1787 Federalist 31 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 31

2The Same Subject Continued

3Concerning the General Power of Taxation

4From the New York Packet.

5Tuesday, January 1, 1788.

6HAMILTON

7To the People of the State of New York:

8IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind,

9 there are certain primary truths, or first principles,

10 upon which all subsequent reasonings must depend.

11These contain an internal evidence which,

12 antecedent to all reflection or combination,

13 commands the assent of the mind.

14Where it produces not this effect,

15 it must proceed either from some defect or disorder

16 in the organs of perception,

17 or from the influence of some strong interest,

18 or passion, or prejudice.

19Of this nature are the maxims in geometry,

20 that "the whole is greater than its part;

21 things equal to the same

22 are equal to one another;

23 two straight lines cannot enclose a space;

24 and all right angles are equal to each other."

25Of the same nature are these other maxims

26 in ethics and politics,

27 that there cannot be an effect without a cause;

28 that the means ought to be proportioned to the end;

29 that every power ought to be commensurate

30 with its object;

31 that there ought to be no limitation of a power

32 destined to effect a purpose

33 which is itself incapable of limitation.

34And there are other truths

35 in the two latter sciences

36 which, if they cannot pretend to rank

37 in the class of axioms,

38 are yet such direct inferences from them,

39 and so obvious in themselves,

40 and so agreeable to the natural

41 and unsophisticated dictates of common-sense,

42 that they challenge the assent

43 of a sound and unbiased mind,

44 with a degree of force and conviction

45 almost equally irresistible.

46The objects of geometrical inquiry

47 are so entirely abstracted from those pursuits

48 which stir up and put in motion

49 the unruly passions of the human heart,

50 that mankind, without difficulty,

51 adopt not only the more simple theorems

52 of the science,

53 but even those abstruse paradoxes

54 which, however they may appear

55 susceptible of demonstration,

56 are at variance with the natural conceptions

57 which the mind, without the aid of philosophy,

58 would be led to entertain upon the subject.

59The INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of matter,

60 or, in other words,

61 the INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing,

62 extending even to the minutest atom,

63 is a point agreed among geometricians,

64 though not less incomprehensible to common-sense

65 than any of those mysteries in religion,

66 against which the batteries of infidelity

67 have been so industriously leveled.

68But in the sciences of morals and politics,

69 men are found far less tractable.

70To a certain degree,

71 it is right and useful that this should be the case.

72Caution and investigation are a necessary armor

73 against error and imposition.

74But this untractableness may be carried too far,

75 and may degenerate into obstinacy,

76 perverseness, or disingenuity.

77Though it cannot be pretended

78 that the principles of moral and political knowledge

79 have, in general,

80 the same degree of certainty

81 with those of the mathematics,

82 yet they have much better claims in this respect

83 than, to judge from the conduct of men

84 in particular situations,

85 we should be disposed to allow them.

86The obscurity is much oftener

87 in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner

88 than in the subject.

89Men, upon too many occasions,

90 do not give their own understandings fair play;

91 but, yielding to some untoward bias,

92 they entangle themselves in words

93 and confound themselves in subtleties.

94How else could it happen

95 (if we admit the objectors

96 to be sincere in their opposition),

97 that positions so clear

98 as those which manifest the necessity

99 of a general power of taxation

100 in the government of the Union,

101 should have to encounter any adversaries

102 among men of discernment?

103Though these positions have been elsewhere

104 fully stated,

105 they will perhaps not be improperly recapitulated

106 in this place,

107 as introductory to an examination

108 of what may have been offered

109 by way of objection to them.

110They are in substance as follows:

111A government ought to contain in itself

112 every power requisite

113 to the full accomplishment of the objects

114 committed to its care,

115 and to the complete execution of the trusts

116 for which it is responsible,

117 free from every other control

118 but a regard to the public good

119 and to the sense of the people.

120As the duties of superintending the national defense

121 and of securing the public peace

122 against foreign or domestic violence

123 involve a provision for casualties and dangers

124 to which no possible limits can be assigned,

125 the power of making that provision

126 ought to know no other bounds

127 than the exigencies of the nation

128 and the resources of the community.

129As revenue is the essential engine

130 by which the means of answering

131 the national exigencies must be procured,

132 the power of procuring that article

133 in its full extent

134 must necessarily be comprehended

135 in that of providing for those exigencies.

136As theory and practice conspire to prove

137 that the power of procuring revenue is unavailing

138 when exercised over the States

139 in their collective capacities,

140 the federal government must of necessity be invested

141 with an unqualified power of taxation

142 in the ordinary modes.

143Did not experience evince the contrary,

144 it would be natural to conclude

145 that the propriety of a general power of taxation

146 in the national government

147 might safely be permitted to rest

148 on the evidence of these propositions,

149 unassisted by any additional arguments

150 or illustrations.

151But we find, in fact,

152 that the antagonists of the proposed Constitution,

153 so far from acquiescing

154 in their justness or truth,

155 seem to make their principal

156 and most zealous effort

157 against this part of the plan.

158It may therefore be satisfactory

159 to analyze the arguments

160 with which they combat it.

161Those of them which have been most labored

162 with that view,

163 seem in substance to amount to this:

164 "It is not true,

165 because the exigencies of the Union

166 may not be susceptible of limitation,

167 that its power of laying taxes

168 ought to be unconfined.

169Revenue is as requisite

170 to the purposes of the local administrations

171 as to those of the Union;

172 and the former are at least of equal importance

173 with the latter

174 to the happiness of the people.

175It is, therefore, as necessary

176 that the State governments should be able

177 to command the means of supplying their wants,

178 as that the national government

179 should possess the like faculty

180 in respect to the wants of the Union.

181But an indefinite power of taxation in the LATTER

182 might, and probably would in time,

183 deprive the FORMER of the means

184 of providing for their own necessities;

185 and would subject them entirely

186 to the mercy of the national legislature.

187As the laws of the Union are to become

188 the supreme law of the land,

189 as it is to have power to pass all laws

190 that may be NECESSARY

191 for carrying into execution the authorities

192 with which it is proposed to vest it,

193 the national government might at any time

194 abolish the taxes imposed for State objects

195 upon the pretense of an interference

196 with its own.

197It might allege a necessity of doing this

198 in order to give efficacy to the national revenues.

199And thus all the resources of taxation

200 might by degrees become

201 the subjects of federal monopoly,

202 to the entire exclusion and destruction

203 of the State governments."

204This mode of reasoning appears sometimes

205 to turn upon the supposition of usurpation

206 in the national government;

207 at other times it seems to be designed

208 only as a deduction

209 from the constitutional operation

210 of its intended powers.

211It is only in the latter light

212 that it can be admitted

213 to have any pretensions to fairness.

214The moment we launch into conjectures

215 about the usurpations of the federal government,

216 we get into an unfathomable abyss,

217 and fairly put ourselves

218 out of the reach of all reasoning.

219Imagination may range at pleasure

220 till it gets bewildered

221 amidst the labyrinths of an enchanted castle,

222 and knows not on which side to turn

223 to extricate itself

224 from the perplexities

225 into which it has so rashly adventured.

226Whatever may be the limits or modifications

227 of the powers of the Union,

228 it is easy to imagine

229 an endless train of possible dangers;

230 and by indulging an excess of jealousy and timidity,

231 we may bring ourselves to a state

232 of absolute scepticism and irresolution.

233I repeat here what I have observed in substance

234 in another place,

235 that all observations founded

236 upon the danger of usurpation

237 ought to be referred

238 to the composition and structure

239 of the government,

240 not to the nature or extent of its powers.

241The State governments,

242 by their original constitutions,

243 are invested with complete sovereignty.

244In what does our security consist

245 against usurpation from that quarter?

246Doubtless in the manner of their formation,

247 and in a due dependence of those

248 who are to administer them

249 upon the people.

250If the proposed construction

251 of the federal government be found,

252 upon an impartial examination of it,

253 to be such as to afford, to a proper extent,

254 the same species of security,

255 all apprehensions on the score of usurpation

256 ought to be discarded.

257It should not be forgotten

258 that a disposition in the State governments

259 to encroach upon the rights of the Union

260 is quite as probable

261 as a disposition in the Union

262 to encroach upon the rights

263 of the State governments.

264What side would be likely to prevail

265 in such a conflict,

266 must depend on the means

267 which the contending parties

268 could employ toward insuring success.

269As in republics strength is always

270 on the side of the people,

271 and as there are weighty reasons

272 to induce a belief

273 that the State governments

274 will commonly possess most influence

275 over them,

276 the natural conclusion is

277 that such contests will be most apt

278 to end to the disadvantage of the Union;

279 and that there is greater probability

280 of encroachments by the members

281 upon the federal head,

282 than by the federal head upon the members.

283But it is evident

284 that all conjectures of this kind

285 must be extremely vague and fallible:

286 and that it is by far the safest course

287 to lay them altogether aside,

288 and to confine our attention wholly

289 to the nature and extent of the powers

290 as they are delineated in the Constitution.

291Every thing beyond this

292 must be left to the prudence and firmness

293 of the people;

294 who, as they will hold the scales

295 in their own hands,

296 it is to be hoped,

297 will always take care

298 to preserve the constitutional equilibrium

299 between the general

300 and the State governments.

301Upon this ground, which is evidently the true one,

302 it will not be difficult to obviate the objections

303 which have been made

304 to an indefinite power of taxation

305 in the United States.

306PUBLIUS.