1787 Federalist 55 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 55

2The Total Number

3of the House of Representatives

4From the New York Packet.

5Friday, February 15, 1788.

6HAMILTON OR MADISON

7To the People of the State of New York:

8THE number of which the House of Representatives

9 is to consist,

10 forms another and a very interesting point of view,

11 under which this branch of the federal legislature

12 may be contemplated.

13Scarce any article, indeed, in the whole Constitution

14 seems to be rendered more worthy of attention,

15 by the weight of character

16 and the apparent force of argument

17 with which it has been assailed.

18The charges exhibited against it are,

19 first, that so small a number of representatives

20 will be an unsafe depositary

21 of the public interests;

22 secondly, that they will not possess

23 a proper knowledge of the local circumstances

24 of their numerous constituents;

25 thirdly, that they will be taken

26 from that class of citizens

27 which will sympathize least

28 with the feelings of the mass of the people,

29 and be most likely to aim

30 at a permanent elevation of the few

31 on the depression of the many;

32 fourthly, that defective as the number will be

33 in the first instance,

34 it will be more and more disproportionate,

35 by the increase of the people,

36 and the obstacles which will prevent

37 a correspondent increase of the representatives.

38In general it may be remarked on this subject,

39 that no political problem

40 is less susceptible of a precise solution

41 than that which relates to the number

42 most convenient for a representative legislature;

43 nor is there any point

44 on which the policy of the several States

45 is more at variance,

46 whether we compare their legislative assemblies

47 directly with each other,

48 or consider the proportions

49 which they respectively bear

50 to the number of their constituents.

51Passing over the difference

52 between the smallest and largest States,

53 as Delaware,

54 whose most numerous branch

55 consists of twenty-one representatives,

56 and Massachusetts,

57 where it amounts to between three and four hundred,

58 a very considerable difference is observable

59 among States nearly equal in population.

60The number of representatives in Pennsylvania

61 is not more than one fifth

62 of that in the State last mentioned.

63New York, whose population is to that of South Carolina

64 as six to five,

65 has little more than one third

66 of the number of representatives.

67As great a disparity prevails

68 between the States of Georgia and Delaware

69 or Rhode Island.

70In Pennsylvania, the representatives

71 do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents

72 than of one for every four or five thousand.

73In Rhode Island,

74 they bear a proportion of at least one

75 for every thousand.

76And according to the constitution of Georgia,

77 the proportion may be carried

78 to one to every ten electors;

79 and must unavoidably far exceed the proportion

80 in any of the other States.

81Another general remark to be made is,

82 that the ratio between the representatives

83 and the people

84 ought not to be the same

85 where the latter are very numerous

86 as where they are very few.

87Were the representatives in Virginia

88 to be regulated by the standard in Rhode Island,

89 they would, at this time,

90 amount to between four and five hundred;

91 and twenty or thirty years hence, to a thousand.

92On the other hand, the ratio of Pennsylvania,

93 if applied to the State of Delaware,

94 would reduce the representative assembly

95 of the latter to seven or eight members.

96Nothing can be more fallacious

97 than to found our political calculations

98 on arithmetical principles.

99Sixty or seventy men

100 may be more properly trusted

101 with a given degree of power than six or seven.

102But it does not follow

103 that six or seven hundred

104 would be proportionably a better depositary.

105And if we carry on the supposition

106 to six or seven thousand,

107 the whole reasoning ought to be reversed.

108The truth is,

109 that in all cases a certain number at least

110 seems to be necessary

111 to secure the benefits of free consultation

112 and discussion,

113 and to guard against too easy a combination

114 for improper purposes;

115 as, on the other hand,

116 the number ought at most

117 to be kept within a certain limit,

118 in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance

119 of a multitude.

120In all very numerous assemblies,

121 of whatever character composed,

122 passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason.

123Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates,

124 every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.

125It is necessary also to recollect here

126 the observations which were applied

127 to the case of biennial elections.

128For the same reason

129 that the limited powers of the Congress,

130 and the control of the State legislatures,

131 justify less frequent elections

132 than the public safely might otherwise require,

133 the members of the Congress need be less numerous

134 than if they possessed

135 the whole power of legislation,

136 and were under no other

137 than the ordinary restraints

138 of other legislative bodies.

139With these general ideas in our mind,

140 let us weigh the objections

141 which have been stated

142 against the number of members proposed

143 for the House of Representatives.

144It is said, in the first place,

145 that so small a number

146 cannot be safely trusted with so much power.

147The number of which this branch of the legislature

148 is to consist, at the outset of the government,

149 will be sixtyfive.

150Within three years a census is to be taken,

151 when the number may be augmented

152 to one for every thirty thousand inhabitants;

153 and within every successive period of ten years

154 the census is to be renewed,

155 and augmentations may continue to be made

156 under the above limitation.

157It will not be thought an extravagant conjecture

158 that the first census will,

159 at the rate of one for every thirty thousand,

160 raise the number of representatives

161 to at least one hundred.

162Estimating the negroes in the proportion of three fifths,

163 it can scarcely be doubted

164 that the population of the United States

165 will by that time, if it does not already,

166 amount to three millions.

167At the expiration of twenty-five years,

168 according to the computed rate of increase,

169 the number of representatives

170 will amount to two hundred,

171 and of fifty years, to four hundred.

172This is a number which, I presume,

173 will put an end to all fears

174 arising from the smallness of the body.

175I take for granted here what I shall,

176 in answering the fourth objection, hereafter show,

177 that the number of representatives

178 will be augmented from time to time

179 in the manner provided by the Constitution.

180On a contrary supposition,

181 I should admit the objection

182 to have very great weight indeed.

183The true question to be decided then is,

184 whether the smallness of the number,

185 as a temporary regulation,

186 be dangerous to the public liberty?

187Whether sixty-five members for a few years,

188 and a hundred or two hundred for a few more,

189 be a safe depositary

190 for a limited and well-guarded power

191 of legislating for the United States?

192I must own that I could not give a negative answer

193 to this question,

194 without first obliterating every impression

195 which I have received

196 with regard to the present genius

197 of the people of America,

198 the spirit which actuates the State legislatures,

199 and the principles which are incorporated

200 with the political character

201 of every class of citizens

202I am unable to conceive

203 that the people of America, in their present temper,

204 or under any circumstances

205 which can speedily happen,

206 will choose, and every second year

207 repeat the choice of,

208 sixty-five or a hundred men

209 who would be disposed to form and pursue

210 a scheme of tyranny or treachery.

211I am unable to conceive

212 that the State legislatures,

213 which must feel so many motives to watch,

214 and which possess so many means of counteracting,

215 the federal legislature,

216 would fail either to detect or to defeat

217 a conspiracy of the latter

218 against the liberties of their common constituents.

219I am equally unable to conceive

220 that there are at this time,

221 or can be in any short time,

222 in the United States,

223 any sixty-five or a hundred men

224 capable of recommending themselves

225 to the choice of the people at large,

226 who would either desire or dare,

227 within the short space of two years,

228 to betray the solemn trust committed to them.

229What change of circumstances, time,

230 and a fuller population of our country may produce,

231 requires a prophetic spirit to declare,

232 which makes no part of my pretensions.

233But judging from the circumstances now before us,

234 and from the probable state of them

235 within a moderate period of time,

236 I must pronounce

237 that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe

238 in the number of hands

239 proposed by the federal Constitution.

240From what quarter can the danger proceed?

241Are we afraid of foreign gold?

242If foreign gold could so easily corrupt

243 our federal rulers

244 and enable them to ensnare and betray

245 their constituents,

246 how has it happened

247 that we are at this time

248 a free and independent nation?

249The Congress which conducted us through the Revolution

250 was a less numerous body than their successors will be;

251 they were not chosen by, nor responsible to,

252 their fellowcitizens at large;

253 though appointed from year to year,

254 and recallable at pleasure,

255 they were generally continued for three years,

256 and prior to the ratification

257 of the federal articles,

258 for a still longer term.

259They held their consultations

260 always under the veil of secrecy;

261 they had the sole transaction of our affairs

262 with foreign nations;

263 through the whole course of the war

264 they had the fate of their country

265 more in their hands

266 than it is to be hoped will ever be the case

267 with our future representatives;

268 and from the greatness of the prize at stake,

269 and the eagerness of the party which lost it,

270 it may well be supposed

271 that the use of other means than force

272 would not have been scrupled.

273Yet we know by happy experience

274 that the public trust was not betrayed;

275 nor has the purity of our public councils

276 in this particular ever suffered,

277 even from the whispers of calumny.

278Is the danger apprehended

279 from the other branches of the federal government?

280But where are the means to be found

281 by the President, or the Senate, or both?

282Their emoluments of office, it is to be presumed,

283 will not, and without a previous corruption

284 of the House of Representatives cannot,

285 more than suffice for very different purposes;

286 their private fortunes,

287 as they must allbe American citizens,

288 cannot possibly be sources of danger.

289The only means, then, which they can possess,

290 will be in the dispensation of appointments.

291Is it here that suspicion rests her charge?

292Sometimes we are told

293 that this fund of corruption is to be exhausted

294 by the President in subduing

295 the virtue of the Senate.

296Now, the fidelity of the other House

297 is to be the victim.

298The improbability of such a mercenary

299 and perfidious combination

300 of the several members of government,

301 standing on as different foundations

302 as republican principles will well admit,

303 and at the same time accountable

304 to the society over which they are placed,

305 ought alone to quiet this apprehension.

306But, fortunately, the Constitution

307 has provided a still further safeguard.

308The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible

309 to any civil offices that may be created,

310 or of which the emoluments may be increased,

311 during the term of their election.

312No offices therefore can be dealt out

313 to the existing members

314 but such as may become vacant

315 by ordinary casualties:

316 and to suppose that these would be sufficient

317 to purchase the guardians of the people,

318 selected by the people themselves,

319 is to renounce every rule

320 by which events ought to be calculated,

321 and to substitute an indiscriminate

322 and unbounded jealousy,

323 with which all reasoning must be vain.

324The sincere friends of liberty,

325 who give themselves up to the extravagancies

326 of this passion,

327 are not aware of the injury they do their own cause.

328As there is a degree of depravity in mankind

329 which requires a certain degree

330 of circumspection and distrust,

331 so there are other qualities in human nature

332 which justify a certain portion

333 of esteem and confidence.

334Republican government presupposes the existence

335 of these qualities in a higher degree

336 than any other form.

337Were the pictures which have been drawn

338 by the political jealousy of some among us

339 faithful likenesses of the human character,

340 the inference would be,

341 that there is not sufficient virtue among men

342 for self-government;

343 and that nothing less than the chains of despotism

344 can restrain them from destroying

345 and devouring one another.

346PUBLIUS.