1787 Federalist 52 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 52

2The House of Representatives

3From the New York Packet.

4Friday, February 8, 1788.

5HAMILTON OR MADISON

6To the People of the State of New York:

7FROM the more general inquiries

8 pursued in the four last papers,

9 I pass on to a more particular examination

10 of the several parts of the government.

11I shall begin with the House of Representatives.

12The first view to be taken of this part

13 of the government

14 relates to the qualifications of the electors

15 and the elected.

16Those of the former are to be the same

17 with those of the electors

18 of the most numerous branch

19 of the State legislatures.

20The definition of the right of suffrage

21 is very justly regarded

22 as a fundamental article of republican government.

23It was incumbent on the convention, therefore,

24 to define and establish this right

25 in the Constitution.

26To have left it open

27 for the occasional regulation of the Congress,

28 would have been improper

29 for the reason just mentioned.

30To have submitted it

31 to the legislative discretion of the States,

32 would have been improper for the same reason;

33 and for the additional reason

34 that it would have rendered too dependent

35 on the State governments

36 that branch of the federal government

37 which ought to be dependent on the people alone.

38To have reduced the different qualifications

39 in the different States to one uniform rule,

40 would probably have been as dissatisfactory

41 to some of the States

42 as it would have been difficult to the convention.

43The provision made by the convention appears,

44 therefore, to be the best that lay within their option.

45It must be satisfactory to every State,

46 because it is conformable to the standard

47 already established,

48 or which may be established,

49 by the State itself.

50It will be safe to the United States,

51 because, being fixed by the State constitutions,

52 it is not alterable by the State governments,

53 and it cannot be feared

54 that the people of the States

55 will alter this part of their constitutions

56 in such a manner

57 as to abridge the rights secured to them

58 by the federal Constitution.

59The qualifications of the elected,

60 being less carefully and properly defined

61 by the State constitutions,

62 and being at the same time more susceptible

63 of uniformity,

64 have been very properly considered and regulated

65 by the convention.

66A representative of the United States

67 must be of the age of twenty-five years;

68 must have been seven years a citizen

69 of the United States;

70 must, at the time of his election,

71 be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent;

72 and, during the time of his service,

73 must be in no office under the United States.

74Under these reasonable limitations,

75 the door of this part of the federal government

76 is open to merit of every description,

77 whether native or adoptive,

78 whether young or old,

79 and without regard to poverty or wealth,

80 or to any particular profession

81 of religious faith.

82The term for which the representatives are to be elected

83 falls under a second view

84 which may be taken of this branch.

85In order to decide on the propriety of this article,

86 two questions must be considered:

87 first, whether biennial elections will,

88 in this case, be safe;

89 secondly, whether they be necessary or useful.

90First. As it is essential to liberty

91 that the government in general

92 should have a common interest with the people,

93 so it is particularly essential

94 that the branch of it under consideration

95 should have an immediate dependence on,

96 and an intimate sympathy with, the people.

97Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy

98 by which this dependence and sympathy

99 can be effectually secured.

100But what particular degree of frequency

101 may be absolutely necessary for the purpose,

102 does not appear to be susceptible

103 of any precise calculation,

104 and must depend on a variety of circumstances

105 with which it may be connected.

106Let us consult experience,

107 the guide that ought always to be followed

108 whenever it can be found.

109The scheme of representation,

110 as a substitute for a meeting

111 of the citizens in person,

112 being at most but very imperfectly known

113 to ancient polity,

114 it is in more modern times only

115 that we are to expect instructive examples.

116And even here,

117 in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive,

118 it will be proper to confine ourselves

119 to the few examples which are best known,

120 and which bear the greatest analogy

121 to our particular case.

122The first to which this character ought to be applied,

123 is the House of Commons in Great Britain.

124The history of this branch of the English Constitution,

125 anterior to the date of Magna Charta,

126 is too obscure to yield instruction.

127The very existence of it

128 has been made a question among political antiquaries.

129The earliest records of subsequent date prove

130 that parliaments were to SIT only every year;

131 not that they were to be ELECTED every year.

132And even these annual sessions were left

133 so much at the discretion of the monarch,

134 that, under various pretexts,

135 very long and dangerous intermissions

136 were often contrived by royal ambition.

137To remedy this grievance,

138 it was provided by a statute

139 in the reign of Charles II.,

140 that the intermissions should not be protracted

141 beyond a period of three years.

142On the accession of William III.,

143 when a revolution took place in the government,

144 the subject was still more seriously resumed,

145 and it was declared to be among

146 the fundamental rights of the people

147 that parliaments ought to be held FREQUENTLY.

148By another statute,

149 which passed a few years later in the same reign,

150 the term "frequently,"

151 which had alluded to the triennial period

152 settled in the time of Charles II.,

153 is reduced to a precise meaning,

154 it being expressly enacted

155 that a new parliament shall be called

156 within three years

157 after the termination of the former.

158The last change, from three to seven years,

159 is well known to have been introduced

160 pretty early in the present century,

161 under on alarm for the Hanoverian succession.

162From these facts it appears

163 that the greatest frequency of elections

164 which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom,

165 for binding the representatives

166 to their constituents,

167 does not exceed a triennial return of them.

168And if we may argue

169 from the degree of liberty retained

170 even under septennial elections,

171 and all the other vicious ingredients

172 in the parliamentary constitution,

173 we cannot doubt

174 that a reduction of the period

175 from seven to three years,

176 with the other necessary reforms,

177 would so far extend the influence of the people

178 over their representatives

179 as to satisfy us that biennial elections,

180 under the federal system,

181 cannot possibly be dangerous

182 to the requisite dependence

183 of the House of Representatives

184 on their constituents.

185Elections in Ireland, till of late,

186 were regulated entirely by the discretion of the crown,

187 and were seldom repeated,

188 except on the accession of a new prince,

189 or some other contingent event.

190The parliament which commenced with George II.

191 was continued throughout his whole reign,

192 a period of about thirty-five years.

193The only dependence of the representatives on the people

194 consisted in the right of the latter

195 to supply occasional vacancies

196 by the election of new members,

197 and in the chance of some event

198 which might produce a general new election.

199The ability also of the Irish parliament

200 to maintain the rights of their constituents,

201 so far as the disposition might exist,

202 was extremely shackled

203 by the control of the crown

204 over the subjects of their deliberation.

205Of late these shackles, if I mistake not, have been broken;

206 and octennial parliaments

207 have besides been established.

208What effect may be produced by this partial reform,

209 must be left to further experience.

210The example of Ireland, from this view of it,

211 can throw but little light on the subject.

212As far as we can draw any conclusion from it,

213 it must be that if the people of that country

214 have been able under all these disadvantages

215 to retain any liberty whatever,

216 the advantage of biennial elections

217 would secure to them every degree of liberty,

218 which might depend on a due connection

219 between their representatives and themselves.

220Let us bring our inquiries nearer home.

221The example of these States, when British colonies,

222 claims particular attention,

223 at the same time that it is so well known

224 as to require little to be said on it.

225The principle of representation,

226 in one branch of the legislature at least,

227 was established in all of them.

228But the periods of election were different.

229They varied from one to seven years.

230Have we any reason to infer,

231 from the spirit and conduct of the representatives

232 of the people, prior to the Revolution,

233 that biennial elections would have been dangerous

234 to the public liberties?

235The spirit which everywhere displayed itself

236 at the commencement of the struggle,

237 and which vanquished the obstacles to independence,

238 is the best of proofs

239 that a sufficient portion of liberty

240 had been everywhere enjoyed

241 to inspire both a sense of its worth

242 and a zeal for its proper enlargement.

243This remark holds good,

244 as well with regard to the then colonies

245 whose elections were least frequent,

246 as to those whose elections were most frequent.

247Virginia was the colony which stood first

248 in resisting the parliamentary usurpations

249 of Great Britain;

250 it was the first also in espousing, by public act,

251 the resolution of independence.

252In Virginia, nevertheless,

253 if I have not been misinformed,

254 elections under the former government were septennial.

255This particular example is brought into view,

256 not as a proof of any peculiar merit,

257 for the priority in those instances

258 was probably accidental;

259 and still less of any advantage

260 in SEPTENNIAL elections,

261 for when compared with a greater frequency

262 they are inadmissible;

263 but merely as a proof,

264 and I conceive it to be a very substantial proof,

265 that the liberties of the people

266 can be in no danger from BIENNIAL elections.

267The conclusion resulting from these examples

268 will be not a little strengthened

269 by recollecting three circumstances.

270The first is, that the federal legislature

271 will possess a part only

272 of that supreme legislative authority

273 which is vested completely

274 in the British Parliament;

275 and which, with a few exceptions,

276 was exercised by the colonial assemblies

277 and the Irish legislature.

278It is a received and well-founded maxim,

279 that where no other circumstances affect the case,

280 the greater the power is,

281 the shorter ought to be its duration;

282 and, conversely, the smaller the power,

283 the more safely may its duration be protracted.

284In the second place, it has, on another occasion,

285 been shown that the federal legislature

286 will not only be restrained

287 by its dependence on its people,

288 as other legislative bodies are,

289 but that it will be, moreover,

290 watched and controlled

291 by the several collateral legislatures,

292 which other legislative bodies are not.

293And in the third place,

294 no comparison can be made

295 between the means that will be possessed

296 by the more permanent branches

297 of the federal government

298 for seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce,

299 the House of Representatives

300 from their duty to the people,

301 and the means of influence

302 over the popular branch

303 possessed by the other branches of the government

304 above cited.

305With less power, therefore, to abuse,

306 the federal representatives can be less tempted

307 on one side,

308 and will be doubly watched on the other.

309PUBLIUS.