1787 Federalist 24 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 24

2The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense

3Further Considered

4For the Independent Journal.

5HAMILTON

6To the People of the State of New York:

7To THE powers proposed to be conferred

8 upon the federal government,

9 in respect to the creation and direction

10 of the national forces,

11 I have met with but one specific objection,

12 which, if I understand it right, is this,

13 that proper provision has not been made

14 against the existence of standing armies

15 in time of peace;

16 an objection which, I shall now endeavor to show,

17 rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations.

18It has indeed been brought forward

19 in the most vague and general form,

20 supported only by bold assertions,

21 without the appearance of argument;

22 without even the sanction of theoretical opinions;

23 in contradiction to the practice

24 of other free nations,

25 and to the general sense of America,

26 as expressed in most of the existing constitutions.

27The proprietory of this remark will appear,

28 the moment it is recollected

29 that the objection under consideration

30 turns upon a supposed necessity

31 of restraining the LEGISLATIVE authority

32 of the nation,

33 in the article of military establishments;

34 a principle unheard of,

35 except in one or two of our State constitutions,

36 and rejected in all the rest.

37A stranger to our politics,

38 who was to read our newspapers

39 at the present juncture,

40 without having previously inspected

41 the plan reported by the convention,

42 would be naturally led to one of two conclusions:

43 either that it contained a positive injunction,

44 that standing armies should be kept up

45 in time of peace;

46 or that it vested in the EXECUTIVE

47 the whole power of levying troops,

48 without subjecting his discretion,

49 in any shape,

50 to the control of the legislature.

51If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself,

52 he would be surprised to discover,

53 that neither the one nor the other was the case;

54 that the whole power of raising armies

55 was lodged in the LEGISLATURE,

56 not in the EXECUTIVE;

57 that this legislature was to be a popular body,

58 consisting of the representatives of the people

59 periodically elected;

60 and that instead of the provision he had supposed

61 in favor of standing armies,

62 there was to be found,

63 in respect to this object,

64 an important qualification

65 even of the legislative discretion,

66 in that clause which forbids the appropriation

67 of money for the support of an army

68 for any longer period than two years

69 a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it,

70 will appear to be a great and real security

71 against the keeping up of troops

72 without evident necessity.

73Disappointed in his first surmise,

74 the person I have supposed would be apt

75 to pursue his conjectures a little further.

76He would naturally say to himself,

77 it is impossible that all this vehement

78 and pathetic declamation

79 can be without some colorable pretext.

80It must needs be that this people,

81 so jealous of their liberties,

82 have, in all the preceding models

83 of the constitutions which they have established,

84 inserted the most precise and rigid precautions

85 on this point,

86 the omission of which, in the new plan,

87 has given birth to all this apprehension

88 and clamor.

89If, under this impression,

90 he proceeded to pass in review

91 the several State constitutions,

92 how great would be his disappointment

93 to find that TWO ONLY of them[1]

94 contained an interdiction of standing armies

95 in time of peace;

96 that the other eleven had either observed

97 a profound silence on the subject,

98 or had in express terms admitted the right

99 of the Legislature

100 to authorize their existence.

101Still, however he would be persuaded

102 that there must be some plausible foundation

103 for the cry raised on this head.

104He would never be able to imagine,

105 while any source of information remained unexplored,

106 that it was nothing more

107 than an experiment upon the public credulity,

108 dictated either by a deliberate intention

109 to deceive,

110 or by the overflowings of a zeal

111 too intemperate to be ingenuous.

112It would probably occur to him,

113 that he would be likely to find

114 the precautions he was in search of

115 in the primitive compact between the States.

116Here, at length,

117 he would expect to meet with a solution

118 of the enigma.

119No doubt, he would observe to himself,

120 the existing Confederation must contain

121 the most explicit provisions

122 against military establishments

123 in time of peace;

124 and a departure from this model,

125 in a favorite point,

126 has occasioned the discontent

127 which appears to influence

128 these political champions.

129If he should now apply himself

130 to a careful and critical survey

131 of the articles of Confederation,

132 his astonishment would not only be increased,

133 but would acquire a mixture of indignation,

134 at the unexpected discovery,

135 that these articles,

136 instead of containing the prohibition

137 he looked for,

138 and though they had, with jealous circumspection,

139 restricted the authority

140 of the State legislatures

141 in this particular,

142 had not imposed a single restraint

143 on that of the United States.

144If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility,

145 or ardent temper,

146 he could now no longer refrain

147 from regarding these clamors

148 as the dishonest artifices

149 of a sinister and unprincipled opposition

150 to a plan which ought at least

151 to receive a fair and candid examination

152 from all sincere lovers of their country!

153How else, he would say,

154 could the authors of them have been tempted

155 to vent such loud censures upon that plan,

156 about a point in which it seems

157 to have conformed itself

158 to the general sense of America

159 as declared in its different forms of government,

160 and in which it has even superadded

161 a new and powerful guard

162 unknown to any of them?

163If, on the contrary,

164 he happened to be a man

165 of calm and dispassionate feelings,

166 he would indulge a sigh

167 for the frailty of human nature,

168 and would lament,

169 that in a matter so interesting

170 to the happiness of millions,

171 the true merits of the question

172 should be perplexed and entangled

173 by expedients so unfriendly

174 to an impartial and right determination.

175Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking,

176 that a conduct of this kind

177 has too much the appearance

178 of an intention to mislead the people

179 by alarming their passions,

180 rather than to convince them

181 by arguments addressed

182 to their understandings.

183But however little this objection may be countenanced,

184 even by precedents among ourselves,

185 it may be satisfactory to take a nearer view

186 of its intrinsic merits.

187From a close examination it will appear

188 that restraints upon the discretion

189 of the legislature

190 in respect to military establishments

191 in time of peace,

192 would be improper to be imposed,

193 and if imposed, from the necessities of society,

194 would be unlikely to be observed.

195Though a wide ocean separates

196 the United States from Europe,

197 yet there are various considerations

198 that warn us against an excess

199 of confidence or security.

200On one side of us,

201 and stretching far into our rear,

202 are growing settlements

203 subject to the dominion of Britain.

204On the other side,

205 and extending to meet the British settlements,

206 are colonies and establishments

207 subject to the dominion of Spain.

208This situation and the vicinity

209 of the West India Islands,

210 belonging to these two powers

211 create between them,

212 in respect to their American possessions

213 and in relation to us,

214 a common interest.

215The savage tribes on our Western frontier

216 ought to be regarded as our natural enemies,

217 their natural allies,

218 because they have most to fear from us,

219 and most to hope from them.

220The improvements in the art of navigation have,

221 as to the facility of communication,

222 rendered distant nations,

223 in a great measure, neighbors.

224Britain and Spain are among

225 the principal maritime powers of Europe.

226A future concert of views between these nations

227 ought not to be regarded as improbable.

228The increasing remoteness of consanguinity

229 is every day diminishing the force

230 of the family compact

231 between France and Spain.

232And politicians have ever with great reason

233 considered the ties of blood

234 as feeble and precarious links

235 of political connection.

236These circumstances combined,

237 admonish us not to be too sanguine

238 in considering ourselves

239 as entirely out of the reach of danger.

240Previous to the Revolution,

241 and ever since the peace,

242 there has been a constant necessity

243 for keeping small garrisons

244 on our Western frontier.

245No person can doubt

246 that these will continue to be indispensable,

247 if it should only be against the ravages

248 and depredations of the Indians.

249These garrisons must either be furnished

250 by occasional detachments from the militia,

251 or by permanent corps in the pay

252 of the government.

253The first is impracticable;

254 and if practicable, would be pernicious.

255The militia would not long, if at all,

256 submit to be dragged

257 from their occupations and families

258 to perform that most disagreeable duty

259 in times of profound peace.

260And if they could be prevailed upon

261 or compelled to do it,

262 the increased expense

263 of a frequent rotation of service,

264 and the loss of labor

265 and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits

266 of individuals,

267 would form conclusive objections to the scheme.

268It would be as burdensome and injurious

269 to the public

270 as ruinous to private citizens.

271The latter resource of permanent corps

272 in the pay of the government

273 amounts to a standing army in time of peace;

274 a small one, indeed,

275 but not the less real for being small.

276Here is a simple view of the subject,

277 that shows us at once the impropriety

278 of a constitutional interdiction

279 of such establishments,

280 and the necessity of leaving the matter

281 to the discretion and prudence

282 of the legislature.

283In proportion to our increase in strength,

284 it is probable, nay, it may be said certain,

285 that Britain and Spain would augment

286 their military establishments

287 in our neighborhood.

288If we should not be willing to be exposed,

289 in a naked and defenseless condition,

290 to their insults and encroachments,

291 we should find it expedient

292 to increase our frontier garrisons

293 in some ratio to the force

294 by which our Western settlements

295 might be annoyed.

296There are, and will be, particular posts,

297 the possession of which will include the command

298 of large districts of territory,

299 and facilitate future invasions

300 of the remainder.

301It may be added

302 that some of those posts will be keys

303 to the trade with the Indian nations.

304Can any man think it would be wise

305 to leave such posts in a situation

306 to be at any instant seized

307 by one or the other

308 of two neighboring and formidable powers?

309To act this part would be to desert

310 all the usual maxims of prudence and policy.

311If we mean to be a commercial people,

312 or even to be secure on our Atlantic side,

313 we must endeavor, as soon as possible,

314 to have a navy.

315To this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals;

316 and for the defense of these,

317 fortifications, and probably garrisons.

318When a nation has become so powerful by sea

319 that it can protect its dock-yards by its fleets,

320 this supersedes the necessity of garrisons

321 for that purpose;

322 but where naval establishments are in their infancy,

323 moderate garrisons will, in all likelihood,

324 be found an indispensable security

325 against descents for the destruction

326 of the arsenals and dock-yards,

327 and sometimes of the fleet itself.

328PUBLIUS.

329[1] This statement of the matter is taken

330 from the printed collection of State constitutions.

331Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the two

332 which contain the interdiction in these words:

333 "As standing armies in time of peace

334 are dangerous to liberty,

335 THEY OUGHT NOT to be kept up."

336This is, in truth,

337 rather a CAUTION than a PROHIBITION.

338New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland

339 have, in each of their bils of rights,

340 a clause to this effect:

341 "Standing armies are dangerous to liberty,

342 and ought not to be raised or kept up

343 WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE";

344 which is a formal admission

345 of the authority of the Legislature.

346New York has no bills of rights,

347 and her constitution says not a word

348 about the matter.

349No bills of rights appear annexed

350 to the constitutions of the other States,

351 except the foregoing,

352 and their constitutions are equally silent.

353I am told, however

354 that one or two States have bills of rights

355 which do not appear in this collection;

356 but that those also recognize the right

357 of the legislative authority

358 in this respect.