1787 Federalist 56 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 56

2The Same Subject Continued

3(The Total Number

4of the House of Representatives)

5From the New York Packet.

6Tuesday, February 19, 1788.

7HAMILTON OR MADISON

8To the People of the State of New York:

9THE SECOND charge against the House of Representatives

10 is, that it will be too small

11 to possess a due knowledge

12 of the interests of its constituents.

13As this objection evidently proceeds

14 from a comparison of the proposed number

15 of representatives

16 with the great extent of the United States,

17 the number of their inhabitants,

18 and the diversity of their interests,

19 without taking into view at the same time

20 the circumstances which will distinguish

21 the Congress from other legislative bodies,

22 the best answer that can be given to it

23 will be a brief explanation of these peculiarities.

24It is a sound and important principle

25 that the representative ought to be acquainted

26 with the interests and circumstances

27 of his constituents.

28But this principle can extend no further

29 than to those circumstances and interests

30 to which the authority and care

31 of the representative relate.

32An ignorance of a variety

33 of minute and particular objects,

34 which do not lie within the compass of legislation,

35 is consistent with every attribute necessary

36 to a due performance of the legislative trust.

37In determining the extent of information required

38 in the exercise of a particular authority,

39 recourse then must be had

40 to the objects within the purview

41 of that authority.

42What are to be the objects of federal legislation?

43Those which are of most importance,

44 and which seem most to require local knowledge,

45 are commerce, taxation, and the militia.

46A proper regulation of commerce

47 requires much information,

48 as has been elsewhere remarked;

49 but as far as this information relates

50 to the laws and local situation

51 of each individual State,

52 a very few representatives

53 would be very sufficient vehicles of it

54 to the federal councils.

55Taxation will consist, in a great measure,

56 of duties which will be involved

57 in the regulation of commerce.

58So far the preceding remark

59 is applicable to this object.

60As far as it may consist of internal collections,

61 a more diffusive knowledge

62 of the circumstances of the State

63 may be necessary.

64But will not this also be possessed

65 in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men,

66 diffusively elected within the State?

67Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts,

68 and it will be found

69 that there will be no peculiar local interests

70 in either,

71 which will not be within the knowledge

72 of the representative of the district.

73Besides this source of information,

74 the laws of the State,

75 framed by representatives from every part of it,

76 will be almost of themselves a sufficient guide.

77In every State there have been made,

78 and must continue to be made,

79 regulations on this subject

80 which will, in many cases,

81 leave little more to be done

82 by the federal legislature,

83 than to review the different laws,

84 and reduce them in one general act.

85A skillful individual in his closet

86 with all the local codes before him,

87 might compile a law on some subjects of taxation

88 for the whole union,

89 without any aid from oral information,

90 and it may be expected

91 that whenever internal taxes may be necessary,

92 and particularly in cases requiring uniformity

93 throughout the States,

94 the more simple objects will be preferred.

95To be fully sensible of the facility

96 which will be given to this branch

97 of federal legislation

98 by the assistance of the State codes,

99 we need only suppose for a moment

100 that this or any other State

101 were divided into a number of parts,

102 each having and exercising within itself

103 a power of local legislation.

104Is it not evident

105 that a degree of local information

106 and preparatory labor

107 would be found in the several volumes

108 of their proceedings,

109 which would very much shorten the labors

110 of the general legislature,

111 and render a much smaller number of members

112 sufficient for it?

113The federal councils will derive great advantage

114 from another circumstance.

115The representatives of each State

116 will not only bring with them

117 a considerable knowledge of its laws,

118 and a local knowledge

119 of their respective districts,

120 but will probably in all cases have been members,

121 and may even at the very time be members,

122 of the State legislature,

123 where all the local information and interests

124 of the State are assembled,

125 and from whence they may easily be conveyed

126 by a very few hands

127 into the legislature of the United States.

128The observations made on the subject of taxation

129 apply with greater force to the case of the militia.

130For however different the rules of discipline

131 may be in different States,

132 they are the same throughout each particular State;

133 and depend on circumstances

134 which can differ but little

135 in different parts of the same State.

136The attentive reader will discern

137 that the reasoning here used,

138 to prove the sufficiency

139 of a moderate number of representatives,

140 does not in any respect contradict

141 what was urged on another occasion

142 with regard to the extensive information

143 which the representatives ought to possess,

144 and the time that might be necessary

145 for acquiring it.

146This information, so far as it may relate

147 to local objects,

148 is rendered necessary and difficult,

149 not by a difference of laws

150 and local circumstances within a single State,

151 but of those among different States.

152Taking each State by itself,

153 its laws are the same,

154 and its interests but little diversified.

155A few men, therefore, will possess

156 all the knowledge requisite

157 for a proper representation of them.

158Were the interests and affairs

159 of each individual State perfectly simple and uniform,

160 a knowledge of them in one part

161 would involve a knowledge of them in every other,

162 and the whole State might be competently represented

163 by a single member taken from any part of it.

164On a comparison of the different States together,

165 we find a great dissimilarity in their laws,

166 and in many other circumstances

167 connected with the objects of federal legislation,

168 with all of which the federal representatives

169 ought to have some acquaintance.

170Whilst a few representatives, therefore,

171 from each State,

172 may bring with them a due knowledge of their own State,

173 every representative will have much

174 information to acquire

175 concerning all the other States.

176The changes of time, as was formerly remarked,

177 on the comparative situation of the different States,

178 will have an assimilating effect.

179The effect of time on the internal affairs of the States,

180 taken singly, will be just the contrary.

181At present some of the States

182 are little more than a society of husbandmen.

183Few of them have made much progress

184 in those branches of industry

185 which give a variety and complexity

186 to the affairs of a nation.

187These, however, will in all of them

188 be the fruits of a more advanced population,

189 and will require, on the part of each State,

190 a fuller representation.

191The foresight of the convention

192 has accordingly taken care

193 that the progress of population

194 may be accompanied with a proper increase

195 of the representative branch of the government.

196The experience of Great Britain,

197 which presents to mankind so many political lessons,

198 both of the monitory and exemplary kind,

199 and which has been frequently consulted

200 in the course of these inquiries,

201 corroborates the result of the reflections

202 which we have just made.

203The number of inhabitants

204 in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland

205 cannot be stated at less than eight millions.

206The representatives of these eight millions

207 in the House of Commons

208 amount to five hundred and fifty-eight.

209Of this number, one ninth are elected

210 by three hundred and sixty-four persons,

211 and one half,

212 by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three

213 persons. 1

214It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected,

215 and who do not even reside among the people at large,

216 can add any thing either

217 to the security of the people

218 against the government,

219 or to the knowledge of their circumstances

220 and interests in the legislative councils.

221On the contrary, it is notorious,

222 that they are more frequently

223 the representatives and instruments

224 of the executive magistrate,

225 than the guardians and advocates

226 of the popular rights.

227They might therefore, with great propriety,

228 be considered as something more

229 than a mere deduction

230 from the real representatives of the nation.

231We will, however, consider them in this light alone,

232 and will not extend the deduction

233 to a considerable number of others,

234 who do not reside among their constitutents,

235 are very faintly connected with them,

236 and have very little particular knowledge

237 of their affairs.

238With all these concessions,

239 two hundred and seventy-nine persons only

240 will be the depository of the safety, interest,

241 and happiness of eight millions

242 that is to say,

243 there will be one representative only

244 to maintain the rights and explain the situation

245 OF TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND

246 SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY constitutents,

247 in an assembly exposed

248 to the whole force of executive influence,

249 and extending its authority

250 to every object of legislation

251 within a nation whose affairs

252 are in the highest degree diversified

253 and complicated.

254Yet it is very certain,

255 not only that a valuable portion of freedom

256 has been preserved under all these circumstances,

257 but that the defects in the British code

258 are chargeable, in a very small proportion,

259 on the ignorance of the legislature

260 concerning the circumstances of the people.

261Allowing to this case the weight which is due to it,

262 and comparing it with that

263 of the House of Representatives

264 as above explained

265 it seems to give the fullest assurance,

266 that a representative

267 for every THIRTY THOUSAND INHABITANTS

268 will render the latter

269 both a safe and competent guardian

270 of the interests which will be confided to it.

271PUBLIUS.

2721 Burgh's "Political Disquisitions."