1787 Federalist 45 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 45

2The Alleged Danger From the Powers

3of the Union to the State Governments

4Considered

5For the Independent Fournal.

6MADISON

7To the People of the State of New York:

8HAVING shown that no one of the powers

9 transferred to the federal government

10 is unnecessary or improper,

11the next question to be considered is,

12 whether the whole mass of them

13 will be dangerous to the portion of authority

14 left in the several States.

15The adversaries to the plan of the convention,

16 instead of considering in the first place

17 what degree of power was absolutely necessary

18 for the purposes of the federal government,

19 have exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry

20 into the possible consequences

21 of the proposed degree of power

22 to the governments of the particular States.

23But if the Union, as has been shown,

24 be essential to the security of the people of America

25 against foreign danger;

26 if it be essential to their security

27 against contentions and wars

28 among the different States;

29 if it be essential to guard them

30 against those violent and oppressive factions

31 which embitter the blessings of liberty,

32 and against those military establishments

33 which must gradually poison its very fountain;

34 if, in a word, the Union be essential

35 to the happiness of the people of America,

36 is it not preposterous,

37 to urge as an objection to a government,

38 without which the objects of the Union

39 cannot be attained,

40 that such a government may derogate

41 from the importance of the governments

42 of the individual States?

43Was, then, the American Revolution effected,

44 was the American Confederacy formed,

45 was the precious blood of thousands spilt,

46 and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished,

47 not that the people of America should enjoy

48 peace, liberty, and safety,

49 but that the government of the individual States,

50 that particular municipal establishments,

51 might enjoy a certain extent of power,

52 and be arrayed with certain dignities

53 and attributes of sovereignty?

54We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World,

55 that the people were made for kings,

56 not kings for the people.

57Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New,

58 in another shape

59 that the solid happiness of the people

60 is to be sacrificed to the views

61 of political institutions of a different form?

62It is too early for politicians to presume

63 on our forgetting that the public good,

64 the real welfare of the great body of the people,

65 is the supreme object to be pursued;

66 and that no form of government whatever

67 has any other value

68 than as it may be fitted

69 for the attainment of this object.

70Were the plan of the convention

71 adverse to the public happiness,

72 my voice would be, Reject the plan.

73Were the Union itself inconsistent

74 with the public happiness,

75 it would be, Abolish the Union.

76In like manner,

77 as far as the sovereignty of the States

78 cannot be reconciled

79 to the happiness of the people,

80 the voice of every good citizen must be,

81 Let the former be sacrificed to the latter.

82How far the sacrifice is necessary, has been shown.

83How far the unsacrificed residue will be endangered,

84 is the question before us.

85Several important considerations

86 have been touched in the course of these papers,

87 which discountenance the supposition

88 that the operation of the federal government

89 will by degrees prove fatal

90 to the State governments.

91The more I revolve the subject,

92 the more fully I am persuaded

93 that the balance is much more likely

94 to be disturbed by the preponderancy

95 of the last than of the first scale.

96We have seen,

97 in all the examples of ancient

98 and modern confederacies,

99 the strongest tendency continually betraying itself

100 in the members,

101 to despoil the general government

102 of its authorities,

103 with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter

104 to defend itself against the encroachments.

105Although, in most of these examples,

106 the system has been so dissimilar

107 from that under consideration

108 as greatly to weaken any inference

109 concerning the latter from the fate of the former,

110 yet, as the States will retain,

111 under the proposed Constitution,

112 a very extensive portion of active sovereignty,

113 the inference ought not to be wholly disregarded.

114In the Achaean league it is probable

115 that the federal head had a degree

116 and species of power,

117 which gave it a considerable likeness

118 to the government framed by the convention.

119The Lycian Confederacy,

120 as far as its principles and form are transmitted,

121 must have borne a still greater analogy to it.

122Yet history does not inform us

123 that either of them ever degenerated,

124 or tended to degenerate,

125 into one consolidated government.

126On the contrary, we know

127 that the ruin of one of them

128 proceeded from the incapacity

129 of the federal authority

130 to prevent the dissensions,

131 and finally the disunion,

132 of the subordinate authorities.

133These cases are the more worthy of our attention,

134 as the external causes

135 by which the component parts were pressed together

136 were much more numerous and powerful

137 than in our case;

138 and consequently less powerful ligaments within

139 would be sufficient

140 to bind the members to the head,

141 and to each other.

142In the feudal system,

143 we have seen a similar propensity exemplified.

144Notwithstanding the want of proper sympathy

145 in every instance

146 between the local sovereigns and the people,

147 and the sympathy in some instances

148 between the general sovereign and the latter,

149 it usually happened

150 that the local sovereigns prevailed

151 in the rivalship for encroachments.

152Had no external dangers enforced

153 internal harmony and subordination,

154 and particularly,

155 had the local sovereigns possessed

156 the affections of the people,

157 the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time

158 consist of as many independent princes

159 as there were formerly feudatory barons.

160The State government will have the advantage

161 of the Federal government,

162 whether we compare them in respect

163 to the immediate dependence

164 of the one on the other;

165 to the weight of personal influence

166 which each side will possess;

167 to the powers respectively vested in them;

168 to the predilection and probable support

169 of the people;

170 to the disposition and faculty

171 of resisting and frustrating

172 the measures of each other.

173The State governments may be regarded

174 as constituent and essential parts

175 of the federal government;

176 whilst the latter is nowise essential

177 to the operation or organization of the former.

178Without the intervention of the State legislatures,

179 the President of the United States cannot be elected

180 at all.

181They must in all cases have a great share

182 in his appointment,

183 and will, perhaps, in most cases,

184 of themselves determine it.

185The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively

186 by the State legislatures.

187Even the House of Representatives,

188 though drawn immediately from the people,

189 will be chosen very much under the influence

190 of that class of men,

191 whose influence over the people

192 obtains for themselves an election

193 into the State legislatures.

194Thus, each of the principal branches

195 of the federal government

196 will owe its existence more or less

197 to the favor of the State governments,

198 and must consequently feel a dependence,

199 which is much more likely to beget

200 a disposition too obsequious

201 than too overbearing towards them.

202On the other side,

203 the component parts of the State governments

204 will in no instance be indebted for their appointment

205 to the direct agency of the federal government,

206 and very little, if at all,

207 to the local influence of its members.

208The number of individuals employed

209 under the Constitution of the United States

210 will be much smaller

211 than the number employed

212 under the particular States.

213There will consequently be less of personal influence

214 on the side of the former than of the latter.

215The members of the legislative, executive,

216 and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States,

217 the justices of peace, officers of militia,

218 ministerial officers of justice,

219 with all the county, corporation,

220 and town officers,

221 for three millions and more of people,

222 intermixed,

223 and having particular acquaintance

224 with every class and circle of people,

225 must exceed, beyond all proportion,

226 both in number and influence,

227 those of every description

228 who will be employed

229 in the administration of the federal system.

230Compare the members of the three great departments

231 of the thirteen States,

232 excluding from the judiciary department

233 the justices of peace,

234 with the members of the corresponding departments

235 of the single government of the Union;

236 compare the militia officers

237 of three millions of people

238 with the military and marine officers

239 of any establishment

240 which is within the compass of probability,

241 or, I may add, of possibility,

242 and in this view alone,

243 we may pronounce the advantage of the States

244 to be decisive.

245If the federal government is to have collectors

246 of revenue,

247 the State governments will have theirs also.

248And as those of the former

249 will be principally on the seacoast,

250 and not very numerous,

251 whilst those of the latter

252 will be spread over the face of the country,

253 and will be very numerous,

254 the advantage in this view also lies on the same side.

255It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess,

256 and may exercise,

257 the power of collecting internal

258 as well as external taxes

259 throughout the States;

260 but it is probable that this power

261 will not be resorted to,

262 except for supplemental purposes of revenue;

263 that an option will then be given to the States

264 to supply their quotas

265 by previous collections of their own;

266 and that the eventual collection,

267 under the immediate authority of the Union,

268 will generally be made by the officers,

269 and according to the rules,

270 appointed by the several States.

271Indeed it is extremely probable,

272 that in other instances,

273 particularly in the organization

274 of the judicial power,

275 the officers of the States will be clothed

276 with the correspondent authority of the Union.

277Should it happen, however,

278 that separate collectors of internal revenue

279 should be appointed under the federal government,

280 the influence of the whole number

281 would not bear a comparison

282 with that of the multitude of State officers

283 in the opposite scale.

284Within every district

285 to which a federal collector would be allotted,

286 there would not be less than thirty or forty,

287 or even more,

288 officers of different descriptions,

289 and many of them persons of character and weight,

290 whose influence would lie on the side of the State.

291The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution

292 to the federal government

293 are few and defined.

294Those which are to remain in the State governments

295 are numerous and indefinite.

296The former will be exercised principally

297 on external objects,

298 as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce;

299 with which last the power of taxation will,

300 for the most part, be connected.

301The powers reserved to the several States

302 will extend to all the objects which,

303 in the ordinary course of affairs,

304 concern the lives, liberties, and properties

305 of the people,

306 and the internal order, improvement,

307 and prosperity of the State.

308The operations of the federal government

309 will be most extensive and important

310 in times of war and danger;

311 those of the State governments,

312 in times of peace and security.

313As the former periods will probably bear

314 a small proportion to the latter,

315 the State governments will here enjoy another advantage

316 over the federal government.

317The more adequate, indeed,

318 the federal powers may be rendered

319 to the national defense,

320 the less frequent will be those scenes of danger

321 which might favor their ascendancy

322 over the governments of the particular States.

323If the new Constitution be examined

324 with accuracy and candor,

325 it will be found that the change which it proposes

326 consists much less

327 in the addition of NEW POWERS to the Union,

328 than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS.

329The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power;

330 but that seems to be an addition which few oppose,

331 and from which no apprehensions are entertained.

332The powers relating to war and peace,

333 armies and fleets, treaties and finance,

334 with the other more considerable powers,

335 are all vested in the existing Congress

336 by the articles of Confederation.

337The proposed change does not enlarge these powers;

338 it only substitutes a more effectual mode

339 of administering them.

340The change relating to taxation

341 may be regarded as the most important;

342 and yet the present Congress have as complete authority

343 to REQUIRE of the States

344 indefinite supplies of money

345 for the common defense and general welfare,

346 as the future Congress will have

347 to require them of individual citizens;

348 and the latter will be no more bound

349 than the States themselves have been,

350 to pay the quotas respectively taxed on them.

351Had the States complied punctually

352 with the articles of Confederation,

353 or could their compliance have been enforced

354 by as peaceable means

355 as may be used with success towards single persons,

356 our past experience is very far

357 from countenancing an opinion,

358 that the State governments

359 would have lost their constitutional powers,

360 and have gradually undergone

361 an entire consolidation.

362To maintain that such an event would have ensued,

363 would be to say at once,

364 that the existence of the State governments

365 is incompatible with any system whatever

366 that accomplishes the essental purposes

367 of the Union.

368PUBLIUS.