1787 Federalist 25 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 25

2The Same Subject Continued

3(The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense

4Further Considered)

5From the New York Packet.

6Friday, December 21, 1787.

7HAMILTON

8To the People of the State of New York:

9IT MAY perhaps be urged

10 that the objects enumerated in the preceding number

11 ought to be provided for by the State governments,

12 under the direction of the Union.

13But this would be, in reality,

14 an inversion of the primary principle

15 of our political association,

16 as it would in practice transfer the care

17 of the common defense

18 from the federal head to the individual members:

19 a project oppressive to some States,

20 dangerous to all,

21 and baneful to the Confederacy.

22The territories of Britain, Spain,

23 and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood

24 do not border on particular States,

25 but encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia.

26The danger, though in different degrees,

27 is therefore common.

28And the means of guarding against it ought,

29 in like manner,

30 to be the objects of common councils

31 and of a common treasury.

32It happens that some States, from local situation,

33 are more directly exposed.

34New York is of this class.

35Upon the plan of separate provisions,

36 New York would have to sustain the whole weight

37 of the establishments

38 requisite to her immediate safety,

39 and to the mediate or ultimate protection

40 of her neighbors.

41This would neither be equitable

42 as it respected New York

43 nor safe as it respected the other States.

44Various inconveniences would attend such a system.

45The States, to whose lot it might fall

46 to support the necessary establishments,

47 would be as little able as willing,

48 for a considerable time to come,

49 to bear the burden of competent provisions.

50The security of all would thus be subjected

51 to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability

52 of a part.

53If the resources of such part

54 becoming more abundant and extensive,

55 its provisions should be proportionally enlarged,

56 the other States would quickly take the alarm

57 at seeing the whole military force of the Union

58 in the hands of two or three of its members,

59 and those probably amongst the most powerful.

60They would each choose to have some counterpoise,

61 and pretenses could easily be contrived.

62In this situation, military establishments,

63 nourished by mutual jealousy,

64 would be apt to swell

65 beyond their natural or proper size;

66 and being at the separate disposal of the members,

67 they would be engines for the abridgment

68 or demolition of the national authcrity.

69Reasons have been already given

70 to induce a supposition

71 that the State governments

72 will too naturally be prone

73 to a rivalship with that of the Union,

74 the foundation of which will be the love of power;

75 and that in any contest

76 between the federal head

77 and one of its members

78 the people will be most apt to unite

79 with their local government.

80If, in addition to this immense advantage,

81 the ambition of the members should be stimulated

82 by the separate and independent possession

83 of military forces,

84 it would afford too strong a temptation

85 and too great a facility to them

86 to make enterprises upon,

87 and finally to subvert,

88 the constitutional authority of the Union.

89On the other hand,

90 the liberty of the people would be less safe

91 in this state of things

92 than in that which left the national forces

93 in the hands of the national government.

94As far as an army may be considered

95 as a dangerous weapon of power,

96 it had better be in those hands

97 of which the people are most likely to be jealous

98 than in those of which they are least likely

99 to be jealous.

100For it is a truth,

101 which the experience of ages has attested,

102 that the people are always most in danger

103 when the means of injuring their rights

104 are in the possession of those

105 of whom they entertain the least suspicion.

106The framers of the existing Confederation,

107 fully aware of the danger to the Union

108 from the separate possession of military forces

109 by the States,

110 have, in express terms, prohibited them

111 from having either ships or troops,

112 unless with the consent of Congress.

113The truth is,

114 that the existence of a federal government

115 and military establishments under State authority

116 are not less at variance with each other

117 than a due supply of the federal treasury

118 and the system of quotas and requisitions.

119There are other lights besides those

120 already taken notice of,

121 in which the impropriety of restraints

122 on the discretion of the national legislature

123 will be equally manifest.

124The design of the objection,

125 which has been mentioned,

126 is to preclude standing armies in time of peace,

127 though we have never been informed

128 how far it is designed

129 the prohibition should extend;

130 whether to raising armies as well as

131 to KEEPING THEM UP

132 in a season of tranquillity or not.

133If it be confined to the latter

134 it will have no precise signification,

135 and it will be ineffectual for the purpose intended.

136When armies are once raised

137 what shall be denominated "keeping them up,"

138 contrary to the sense of the Constitution?

139What time shall be requisite

140 to ascertain the violation?

141Shall it be a week, a month, a year?

142Or shall we say they may be continued

143 as long as the danger

144 which occasioned their being raised continues?

145This would be to admit

146 that they might be kept up IN TIME OF PEACE,

147 against threatening or impending danger,

148 which would be at once to deviate

149 from the literal meaning of the prohibition,

150 and to introduce an extensive latitude

151 of construction.

152Who shall judge of the continuance of the danger?

153This must undoubtedly be submitted

154 to the national government,

155 and the matter would then be brought to this issue,

156 that the national government,

157 to provide against apprehended danger,

158 might in the first instance raise troops,

159 and might afterwards keep them on foot

160 as long as they supposed the peace or safety

161 of the community

162 was in any degree of jeopardy.

163It is easy to perceive

164 that a discretion so latitudinary as this

165 would afford ample room

166 for eluding the force of the provision.

167The supposed utility of a provision of this kind

168 can only be founded on the supposed probability,

169 or at least possibility,

170 of a combination between the executive

171 and the legislative,

172 in some scheme of usurpation.

173Should this at any time happen,

174 how easy would it be to fabricate pretenses

175 of approaching danger!

176Indian hostilities, instigated by Spain or Britain,

177 would always be at hand.

178Provocations to produce the desired appearances

179 might even be given to some foreign power,

180 and appeased again by timely concessions.

181If we can reasonably presume

182 such a combination to have been formed,

183 and that the enterprise is warranted

184 by a sufficient prospect of success,

185 the army, when once raised,

186 from whatever cause, or on whatever pretext,

187 may be applied to the execution of the project.

188If, to obviate this consequence,

189 it should be resolved to extend the prohibition

190 to the RAISING of armies in time of peace,

191 the United States would then exhibit

192 the most extraordinary spectacle

193 which the world has yet seen,

194 that of a nation incapacitated

195 by its Constitution to prepare for defense,

196 before it was actually invaded.

197As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war

198 has of late fallen into disuse,

199 the presence of an enemy within our territories

200 must be waited for,

201 as the legal warrant to the government

202 to begin its levies of men

203 for the protection of the State.

204We must receive the blow,

205 before we could even prepare to return it.

206All that kind of policy

207 by which nations anticipate distant danger,

208 and meet the gathering storm,

209 must be abstained from,

210 as contrary to the genuine maxims

211 of a free government.

212We must expose our property and liberty

213 to the mercy of foreign invaders,

214 and invite them by our weakness

215 to seize the naked and defenseless prey,

216 because we are afraid that rulers,

217 created by our choice, dependent on our will,

218 might endanger that liberty,

219 by an abuse of the means

220 necessary to its preservation.

221Here I expect we shall be told

222 that the militia of the country

223 is its natural bulwark,

224 and would be at all times equal

225 to the national defense.

226This doctrine, in substance,

227 had like to have lost us our independence.

228It cost millions to the United States

229 that might have been saved.

230The facts which, from our own experience,

231 forbid a reliance of this kind,

232 are too recent to permit us

233 to be the dupes of such a suggestion.

234The steady operations of war

235 against a regular and disciplined army

236 can only be successfully conducted

237 by a force of the same kind.

238Considerations of economy,

239 not less than of stability and vigor,

240 confirm this position.

241The American militia,

242 in the course of the late war,

243 have, by their valor on numerous occasions,

244 erected eternal monuments to their fame;

245 but the bravest of them feel and know

246 that the liberty of their country

247 could not have been established

248 by their efforts alone,

249 however great and valuable they were.

250War, like most other things,

251 is a science to be acquired and perfected

252 by diligence, by perserverance,

253 by time, and by practice.

254All violent policy,

255 as it is contrary to the natural

256 and experienced course of human affairs,

257 defeats itself.

258Pennsylvania, at this instant,

259 affords an example of the truth of this remark.

260The Bill of Rights of that State declares

261 that standing armies are dangerous to liberty,

262 and ought not to be kept up in time of peace.

263Pennsylvania, nevertheless,

264 in a time of profound peace,

265 from the existence of partial disorders

266 in one or two of her counties,

267 has resolved to raise a body of troops;

268 and in all probability will keep them up

269 as long as there is any appearance of danger

270 to the public peace.

271The conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson

272 on the same subject, though on different ground.

273That State

274 (without waiting for the sanction of Congress,

275 as the articles of the Confederation require)

276 was compelled to raise troops

277 to quell a domestic insurrection,

278 and still keeps a corps in pay

279 to prevent a revival of the spirit of revolt.

280The particular constitution of Massachusetts

281 opposed no obstacle to the measure;

282 but the instance is still of use to instruct us

283 that cases are likely to occur

284 under our government,

285 as well as under those of other nations,

286 which will sometimes render a military force

287 in time of peace

288 essential to the security of the society,

289 and that it is therefore improper

290 in this respect

291 to control the legislative discretion.

292It also teaches us,

293 in its application to the United States,

294 how little the rights of a feeble government

295 are likely to be respected,

296 even by its own constituents.

297And it teaches us, in addition to the rest,

298 how unequal parchment provisions are

299 to a struggle with public necessity.

300It was a fundamental maxim

301 of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth,

302 that the post of admiral should not be conferred

303 twice on the same person.

304The Peloponnesian confederates,

305 having suffered a severe defeat at sea

306 from the Athenians,

307 demanded Lysander,

308 who had before served with success

309 in that capacity,

310 to command the combined fleets.

311The Lacedaemonians, to gratify their allies,

312 and yet preserve the semblance of an adherence

313 to their ancient institutions,

314 had recourse to the flimsy subterfuge

315 of investing Lysander

316 with the real power of admiral,

317 under the nominal title of vice-admiral.

318This instance is selected from among a multitude

319 that might be cited to confirm the truth

320 already advanced

321 and illustrated by domestic examples;

322 which is, that nations pay little regard

323 to rules and maxims

324 calculated in their very nature

325 to run counter to the necessities of society.

326Wise politicians will be cautious

327 about fettering the government

328 with restrictions that cannot be observed,

329 because they know that every breach

330 of the fundamental laws,

331 though dictated by necessity,

332 impairs that sacred reverence

333 which ought to be maintained

334 in the breast of rulers

335 towards the constitution of a country,

336 and forms a precedent for other breaches

337 where the same plea of necessity

338 does not exist at all,

339 or is less urgent and palpable.

340PUBLIUS.