1787 Federalist 27 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 27

2The Same Subject Continued

3(The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority

4in Regard to the Common Defense Considered)

5From the New York Packet.

6Tuesday, December 25, 1787.

7HAMILTON

8To the People of the State of New York:

9IT HAS been urged, in different shapes,

10 that a Constitution of the kind proposed

11 by the convention

12 cannot operate without the aid

13 of a military force to execute its laws.

14This, however, like most other things

15 that have been alleged on that side,

16 rests on mere general assertion,

17 unsupported by any precise

18 or intelligible designation

19 of the reasons upon which it is founded.

20As far as I have been able to divine

21 the latent meaning of the objectors,

22 it seems to originate in a presupposition

23 that the people will be disinclined

24 to the exercise of federal authority

25 in any matter of an internal nature.

26Waiving any exception that might be taken

27 to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness

28 of the distinction

29 between internal and external,

30 let us inquire what ground there is

31 to presuppose that disinclination

32 in the people.

33Unless we presume at the same time

34 that the powers of the general government

35 will be worse administered

36 than those of the State government,

37 there seems to be no room

38 for the presumption of ill-will,

39 disaffection, or opposition in the people.

40I believe it may be laid down as a general rule

41 that their confidence in and obedience to a government

42 will commonly be proportioned

43 to the goodness or badness

44 of its administration.

45It must be admitted

46 that there are exceptions to this rule;

47 but these exceptions depend so entirely

48 on accidental causes,

49 that they cannot be considered

50 as having any relation

51 to the intrinsic merits or demerits

52 of a constitution.

53These can only be judged of

54 by general principles and maxims.

55Various reasons have been suggested,

56 in the course of these papers,

57 to induce a probability

58 that the general government

59 will be better administered

60 than the particular governments;

61 the principal of which reasons are

62 that the extension of the spheres of election

63 will present a greater option,

64 or latitude of choice, to the people;

65 that through the medium of the State legislatures

66 which are select bodies of men,

67 and which are to appoint the members

68 of the national Senate

69 there is reason to expect

70 that this branch will generally be composed

71 with peculiar care and judgment;

72 that these circumstances promise greater knowledge

73 and more extensive information

74 in the national councils,

75 and that they will be less apt

76 to be tainted by the spirit of faction,

77 and more out of the reach

78 of those occasional ill-humors,

79 or temporary prejudices and propensities,

80 which, in smaller societies,

81 frequently contaminate the public councils,

82 beget injustice and oppression

83 of a part of the community,

84 and engender schemes which,

85 though they gratify a momentary inclination

86 or desire,

87 terminate in general distress,

88 dissatisfaction, and disgust.

89Several additional reasons of considerable force,

90 to fortify that probability,

91 will occur when we come to survey,

92 with a more critical eye,

93 the interior structure of the edifice

94 which we are invited to erect.

95It will be sufficient here to remark,

96 that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned

97 to justify an opinion,

98 that the federal government is likely

99 to be administered in such a manner

100 as to render it odious or contemptible

101 to the people,

102 there can be no reasonable foundation

103 for the supposition

104 that the laws of the Union

105 will meet with any greater obstruction

106 from them,

107 or will stand in need of any other methods

108 to enforce their execution,

109 than the laws of the particular members.

110The hope of impunity

111 is a strong incitement to sedition;

112 the dread of punishment,

113 a proportionably strong discouragement to it.

114Will not the government of the Union,

115 which, if possessed of a due degree of power,

116 can call to its aid

117 the collective resources

118 of the whole Confederacy,

119 be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment

120 and to inspire the LATTER,

121 than that of a single State,

122 which can only command

123 the resources within itself?

124A turbulent faction in a State

125 may easily suppose itself able

126 to contend with the friends to the government

127 in that State;

128 but it can hardly be so infatuated

129 as to imagine itself a match

130 for the combined efforts of the Union.

131If this reflection be just,

132 there is less danger of resistance

133 from irregular combinations of individuals

134 to the authority of the Confederacy

135 than to that of a single member.

136I will, in this place, hazard an observation,

137 which will not be the less just

138 because to some it may appear new;

139 which is, that the more the operations

140 of the national authority

141 are intermingled

142 in the ordinary exercise of government,

143 the more the citizens are accustomed

144 to meet with it

145 in the common occurrences

146 of their political life,

147 the more it is familiarized

148 to their sight and to their feelings,

149 the further it enters into those objects

150 which touch the most sensible chords

151 and put in motion

152 the most active springs of the human heart,

153 the greater will be the probability

154 that it will conciliate the respect

155 and attachment of the community.

156Man is very much a creature of habit.

157A thing that rarely strikes his senses

158 will generally have but little influence

159 upon his mind.

160A government continually at a distance

161 and out of sight

162 can hardly be expected

163 to interest the sensations of the people.

164The inference is,

165 that the authority of the Union,

166 and the affections of the citizens towards it,

167 will be strengthened, rather than weakened,

168 by its extension to what are called

169 matters of internal concern;

170 and will have less occasion to recur to force,

171 in proportion to the familiarity

172 and comprehensiveness of its agency.

173The more it circulates through those channls

174 and currents

175 in which the passions of mankind naturally flow,

176 the less will it require the aid

177 of the violent and perilous expedients

178 of compulsion.

179One thing, at all events, must be evident,

180 that a government like the one proposed

181 would bid much fairer

182 to avoid the necessity of using force,

183 than that species of league contend for

184 by most of its opponents;

185 the authority of which should only operate

186 upon the States

187 in their political or collective capacities.

188It has been shown

189 that in such a Confederacy

190 there can be no sanction for the laws but force;

191 that frequent delinquencies in the members

192 are the natural offspring

193 of the very frame of the government;

194 and that as often as these happen,

195 they can only be redressed, if at all,

196 by war and violence.

197The plan reported by the convention,

198 by extending the authority of the federal head

199 to the individual citizens of the several States,

200 will enable the government

201 to employ the ordinary magistracy of each,

202 in the execution of its laws.

203It is easy to perceive

204 that this will tend to destroy,

205 in the common apprehension,

206 all distinction between the sources

207 from which they might proceed;

208 and will give the federal government

209 the same advantage

210 for securing a due obedience to its authority

211 which is enjoyed by the government of each State,

212 in addition to the influence on public opinion

213 which will result

214 from the important consideration

215 of its having power

216 to call to its assistance and support

217 the resources of the whole Union.

218It merits particular attention in this place,

219 that the laws of the Confederacy,

220 as to the ENUMERATED and LEGITIMATE objects

221 of its jurisdiction,

222 will become the SUPREME LAW of the land;

223 to the observance of which all officers,

224 legislative, executive, and judicial,

225 in each State,

226 will be bound by the sanctity of an oath.

227Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates,

228 of the respective members,

229 will be incorporated into the operations

230 of the national government

231 AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND CONSTITUTIONAL

232 AUTHORITY EXTENDS;

233 and will be rendered auxiliary

234 to the enforcement of its laws.[1]

235Any man who will pursue, by his own reflections,

236 the consequences of this situation,

237 will perceive that there is good ground

238 to calculate upon a regular and peaceable

239 execution of the laws of the Union,

240 if its powers are administered

241 with a common share of prudence.

242If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary,

243 we may deduce any inferences we please

244 from the supposition;

245 for it is certainly possible,

246 by an injudicious exercise of the authorities

247 of the best government that ever was,

248 or ever can be instituted,

249 to provoke and precipitate the people

250 into the wildest excesses.

251But though the adversaries

252 of the proposed Constitution

253 should presume that the national rulers

254 would be insensible to the motives

255 of public good,

256 or to the obligations of duty,

257 I would still ask them

258 how the interests of ambition,

259 or the views of encroachment,

260 can be promoted by such a conduct?

261PUBLIUS.

262[1] The sophistry which has been employed

263 to show that this will tend

264 to the destruction of the State governments,

265 will, in its will, in its proper place,

266 be fully detected.