1787 Federalist 46 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 46

2The Influence of the State

3and Federal Governments Compared

4From the New York Packet.

5Tuesday, January 29, 1788.

6MADISON

7To the People of the State of New York:

8RESUMING the subject of the last paper,

9 I proceed to inquire

10 whether the federal government

11 or the State governments

12 will have the advantage

13 with regard to the predilection and support

14 of the people.

15Notwithstanding the different modes

16 in which they are appointed,

17 we must consider both of them

18 as substantially dependent

19 on the great body of the citizens

20 of the United States.

21I assume this position here as it respects the first,

22 reserving the proofs for another place.

23The federal and State governments

24 are in fact but different agents

25 and trustees of the people,

26 constituted with different powers,

27 and designed for different purposes.

28The adversaries of the Constitution

29 seem to have lost sight of the people altogether

30 in their reasonings on this subject;

31 and to have viewed these different establishments,

32 not only as mutual rivals and enemies,

33 but as uncontrolled by any common superior

34 in their efforts to usurp

35 the authorities of each other.

36These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error.

37They must be told

38 that the ultimate authority,

39 wherever the derivative may be found,

40 resides in the people alone,

41 and that it will not depend merely

42 on the comparative ambition or address

43 of the different governments,

44 whether either, or which of them,

45 will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction

46 at the expense of the other.

47Truth, no less than decency, requires

48 that the event in every case should be supposed

49 to depend on the sentiments and sanction

50 of their common constituents.

51Many considerations,

52 besides those suggested on a former occasion,

53 seem to place it beyond doubt

54 that the first and most natural attachment

55 of the people

56 will be to the governments

57 of their respective States.

58Into the administration of these

59 a greater number of individuals will expect to rise.

60From the gift of these

61 a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow.

62By the superintending care of these,

63 all the more domestic and personal interests

64 of the people

65 will be regulated and provided for.

66With the affairs of these,

67 the people will be more familiarly

68 and minutely conversant.

69And with the members of these,

70 will a greater proportion of the people

71 have the ties of personal acquaintance

72 and friendship,

73 and of family and party attachments;

74 on the side of these, therefore,

75 the popular bias may well be expected

76 most strongly to incline.

77Experience speaks the same language in this case.

78The federal administration,

79 though hitherto very defective

80 in comparison with what may be hoped

81 under a better system,

82 had, during the war,

83 and particularly whilst the independent fund

84 of paper emissions was in credit,

85 an activity and importance as great

86 as it can well have

87 in any future circumstances whatever.

88It was engaged, too, in a course of measures

89 which had for their object

90 the protection of everything that was dear,

91 and the acquisition of everything

92 that could be desirable to the people at large.

93It was, nevertheless, invariably found,

94 after the transient enthusiasm

95 for the early Congresses was over,

96 that the attention and attachment of the people

97 were turned anew

98 to their own particular governments;

99 that the federal council was at no time

100 the idol of popular favor;

101 and that opposition to proposed enlargements

102 of its powers and importance

103 was the side usually taken

104 by the men who wished to build

105 their political consequence

106 on the prepossessions of their fellow-citizens.

107If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked,

108 the people should in future become more partial

109 to the federal than to the State governments,

110 the change can only result

111 from such manifest and irresistible proofs

112 of a better administration,

113 as will overcome all their antecedent propensities.

114And in that case,

115 the people ought not surely to be precluded

116 from giving most of their confidence

117 where they may discover it to be most due;

118 but even in that case

119 the State governments

120 could have little to apprehend,

121 because it is only within a certain sphere

122 that the federal power can,

123 in the nature of things,

124 be advantageously administered.

125The remaining points

126 on which I propose to compare

127 the federal and State governments,

128 are the disposition and the faculty

129 they may respectively possess,

130 to resist and frustrate

131 the measures of each other.

132It has been already proved

133 that the members of the federal

134 will be more dependent

135 on the members of the State governments,

136 than the latter will be on the former.

137It has appeared also,

138 that the prepossessions of the people,

139 on whom both will depend,

140 will be more on the side of the State governments,

141 than of the federal government.

142So far as the disposition of each towards the other

143 may be influenced by these causes,

144 the State governments must clearly have the advantage.

145But in a distinct and very important point of view,

146 the advantage will lie on the same side.

147The prepossessions,

148 which the members themselves

149 will carry into the federal government,

150 will generally be favorable to the States;

151 whilst it will rarely happen,

152 that the members of the State governments

153 will carry into the public councils

154 a bias in favor of the general government.

155A local spirit will infallibly prevail

156 much more in the members of Congress,

157 than a national spirit will prevail

158 in the legislatures of the particular States.

159Every one knows

160 that a great proportion of the errors

161 committed by the State legislatures

162 proceeds from the disposition of the members

163 to sacrifice the comprehensive

164 and permanent interest

165 of the State,

166 to the particular and separate views

167 of the counties or districts in which they reside.

168And if they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy

169 to embrace the collective welfare

170 of their particular State,

171 how can it be imagined

172 that they will make the aggregate prosperity

173 of the Union,

174 and the dignity and respectability

175 of its government,

176 the objects of their affections

177 and consultations?

178For the same reason

179 that the members of the State legislatures

180 will be unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently

181 to national objects,

182 the members of the federal legislature

183 will be likely to attach themselves too much

184 to local objects.

185The States will be to the latter

186 what counties and towns are to the former.

187Measures will too often be decided

188 according to their probable effect,

189 not on the national prosperity and happiness,

190 but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits

191 of the governments and people

192 of the individual States.

193What is the spirit that has in general characterized

194 the proceedings of Congress?

195A perusal of their journals,

196 as well as the candid acknowledgments

197 of such as have had a seat in that assembly,

198 will inform us,

199 that the members have but too frequently displayed

200 the character,

201 rather of partisans of their respective States,

202 than of impartial guardians of a common interest;

203 that where on one occasion improper sacrifices

204 have been made of local considerations,

205 to the aggrandizement of the federal government,

206 the great interests of the nation have suffered

207 on a hundred,

208 from an undue attention

209 to the local prejudices, interests, and views

210 of the particular States.

211I mean not by these reflections to insinuate,

212 that the new federal government

213 will not embrace a more enlarged plan of policy

214 than the existing government may have pursued;

215 much less, that its views will be as confined

216 as those of the State legislatures;

217 but only that it will partake sufficiently

218 of the spirit of both,

219 to be disinclined to invade the rights

220 of the individual States,

221 or the preorgatives of their governments.

222The motives on the part of the State governments,

223 to augment their prerogatives

224 by defalcations from the federal government,

225 will be overruled by no reciprocal predispositions

226 in the members.

227Were it admitted, however,

228 that the Federal government may feel

229 an equal disposition with the State governments

230 to extend its power beyond the due limits,

231 the latter would still have the advantage

232 in the means of defeating such encroachments.

233If an act of a particular State,

234 though unfriendly to the national government,

235 be generally popular in that State

236 and should not too grossly violate

237 the oaths of the State officers,

238 it is executed immediately and, of course,

239 by means on the spot

240 and depending on the State alone.

241The opposition of the federal government,

242 or the interposition of federal officers,

243 would but inflame the zeal of all parties

244 on the side of the State,

245 and the evil could not be prevented or repaired,

246 if at all,

247 without the employment of means

248 which must always be resorted to

249 with reluctance and difficulty.

250On the other hand,

251 should an unwarrantable measure

252 of the federal government

253 be unpopular in particular States,

254 which would seldom fail to be the case,

255 or even a warrantable measure be so,

256 which may sometimes be the case,

257 the means of opposition to it

258 are powerful and at hand.

259The disquietude of the people;

260 their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal

261 to co-operate with the officers of the Union;

262 the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State;

263 the embarrassments created by legislative devices,

264 which would often be added on such occasions,

265 would oppose, in any State,

266 difficulties not to be despised;

267 would form, in a large State,

268 very serious impediments;

269 and where the sentiments of several adjoining States

270 happened to be in unison,

271 would present obstructions

272 which the federal government

273 would hardly be willing to encounter.

274But ambitious encroachments of the federal government,

275 on the authority of the State governments,

276 would not excite the opposition of a single State,

277 or of a few States only.

278They would be signals of general alarm.

279Every government would espouse the common cause.

280A correspondence would be opened.

281Plans of resistance would be concerted.

282One spirit would animate and conduct the whole.

283The same combinations, in short,

284 would result from an apprehension of the federal,

285 as was produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke;

286 and unless the projected innovations

287 should be voluntarily renounced,

288 the same appeal to a trial of force

289 would be made in the one case

290 as was made in the other.

291But what degree of madness

292 could ever drive the federal government

293 to such an extremity.

294In the contest with Great Britain,

295 one part of the empire was employed against the other.

296The more numerous part invaded the rights

297 of the less numerous part.

298The attempt was unjust and unwise;

299 but it was not in speculation absolutely chimerical.

300But what would be the contest in the case we are supposing?

301Who would be the parties?

302A few representatives of the people

303 would be opposed to the people themselves;

304 or rather one set of representatives

305 would be contending against thirteen sets

306 of representatives,

307 with the whole body of their common constituents

308 on the side of the latter.

309The only refuge left

310 for those who prophesy the downfall

311 of the State governments

312 is the visionary supposition

313 that the federal government

314 may previously accumulate

315 a military force for the projects of ambition.

316The reasonings contained in these papers

317 must have been employed to little purpose indeed,

318 if it could be necessary now

319 to disprove the reality of this danger.

320That the people and the States should,

321 for a sufficient period of time,

322 elect an uninterupted succession of men

323 ready to betray both;

324 that the traitors should, throughout this period,

325 uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan

326 for the extension of the military establishment;

327 that the governments and the people of the States

328 should silently and patiently behold

329 the gathering storm,

330 and continue to supply the materials,

331 until it should be prepared

332 to burst on their own heads,

333 must appear to every one

334 more like the incoherent dreams

335 of a delirious jealousy,

336 or the misjudged exaggerations

337 of a counterfeit zeal,

338 than like the sober apprehensions

339 of genuine patriotism.

340Extravagant as the supposition is,

341 let it however be made.

342Let a regular army,

343 fully equal to the resources of the country, be formed;

344 and let it be entirely at the devotion

345 of the federal government;

346 still it would not be going too far to say,

347 that the State governments,

348 with the people on their side,

349 would be able to repel the danger.

350The highest number to which,

351 according to the best computation,

352 a standing army can be carried in any country,

353 does not exceed one hundredth part

354 of the whole number of souls;

355 or one twenty-fifth part

356 of the number able to bear arms.

357This proportion would not yield, in the United States,

358 an army of more than twenty-five

359 or thirty thousand men.

360To these would be opposed a militia

361 amounting to near half a million of citizens

362 with arms in their hands,

363 officered by men chosen from among themselves,

364 fighting for their common liberties,

365 and united and conducted by governments

366 possessing their affections and confidence.

367It may well be doubted,

368 whether a militia thus circumstanced

369 could ever be conquered

370 by such a proportion of regular troops.

371Those who are best acquainted

372 with the last successful resistance of this country

373 against the British arms,

374 will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it.

375Besides the advantage of being armed,

376 which the Americans possess

377 over the people of almost every other nation,

378 the existence of subordinate governments,

379 to which the people are attached,

380 and by which the militia officers are appointed,

381 forms a barrier against

382 the enterprises of ambition,

383 more insurmountable

384 than any which a simple government

385 of any form can admit of.

386Notwithstanding the military establishments

387 in the several kingdoms of Europe,

388 which are carried as far

389 as the public resources will bear,

390 the governments are afraid

391 to trust the people with arms.

392And it is not certain,

393 that with this aid alone

394 they would not be able to shake off their yokes.

395But were the people to possess

396 the additional advantages of local governments

397 chosen by themselves,

398 who could collect the national will

399 and direct the national force,

400 and of officers appointed out of the militia,

401 by these governments,

402 and attached both to them and to the militia,

403 it may be affirmed with the greatest assurance,

404 that the throne of every tyranny in Europe

405 would be speedily overturned

406 in spite of the legions which surround it.

407Let us not insult the free and gallant citizens

408 of America with the suspicion,

409 that they would be less able

410 to defend the rights

411 of which they would be in actual possession,

412 than the debased subjects of arbitrary power

413 would be to rescue theirs

414 from the hands of their oppressors.

415Let us rather no longer insult them

416 with the supposition

417 that they can ever reduce themselves

418 to the necessity of making the experiment,

419 by a blind and tame submission

420 to the long train of insidious measures

421 which must precede and produce it.

422The argument under the present head

423 may be put into a very concise form,

424 which appears altogether conclusive.

425Either the mode in which the federal government

426 is to be constructed

427 will render it sufficiently dependent on the people,

428 or it will not.

429On the first supposition,

430 it will be restrained by that dependence

431 from forming schemes obnoxious

432 to their constituents.

433On the other supposition,

434 it will not possess the confidence of the people,

435 and its schemes of usurpation

436 will be easily defeated by the State governments,

437 who will be supported by the people.

438On summing up the considerations

439 stated in this and the last paper,

440 they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence,

441 that the powers proposed to be lodged

442 in the federal government

443 are as little formidable

444 to those reserved to the individual States,

445 as they are indispensably necessary

446 to accomplish the purposes of the Union;

447 and that all those alarms which have been sounded,

448 of a meditated and consequential annihilation

449 of the State governments,

450 must, on the most favorable interpretation,

451 be ascribed to the chimerical fears

452 of the authors of them.

453PUBLIUS.