1787 Federalist 53 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 53

2The Same Subject Continued

3(The House of Representatives)

4From the New York Packet.

5Tuesday, February 12, 1788.

6HAMILTON OR MADISON

7To the People of the State of New York:

8I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded

9 of a current observation,

10 "that where annual elections end, tyranny begins."

11If it be true, as has often been remarked,

12 that sayings which become proverbial

13 are generally founded in reason,

14 it is not less true,

15 that when once established,

16 they are often applied to cases

17 to which the reason of them does not extend.

18I need not look for a proof beyond the case before us.

19What is the reason

20 on which this proverbial observation is founded?

21No man will subject himself to the ridicule

22 of pretending that any natural connection

23 subsists between the sun or the seasons,

24 and the period within which human virtue

25 can bear the temptations of power.

26Happily for mankind,

27 liberty is not, in this respect,

28 confined to any single point of time;

29 but lies within extremes,

30 which afford sufficient latitude

31 for all the variations which may be required

32 by the various situations and circumstances

33 of civil society.

34The election of magistrates might be,

35 if it were found expedient,

36 as in some instances it actually has been,

37 daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual;

38 and if circumstances may require a deviation

39 from the rule on one side,

40 why not also on the other side?

41Turning our attention to the periods

42 established among ourselves,

43 for the election of the most numerous branches

44 of the State legislatures,

45 we find them by no means coinciding

46 any more in this instance,

47 than in the elections of other civil magistrates.

48In Connecticut and Rhode Island,

49 the periods are half-yearly.

50In the other States, South Carolina excepted,

51 they are annual.

52In South Carolina they are biennial

53 as is proposed in the federal government.

54Here is a difference, as four to one,

55 between the longest and shortest periods;

56 and yet it would be not easy to show,

57 that Connecticut or Rhode Island

58 is better governed,

59 or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty,

60 than South Carolina;

61 or that either the one or the other of these States

62 is distinguished in these respects,

63 and by these causes,

64 from the States whose elections

65 are different from both.

66In searching for the grounds of this doctrine,

67 I can discover but one,

68 and that is wholly inapplicable to our case.

69The important distinction so well understood in America,

70 between a Constitution established by the people

71 and unalterable by the government,

72 and a law established by the government

73 and alterable by the government,

74 seems to have been little understood

75 and less observed in any other country.

76Wherever the supreme power of legislation has resided,

77 has been supposed to reside also

78 a full power to change the form of the government.

79Even in Great Britain,

80 where the principles of political and civil liberty

81 have been most discussed,

82 and where we hear most

83 of the rights of the Constitution,

84 it is maintained

85 that the authority of the Parliament

86 is transcendent and uncontrollable,

87 as well with regard to the Constitution,

88 as the ordinary objects of legislative provision.

89They have accordingly, in several instances,

90 actually changed, by legislative acts,

91 some of the most fundamental articles

92 of the government.

93They have in particular, on several occasions,

94 changed the period of election;

95 and, on the last occasion,

96 not only introduced septennial

97 in place of triennial elections,

98 but by the same act,

99 continued themselves in place four years

100 beyond the term for which they were elected

101 by the people.

102An attention to these dangerous practices

103 has produced a very natural alarm

104 in the votaries of free government,

105 of which frequency of elections

106 is the corner-stone;

107 and has led them to seek for some security to liberty,

108 against the danger to which it is exposed.

109Where no Constitution, paramount to the government,

110 either existed or could be obtained,

111 no constitutional security,

112 similar to that established in the United States,

113 was to be attempted.

114Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for;

115 and what better security would the case admit,

116 than that of selecting and appealing

117 to some simple and familiar portion of time,

118 as a standard for measuring

119 the danger of innovations,

120 for fixing the national sentiment,

121 and for uniting the patriotic exertions?

122The most simple and familiar portion of time,

123 applicable to the subject was that of a year;

124 and hence the doctrine has been inculcated

125 by a laudable zeal,

126 to erect some barrier

127 against the gradual innovations

128 of an unlimited government,

129 that the advance towards tyranny

130 was to be calculated by the distance of departure

131 from the fixed point of annual elections.

132But what necessity can there be

133 of applying this expedient to a government limited,

134 as the federal government will be,

135 by the authority of a paramount Constitution?

136Or who will pretend

137 that the liberties of the people of America

138 will not be more secure under biennial elections,

139 unalterably fixed by such a Constitution,

140 than those of any other nation would be,

141 where elections were annual,

142 or even more frequent,

143 but subject to alterations

144 by the ordinary power of the government?

145The second question stated is,

146 whether biennial elections be necessary or useful.

147The propriety of answering this question

148 in the affirmative

149 will appear from several very obvious considerations.

150No man can be a competent legislator

151 who does not add to an upright intention

152 and a sound judgment

153 a certain degree of knowledge

154 of the subjects on which he is to legislate.

155A part of this knowledge may be acquired

156 by means of information

157 which lie within the compass of men

158 in private as well as public stations.

159Another part can only be attained,

160 or at least thoroughly attained,

161 by actual experience in the station

162 which requires the use of it.

163The period of service, ought, therefore,

164 in all such cases,

165 to bear some proportion

166 to the extent of practical knowledge

167 requisite to the due performance of the service.

168The period of legislative service

169 established in most of the States

170 for the more numerous branch is,

171 as we have seen, one year.

172The question then may be put into this simple form:

173 does the period of two years

174 bear no greater proportion

175 to the knowledge requisite for federal legislation

176 than one year does

177 to the knowledge requisite for State legislation?

178The very statement of the question, in this form,

179 suggests the answer that ought to be given to it.

180In a single State,

181 the requisite knowledge relates to the existing laws

182 which are uniform throughout the State,

183 and with which all the citizens

184 are more or less conversant;

185 and to the general affairs of the State,

186 which lie within a small compass,

187 are not very diversified,

188 and occupy much of the attention and conversation

189 of every class of people.

190The great theatre of the United States

191 presents a very different scene.

192The laws are so far from being uniform,

193 that they vary in every State;

194 whilst the public affairs of the Union

195 are spread throughout a very extensive region,

196 and are extremely diversified

197 by the local affairs connected with them,

198 and can with difficulty be correctly learnt

199 in any other place than in the central councils

200 to which a knowledge of them will be brought

201 by the representatives of every part of the empire.

202Yet some knowledge of the affairs,

203 and even of the laws, of all the States,

204 ought to be possessed by the members

205 from each of the States.

206How can foreign trade be properly regulated

207 by uniform laws,

208 without some acquaintance with the commerce,

209 the ports, the usages,

210 and the regulatious of the different States?

211How can the trade between the different States

212 be duly regulated,

213 without some knowledge of their relative situations

214 in these and other respects?

215How can taxes be judiciously imposed

216 and effectually collected,

217 if they be not accommodated

218 to the different laws and local circumstances

219 relating to these objects in the different States?

220How can uniform regulations for the militia

221 be duly provided,

222 without a similar knowledge

223 of many internal circumstances

224 by which the States are distinguished

225 from each other?

226These are the principal objects of federal legislation,

227 and suggest most forcibly

228 the extensive information

229 which the representatives ought to acquire.

230The other interior objects

231 will require a proportional degree of information

232 with regard to them.

233It is true that all these difficulties will,

234 by degrees, be very much diminished.

235The most laborious task

236 will be the proper inauguration of the government

237 and the primeval formation of a federal code.

238Improvements on the first draughts

239 will every year become both easier and fewer.

240Past transactions of the government

241 will be a ready and accurate source of information

242 to new members.

243The affairs of the Union

244 will become more and more objects

245 of curiosity and conversation

246 among the citizens at large.

247And the increased intercourse

248 among those of different States

249 will contribute not a little

250 to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs,

251 as this again will contribute

252 to a general assimilation

253 of their manners and laws.

254But with all these abatements,

255 the business of federal legislation

256 must continue so far to exceed,

257 both in novelty and difficulty,

258 the legislative business of a single State,

259 as to justify the longer period of service

260 assigned to those who are to transact it.

261A branch of knowledge

262 which belongs to the acquirements

263 of a federal representative,

264 and which has not been mentioned

265 is that of foreign affairs.

266In regulating our own commerce

267 he ought to be not only acquainted

268 with the treaties between the United States

269 and other nations,

270 but also with the commercial policy and laws

271 of other nations.

272He ought not to be altogether ignorant

273 of the law of nations;

274 for that, as far as it is a proper object

275 of municipal legislation,

276 is submitted to the federal government.

277And although the House of Representatives

278 is not immediately to participate

279 in foreign negotiations and arrangements,

280 yet from the necessary connection

281 between the several branches of public affairs,

282 those particular branches will frequently deserve

283 attention in the ordinary course of legislation,

284 and will sometimes demand

285 particular legislative sanction and co-operation.

286Some portion of this knowledge may, no doubt,

287 be acquired in a man's closet;

288 but some of it also can only be derived

289 from the public sources of information;

290 and all of it will be acquired to best effect

291 by a practical attention to the subject

292 during the period of actual service

293 in the legislature.

294There are other considerations,

295 of less importance, perhaps,

296 but which are not unworthy of notice.

297The distance which many of the representatives

298 will be obliged to travel,

299 and the arrangements rendered necessary

300 by that circumstance,

301 might be much more serious objections

302 with fit men to this service,

303 if limited to a single year,

304 than if extended to two years.

305No argument can be drawn on this subject,

306 from the case of the delegates

307 to the existing Congress.

308They are elected annually, it is true;

309 but their re-election is considered

310 by the legislative assemblies

311 almost as a matter of course.

312The election of the representatives by the people

313 would not be governed by the same principle.

314A few of the members,

315 as happens in all such assemblies,

316 will possess superior talents;

317 will, by frequent reelections,

318 become members of long standing;

319 will be thoroughly masters of the public business,

320 and perhaps not unwilling

321 to avail themselves of those advantages.

322The greater the proportion of new members,

323 and the less the information of the bulk of the members

324 the more apt will they be

325 to fall into the snares that may be laid for them.

326This remark is no less applicable

327 to the relation which will subsist

328 between the House of Representatives

329 and the Senate.

330It is an inconvenience mingled

331 with the advantages of our frequent elections

332 even in single States,

333 where they are large,

334 and hold but one legislative session in a year,

335 that spurious elections cannot be investigated

336 and annulled in time

337 for the decision to have its due effect.

338If a return can be obtained,

339 no matter by what unlawful means,

340 the irregular member, who takes his seat of course,

341 is sure of holding it a sufficient time

342 to answer his purposes.

343Hence, a very pernicious encouragement is given

344 to the use of unlawful means,

345 for obtaining irregular returns.

346Were elections for the federal legislature to be annual,

347 this practice might become a very serious abuse,

348 particularly in the more distant States.

349Each house is, as it necessarily must be,

350 the judge of the elections, qualifications,

351 and returns of its members;

352 and whatever improvements may be suggested

353 by experience,

354 for simplifying and accelerating the process

355 in disputed cases,

356 so great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse,

357 before an illegitimate member

358 could be dispossessed of his seat,

359 that the prospect of such an event

360 would be little check

361 to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat.

362All these considerations taken together

363 warrant us in affirming,

364 that biennial elections

365 will be as useful to the affairs of the public

366 as we have seen that they will be safe

367 to the liberty of the people.

368PUBLIUS.