1787 Federalist 54 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 54

2The Apportionment of Members

3Among the States

4From the New York Packet.

5Tuesday, February 12, 1788.

6HAMILTON OR MADISON

7To the People of the State of New York:

8THE next view which I shall take

9 of the House of Representatives

10 relates to the appointment of its members

11 to the several States

12 which is to be determined by the same rule

13 with that of direct taxes.

14It is not contended

15 that the number of people in each State

16 ought not to be the standard

17 for regulating the proportion of those

18 who are to represent the people of each State.

19The establishment of the same rule

20 for the appointment of taxes,

21 will probably be as little contested;

22 though the rule itself in this case,

23 is by no means founded on the same principle.

24In the former case,

25 the rule is understood to refer

26 to the personal rights of the people,

27 with which it has a natural

28 and universal connection.

29In the latter, it has reference

30 to the proportion of wealth,

31 of which it is in no case a precise measure,

32 and in ordinary cases a very unfit one.

33But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule

34 as applied to the relative wealth

35 and contributions of the States,

36 it is evidently the least objectionable

37 among the practicable rules,

38 and had too recently obtained

39 the general sanction of America,

40 not to have found a ready preference

41 with the convention.

42All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said;

43 but does it follow,

44 from an admission of numbers

45 for the measure of representation,

46 or of slaves combined with free citizens

47 as a ratio of taxation,

48 that slaves ought to be included

49 in the numerical rule of representation?

50Slaves are considered as property, not as persons.

51They ought therefore to be comprehended

52 in estimates of taxation which are founded on property,

53 and to be excluded from representation

54 which is regulated by a census of persons.

55This is the objection, as I understand it,

56 stated in its full force.

57I shall be equally candid

58 in stating the reasoning

59 which may be offered on the opposite side.

60"We subscribe to the doctrine,"

61 might one of our Southern brethren observe,

62 "that representation relates more immediately

63 to persons,

64 and taxation more immediately to property,

65 and we join in the application of this distinction

66 to the case of our slaves.

67But we must deny the fact,

68 that slaves are considered merely as property,

69 and in no respect whatever as persons.

70The true state of the case is,

71 that they partake of both these qualities:

72 being considered by our laws,

73 in some respects, as persons,

74 and in other respects as property.

75In being compelled to labor, not for himself,

76 but for a master;

77 in being vendible by one master to another master;

78 and in being subject at all times

79 to be restrained in his liberty

80 and chastised in his body,

81 by the capricious will of another,

82 the slave may appear to be degraded

83 from the human rank,

84 and classed with those irrational animals

85 which fall under the legal denomination

86 of property.

87In being protected, on the other hand,

88 in his life and in his limbs,

89 against the violence of all others,

90 even the master of his labor and his liberty;

91 and in being punishable himself

92 for all violence committed against others,

93 the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law

94 as a member of the society,

95 not as a part of the irrational creation;

96 as a moral person,

97 not as a mere article of property.

98The federal Constitution, therefore,

99 decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves,

100 when it views them in the mixed character

101 of persons and of property.

102This is in fact their true character.

103It is the character bestowed on them

104 by the laws under which they live;

105 and it will not be denied,

106 that these are the proper criterion;

107 because it is only under the pretext

108 that the laws have transformed the negroes

109 into subjects of property,

110 that a place is disputed them

111 in the computation of numbers;

112 and it is admitted,

113 that if the laws were to restore the rights

114 which have been taken away,

115 the negroes could no longer be refused

116 an equal share of representation

117 with the other inhabitants."

118This question may be placed in another light.

119It is agreed on all sides,

120 that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation,

121 as they are the only proper scale

122 of representation.

123Would the convention have been impartial or consistent,

124 if they had rejected the slaves

125 from the list of inhabitants,

126 when the shares of representation

127 were to be calculated,

128 and inserted them on the lists

129 when the tariff of contributions

130 was to be adjusted?

131Could it be reasonably expected,

132 that the Southern States would concur in a system,

133 which considered their slaves

134 in some degree as men,

135 when burdens were to be imposed,

136 but refused to consider them in the same light,

137 when advantages were to be conferred?

138Might not some surprise also be expressed,

139 that those who reproach the Southern States

140 with the barbarous policy

141 of considering as property

142 a part of their human brethren,

143 should themselves contend,

144 that the government to which all the States

145 are to be parties,

146 ought to consider this unfortunate race

147 more completely in the unnatural light of property,

148 than the very laws of which they complain?

149"It may be replied, perhaps,

150 that slaves are not included

151 in the estimate of representatives

152 in any of the States possessing them.

153They neither vote themselves

154 nor increase the votes of their masters.

155Upon what principle, then,

156 ought they to be taken

157 into the federal estimate of representation?

158In rejecting them altogether,

159 the Constitution would, in this respect,

160 have followed the very laws

161 which have been appealed to as the proper guide."

162"This objection is repelled by a single abservation.

163It is a fundamental principle

164 of the proposed Constitution,

165 that as the aggregate number of representatives

166 allotted to the several States

167 is to be determined by a federal rule,

168 founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants,

169 so the right of choosing this allotted number

170 in each State

171 is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants

172 as the State itself may designate.

173The qualifications on which the right of suffrage depend

174 are not, perhaps, the same in any two States.

175In some of the States the difference is very material.

176In every State,

177 a certain proportion of inhabitants

178 are deprived of this right

179 by the constitution of the State,

180 who will be included in the census

181 by which the federal Constitution

182 apportions the representatives.

183In this point of view

184 the Southern States might retort the complaint,

185 by insisting that the principle laid down

186 by the convention

187 required that no regard should be had

188 to the policy of particular States

189 towards their own inhabitants;

190 and consequently, that the slaves, as inhabitants,

191 should have been admitted into the census

192 according to their full number,

193 in like manner with other inhabitants,

194 who, by the policy of other States,

195 are not admitted to all the rights of citizens.

196A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle,

197 is waived by those who would be gainers by it.

198All that they ask is

199 that equal moderation be shown on the other side.

200Let the case of the slaves be considered,

201 as it is in truth, a peculiar one.

202Let the compromising expedient of the Constitution

203 be mutually adopted,

204 which regards them as inhabitants,

205 but as debased by servitude

206 below the equal level of free inhabitants,

207 which regards the SLAVE

208 as divested of two fifths of the MAN."

209"After all, may not another ground be taken

210 on which this article of the Constitution

211 will admit of a still more ready defense?

212We have hitherto proceeded on the idea

213 that representation related to persons only,

214 and not at all to property.

215But is it a just idea?

216Government is instituted no less

217 for protection of the property,

218 than of the persons, of individuals.

219The one as well as the other, therefore,

220 may be considered as represented

221 by those who are charged with the government.

222Upon this principle it is,

223 that in several of the States,

224 and particularly in the State of New York,

225 one branch of the government

226 is intended more especially

227 to be the guardian of property,

228 and is accordingly elected

229 by that part of the society

230 which is most interested

231 in this object of government.

232In the federal Constitution,

233 this policy does not prevail.

234The rights of property are committed

235 into the same hands with the personal rights.

236Some attention ought, therefore,

237 to be paid to property in the choice of those hands."

238"For another reason,

239 the votes allowed in the federal legislature

240 to the people of each State,

241 ought to bear some proportion

242 to the comparative wealth of the States.

243States have not, like individuals,

244 an influence over each other,

245 arising from superior advantages of fortune.

246If the law allows an opulent citizen

247 but a single vote in the choice of his representative,

248 the respect and consequence

249 which he derives from his fortunate situation

250 very frequently guide the votes of others

251 to the objects of his choice;

252 and through this imperceptible channel

253 the rights of property are conveyed

254 into the public representation.

255A State possesses no such influence over other States.

256It is not probable

257 that the richest State in the Confederacy

258 will ever influence the choice

259 of a single representative in any other State.

260Nor will the representatives

261 of the larger and richer States possess

262 any other advantage in the federal legislature,

263 over the representatives of other States,

264 than what may result

265 from their superior number alone.

266As far, therefore,

267 as their superior wealth and weight

268 may justly entitle them to any advantage,

269 it ought to be secured to them

270 by a superior share of representation.

271The new Constitution is, in this respect,

272 materially different from the existing Confederation,

273 as well as from that of the United Netherlands,

274 and other similar confederacies.

275In each of the latter,

276 the efficacy of the federal resolutions

277 depends on the subsequent and voluntary resolutions

278 of the states composing the union.

279Hence the states,

280 though possessing an equal vote in the public councils,

281 have an unequal influence,

282 corresponding with the unequal importance

283 of these subsequent and voluntary resolutions.

284Under the proposed Constitution,

285 the federal acts will take effect

286 without the necessary intervention

287 of the individual States.

288They will depend merely

289 on the majority of votes in the federal legislature,

290 and consequently each vote,

291 whether proceeding from a larger or smaller State,

292 or a State more or less wealthy or powerful,

293 will have an equal weight and efficacy:

294 in the same manner as the votes individually given

295 in a State legislature,

296 by the representatives of unequal counties

297 or other districts,

298 have each a precise equality of value and effect;

299 or if there be any difference in the case,

300 it proceeds from the difference

301 in the personal character

302 of the individual representative,

303 rather than from any regard

304 to the extent of the district from which he comes."

305Such is the reasoning

306 which an advocate for the Southern interests

307 might employ on this subject;

308 and although it may appear to be a little strained

309 in some points,

310 yet, on the whole, I must confess

311 that it fully reconciles me

312 to the scale of representation

313 which the convention have established.

314In one respect,

315 the establishment of a common measure

316 for representation and taxation

317 will have a very salutary effect.

318As the accuracy of the census

319 to be obtained by the Congress

320 will necessarily depend,

321 in a considerable degree

322 on the disposition,

323 if not on the co-operation, of the States,

324 it is of great importance

325 that the States should feel

326 as little bias as possible,

327 to swell or to reduce the amount of their numbers.

328Were their share of representation alone

329 to be governed by this rule,

330 they would have an interest in exaggerating

331 their inhabitants.

332Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone,

333 a contrary temptation would prevail.

334By extending the rule to both objects,

335 the States will have opposite interests,

336 which will control and balance each other,

337 and produce the requisite impartiality.

338PUBLIUS.