federalist 57 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 57

2The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan

3to Elevate the Few at the Expense

4of the Many Considered in Connection

5with Representation

6From the New York Packet.

7Tuesday, February 19, 1788.

8HAMILTON OR MADISON

9To the People of the State of New York:

10THE THIRD charge against the House of Representatives

11 is, that it will be taken from that class of citizens

12 which will have least sympathy

13 with the mass of the people,

14 and be most likely to aim

15 at an ambitious sacrifice of the many

16 to the aggrandizement of the few.

17Of all the objections which have been framed

18 against the federal Constitution,

19 this is perhaps the most extraordinary.

20Whilst the objection itself is levelled

21 against a pretended oligarchy,

22 the principle of it strikes

23 at the very root of republican government.

24The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be,

25 first to obtain for rulers men

26 who possess most wisdom to discern,

27 and most virtue to pursue,

28 the common good of the society;

29 and in the next place,

30 to take the most effectual precautions

31 for keeping them virtuous

32 whilst they continue to hold their public trust.

33The elective mode of obtaining rulers

34 is the characteristic policy of republican government.

35The means relied on in this form of government

36 for preventing their degeneracy

37 are numerous and various.

38The most effectual one,

39 is such a limitation of the term of appointments

40 as will maintain a proper responsibility

41 to the people.

42Let me now ask what circumstance there is

43 in the constitution of the House of Representatives

44 that violates the principles

45 of republican government,

46 or favors the elevation of the few

47 on the ruins of the many?

48Let me ask whether every circumstance is not,

49 on the contrary, strictly conformable

50 to these principles,

51 and scrupulously impartial

52 to the rights and pretensions

53 of every class and description of citizens?

54Who are to be the electors

55 of the federal representatives?

56Not the rich, more than the poor;

57 not the learned, more than the ignorant;

58 not the haughty heirs of distinguished names,

59 more than the humble sons of obscurity

60 and unpropitious fortune.

61The electors are to be the great body

62 of the people of the United States.

63They are to be the same

64 who exercise the right in every State

65 of electing the corresponding branch

66 of the legislature of the State.

67Who are to be the objects of popular choice?

68Every citizen whose merit may recommend him

69 to the esteem and confidence of his country.

70No qualification of wealth, of birth,

71 of religious faith, or of civil profession

72 is permitted to fetter the judgement

73 or disappoint the inclination of the people.

74If we consider the situation of the men

75 on whom the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens

76 may confer the representative trust,

77 we shall find it involving every security

78 which can be devised or desired

79 for their fidelity to their constituents.

80In the first place,

81 as they will have been distinguished

82 by the preference of their fellow-citizens,

83 we are to presume that in general

84 they will be somewhat distinguished also

85 by those qualities which entitle them to it,

86 and which promise a sincere and scrupulous regard

87 to the nature of their engagements.

88In the second place,

89 they will enter into the public service

90 under circumstances which cannot fail

91 to produce a temporary affection at least

92 to their constituents.

93There is in every breast a sensibility

94 to marks of honor, of favor, of esteem,

95 and of confidence,

96 which, apart from all considerations of interest,

97 is some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns.

98Ingratitude is a common topic of declamation

99 against human nature;

100 and it must be confessed

101 that instances of it are but too

102 frequent and flagrant,

103 both in public and in private life.

104But the universal and extreme indignation

105 which it inspires

106 is itself a proof of the energy and prevalence

107 of the contrary sentiment.

108In the third place,

109 those ties which bind the representative

110 to his constituents

111 are strengthened by motives

112 of a more selfish nature.

113His pride and vanity attach him

114 to a form of government which favors his pretensions

115 and gives him a share

116 in its honors and distinctions.

117Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained

118 by a few aspiring characters,

119 it must generally happen

120 that a great proportion of the men

121 deriving their advancement

122 from their influence with the people,

123 would have more to hope

124 from a preservation of the favor,

125 than from innovations in the government

126 subversive of the authority of the people.

127All these securities, however,

128 would be found very insufficient

129 without the restraint of frequent elections.

130Hence, in the fourth place,

131 the House of Representatives is so constituted

132 as to support in the members

133 an habitual recollection

134 of their dependence on the people.

135Before the sentiments impressed on their minds

136 by the mode of their elevation

137 can be effaced by the exercise of power,

138 they will be compelled to anticipate the moment

139 when their power is to cease,

140 when their exercise of it is to be reviewed,

141 and when they must descend to the level

142 from which they were raised;

143 there forever to remain

144 unless a faithful discharge of their trust

145 shall have established their title

146 to a renewal of it.

147I will add, as a fifth circumstance

148 in the situation of the House of Representatives,

149 restraining them from oppressive measures,

150 that they can make no law

151 which will not have its full operation

152 on themselves and their friends,

153 as well as on the great mass of the society.

154This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds

155 by which human policy can connect

156 the rulers and the people together.

157It creates between them

158 that communion of interests

159 and sympathy of sentiments,

160 of which few governments have furnished examples;

161 but without which every government

162 degenerates into tyranny.

163If it be asked,

164 what is to restrain the House of Representatives

165 from making legal discriminations

166 in favor of themselves

167 and a particular class of the society?

168I answer: the genius of the whole system;

169 the nature of just and constitutional laws;

170 and above all, the vigilant and manly spirit

171 which actuates the people of America,

172 a spirit which nourishes freedom,

173 and in return is nourished by it.

174If this spirit shall ever be so far debased

175 as to tolerate a law not obligatory

176 on the legislature, as well as on the people,

177 the people will be prepared

178 to tolerate any thing but liberty.

179Such will be the relation

180 between the House of Representatives

181 and their constituents.

182Duty, gratitude, interest, ambition itself,

183 are the chords by which they will be bound

184 to fidelity and sympathy

185 with the great mass of the people.

186It is possible that these may all be insufficient

187 to control the caprice and wickedness of man.

188But are they not all that government will admit,

189 and that human prudence can devise?

190Are they not the genuine and the characteristic means

191 by which republican government

192 provides for the liberty

193 and happiness of the people?

194Are they not the identical means

195 on which every State government in the Union

196 relies for the attainment of these important ends?

197What then are we to understand

198 by the objection which this paper has combated?

199What are we to say to the men

200 who profess the most flaming zeal

201 for republican government,

202 yet boldly impeach the fundamental principle of it;

203 who pretend to be champions

204 for the right and the capacity of the people

205 to choose their own rulers,

206 yet maintain that they will prefer those only

207 who will immediately and infallibly betray

208 the trust committed to them?

209Were the objection to be read by one

210 who had not seen the mode prescribed

211 by the Constitution

212 for the choice of representatives,

213 he could suppose nothing less

214 than that some unreasonable

215 qualification of property

216 was annexed to the right of suffrage;

217 or that the right of eligibility

218 was limited to persons

219 of particular families or fortunes;

220 or at least that the mode prescribed

221 by the State constitutions

222 was in some respect or other,

223 very grossly departed from.

224We have seen how far such a supposition would err,

225 as to the two first points.

226Nor would it, in fact, be less erroneous as to the last.

227The only difference discoverable between the two cases is,

228 that each representative of the United States

229 will be elected by five or six thousand citizens;

230 whilst in the individual States,

231 the election of a representative

232 is left to about as many hundreds.

233Will it be pretended

234 that this difference is sufficient

235 to justify an attachment to the State governments,

236 and an abhorrence to the federal government?

237If this be the point on which the objection turns,

238 it deserves to be examined.

239Is it supported by REASON?

240This cannot be said,

241 without maintaining

242 that five or six thousand citizens

243 are less capable of choosing a fit representative,

244 or more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one,

245 than five or six hundred.

246Reason, on the contrary, assures us,

247 that as in so great a number

248 a fit representative would be

249 most likely to be found,

250 so the choice would be less likely

251 to be diverted from him

252 by the intrigues of the ambitious

253 or the ambitious or the bribes of the rich.

254Is the CONSEQUENCE from this doctrine admissible?

255If we say that five or six hundred citizens

256 are as many as can jointly exercise

257 their right of suffrage,

258 must we not deprive the people

259 of the immediate choice of their public servants,

260 in every instance

261 where the administration of the government

262 does not require as many of them

263 as will amount to one for that number of citizens?

264Is the doctrine warranted by FACTS?

265It was shown in the last paper,

266 that the real representation

267 in the British House of Commons

268 very little exceeds the proportion

269 of one for every thirty thousand inhabitants.

270Besides a variety of powerful causes not existing here,

271 and which favor in that country

272 the pretensions of rank and wealth,

273 no person is eligible as a representative of a county,

274 unless he possess real estate

275 of the clear value

276 of six hundred pounds sterling per year;

277 nor of a city or borough,

278 unless he possess a like estate

279 of half that annual value.

280To this qualification

281 on the part of the county representatives

282 is added another on the part of the county electors,

283 which restrains the right of suffrage

284 to persons having a freehold estate

285 of the annual value of more than

286 twenty pounds sterling,

287 according to the present rate of money.

288Notwithstanding these unfavorable circumstances,

289 and notwithstanding some very unequal laws

290 in the British code,

291 it cannot be said

292 that the representatives of the nation

293 have elevated the few on the ruins of the many.

294But we need not resort to foreign experience

295 on this subject.

296Our own is explicit and decisive.

297The districts in New Hampshire

298 in which the senators are chosen immediately

299 by the people,

300 are nearly as large as will be necessary

301 for her representatives in the Congress.

302Those of Massachusetts are larger

303 than will be necessary for that purpose;

304 and those of New York still more so.

305In the last State the members of Assembly

306 for the cities and counties of New York and Albany

307 are elected by very nearly as many voters

308 as will be entitled to a representative

309 in the Congress,

310 calculating on the number

311 of sixty-five representatives only.

312It makes no difference

313 that in these senatorial districts and counties

314 a number of representatives

315 are voted for by each elector at the same time.

316If the same electors at the same time

317 are capable of choosing four or five representatives,

318 they cannot be incapable of choosing one.

319Pennsylvania is an additional example.

320Some of her counties,

321 which elect her State representatives,

322 are almost as large as her districts will be

323 by which her federal representatives

324 will be elected.

325The city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain

326 between fifty and sixty thousand souls.

327It will therefore form nearly two districts

328 for the choice of federal representatives.

329It forms, however, but one county,

330 in which every elector votes

331 for each of its representatives

332 in the State legislature.

333And what may appear to be still more directly

334 to our purpose,

335 the whole city actually elects a SINGLE MEMBER

336 for the executive council.

337This is the case in all the other counties of the State.

338Are not these facts the most satisfactory proofs

339 of the fallacy which has been employed

340 against the branch of the federal government

341 under consideration?

342Has it appeared on trial

343 that the senators of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,

344 and New York,

345 or the executive council of Pennsylvania,

346 or the members of the Assembly

347 in the two last States,

348 have betrayed any peculiar disposition

349 to sacrifice the many to the few,

350 or are in any respect less worthy of their places

351 than the representatives and magistrates

352 appointed in other States

353 by very small divisions of the people?

354But there are cases of a stronger complexion

355 than any which I have yet quoted.

356One branch of the legislature of Connecticut

357 is so constituted

358 that each member of it

359 is elected by the whole State.

360So is the governor of that State,

361 of Massachusetts, and of this State,

362 and the president of New Hampshire.

363I leave every man to decide

364 whether the result of any one of these experiments

365 can be said to countenance a suspicion,

366 that a diffusive mode of choosing representatives

367 of the people

368 tends to elevate traitors

369 and to undermine the public liberty.

370PUBLIUS.