1787 Federalist 23 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 23

2The Necessity of a Government as Energetic

3as the One Proposed

4to the Preservation of the Union

5From the New York Packet.

6Tuesday, December 18, 1787.

7HAMILTON

8To the People of the State of New York:

9THE necessity of a Constitution,

10 at least equally energetic with the one proposed,

11 to the preservation of the Union,

12 is the point at the examination of which

13 we are now arrived.

14This inquiry will naturally divide itself

15 into three branches

16 the objects to be provided for

17 by the federal government,

18 the quantity of power necessary

19 to the accomplishment of those objects,

20 the persons upon whom that power ought to operate.

21Its distribution and organization

22 will more properly claim our attention

23 under the succeeding head.

24The principal purposes to be answered by union

25 are these

26 the common defense of the members;

27 the preservation of the public peace

28 as well against internal convulsions

29 as external attacks;

30 the regulation of commerce with other nations

31 and between the States;

32 the superintendence of our intercourse,

33 political and commercial,

34 with foreign countries.

35The authorities essential to the common defense

36 are these:

37 to raise armies;

38 to build and equip fleets;

39 to prescribe rules for the government of both;

40 to direct their operations;

41 to provide for their support.

42These powers ought to exist without limitation,

43 BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORESEE

44 OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY

45 OF NATIONAL EXIGENCIES,

46 OR THE CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY

47 OF THE MEANS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY

48 TO SATISFY THEM.

49The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations

50 are infinite,

51 and for this reason no constitutional shackles

52 can wisely be imposed

53 on the power to which the care of it

54 is committed.

55This power ought to be coextensive

56 with all the possible combinations

57 of such circumstances;

58 and ought to be under the direction

59 of the same councils

60 which are appointed to preside

61 over the common defense.

62This is one of those truths which,

63 to a correct and unprejudiced mind,

64 carries its own evidence along with it;

65 and may be obscured,

66 but cannot be made plainer

67 by argument or reasoning.

68It rests upon axioms as simple

69 as they are universal;

70 the MEANS ought to be proportioned to the END;

71 the persons, from whose agency the attainment

72 of any END is expected,

73 ought to possess the MEANS

74 by which it is to be attained.

75Whether there ought to be a federal government

76 intrusted with the care of the common defense,

77 is a question in the first instance,

78 open for discussion;

79 but the moment it is decided in the affirmative,

80 it will follow,

81 that that government ought to be clothed

82 with all the powers requisite

83 to complete execution of its trust.

84And unless it can be shown

85 that the circumstances which may affect

86 the public safety

87 are reducible within certain determinate limits;

88 unless the contrary of this position

89 can be fairly and rationally disputed,

90 it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence,

91 that there can be no limitation of that authority

92 which is to provide for the defense

93 and protection of the community,

94 in any matter essential to its efficacy

95 that is,

96 in any matter essential to the FORMATION,

97 DIRECTION, or SUPPORT

98 of the NATIONAL FORCES.

99Defective as the present Confederation

100 has been proved to be,

101 this principle appears to have been fully recognized

102 by the framers of it;

103 though they have not made proper or adequate provision

104 for its exercise.

105Congress have an unlimited discretion

106 to make requisitions of men and money;

107 to govern the army and navy;

108 to direct their operations.

109As their requisitions are made constitutionally binding

110 upon the States,

111 who are in fact under the most solemn obligations

112 to furnish the supplies required of them,

113 the intention evidently was

114 that the United States should command

115 whatever resources were by them judged requisite

116 to the "common defense and general welfare."

117It was presumed that a sense of their true interests,

118 and a regard to the dictates of good faith,

119 would be found sufficient pledges

120 for the punctual performance

121 of the duty of the members

122 to the federal head.

123The experiment has, however, demonstrated

124 that this expectation was ill-founded and illusory;

125 and the observations, made under the last head,

126 will, I imagine, have sufficed to convince

127 the impartial and discerning,

128 that there is an absolute necessity

129 for an entire change

130 in the first principles of the system;

131 that if we are in earnest

132 about giving the Union energy and duration,

133 we must abandon the vain project

134 of legislating upon the States

135 in their collective capacities;

136 we must extend the laws of the federal government

137 to the individual citizens of America;

138 we must discard the fallacious scheme

139 of quotas and requisitions,

140 as equally impracticable and unjust.

141The result from all this is

142 that the Union ought to be invested with full power

143 to levy troops;

144 to build and equip fleets;

145 and to raise the revenues

146 which will be required

147 for the formation and support

148 of an army and navy,

149 in the customary and ordinary modes

150 practiced in other governments.

151If the circumstances of our country are such

152 as to demand a compound instead of a simple,

153 a confederate instead of a sole, government,

154 the essential point which will remain to be adjusted

155 will be to discriminate the OBJECTS,

156 as far as it can be done,

157 which shall appertain

158 to the different provinces

159 or departments of power;

160 allowing to each the most ample authority

161 for fulfilling the objects

162 committed to its charge.

163Shall the Union be constituted

164 the guardian of the common safety?

165Are fleets and armies and revenues

166 necessary to this purpose?

167The government of the Union must be empowered

168 to pass all laws,

169 and to make all regulations

170 which have relation to them.

171The same must be the case in respect to commerce,

172 and to every other matter

173 to which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend.

174Is the administration of justice

175 between the citizens of the same State

176 the proper department of the local governments?

177These must possess all the authorities

178 which are connected with this object,

179 and with every other that may be allotted

180 to their particular cognizance and direction.

181Not to confer in each case a degree of power

182 commensurate to the end,

183 would be to violate the most obvious rules

184 of prudence and propriety,

185 and improvidently to trust

186 the great interests of the nation

187 to hands which are disabled

188 from managing them with vigor and success.

189Who is likely to make suitable provisions

190 for the public defense,

191 as that body to which the guardianship

192 of the public safety is confided;

193 which, as the centre of information,

194 will best understand the extent and urgency

195 of the dangers that threaten;

196 as the representative of the WHOLE,

197 will feel itself most deeply interested

198 in the preservation of every part;

199 which, from the responsibility implied

200 in the duty assigned to it,

201 will be most sensibly impressed

202 with the necessity of proper exertions;

203 and which, by the extension of its authority

204 throughout the States,

205 can alone establish uniformity and concert

206 in the plans and measures

207 by which the common safety is to be secured?

208Is there not a manifest inconsistency

209 in devolving upon the federal government

210 the care of the general defense,

211 and leaving in the State governments

212 the EFFECTIVE powers

213 by which it is to be provided for?

214Is not a want of co-operation

215 the infallible consequence of such a system?

216And will not weakness, disorder,

217 an undue distribution of the burdens

218 and calamities of war,

219 an unnecessary and intolerable increase of expense,

220 be its natural and inevitable concomitants?

221Have we not had unequivocal experience of its effects

222 in the course of the revolution

223 which we have just accomplished?

224Every view we may take of the subject,

225 as candid inquirers after truth,

226 will serve to convince us,

227 that it is both unwise and dangerous

228 to deny the federal government

229 an unconfined authority,

230 as to all those objects

231 which are intrusted to its management.

232It will indeed deserve

233 the most vigilant and careful attention

234 of the people,

235 to see that it be modeled in such a manner

236 as to admit of its being safely vested

237 with the requisite powers.

238If any plan which has been, or may be,

239 offered to our consideration,

240 should not, upon a dispassionate inspection,

241 be found to answer this description,

242 it ought to be rejected.

243A government, the constitution of which

244 renders it unfit to be trusted with all the powers

245 which a free people

246 OUGHT TO DELEGATE TO ANY GOVERNMENT,

247 would be an unsafe and improper depositary

248 of the NATIONAL INTERESTS.

249Wherever THESE can with propriety be confided,

250 the coincident powers may safely accompany them.

251This is the true result of all just reasoning

252 upon the subject.

253And the adversaries of the plan

254 promulgated by the convention

255 ought to have confined themselves to showing,

256 that the internal structure

257 of the proposed government

258 was such as to render it unworthy

259 of the confidence of the people.

260They ought not to have wandered

261 into inflammatory declamations

262 and unmeaning cavils

263 about the extent of the powers.

264The POWERS are not too extensive

265 for the OBJECTS of federal administration,

266 or, in other words,

267 for the management of our NATIONAL INTERESTS;

268 nor can any satisfactory argument be framed

269 to show that they are chargeable

270 with such an excess.

271If it be true,

272 as has been insinuated by some of the writers

273 on the other side,

274 that the difficulty arises

275 from the nature of the thing,

276 and that the extent of the country

277 will not permit us to form a government

278 in which such ample powers

279 can safely be reposed,

280 it would prove that we ought to contract our views,

281 and resort to the expedient

282 of separate confederacies,

283 which will move within more practicable spheres.

284For the absurdity must continually stare us

285 in the face

286 of confiding to a government the direction

287 of the most essential national interests,

288 without daring to trust it to the authorities

289 which are indispensible

290 to their proper and efficient management.

291Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions,

292 but firmly embrace a rational alternative.

293I trust, however,

294 that the impracticability of one general system

295 cannot be shown.

296I am greatly mistaken,

297 if any thing of weight has yet been advanced

298 of this tendency;

299 and I flatter myself,

300 that the observations which have been made

301 in the course of these papers

302 have served to place the reverse of that position

303 in as clear a light

304 as any matter still in the womb

305 of time and experience

306 can be susceptible of.

307This, at all events, must be evident,

308 that the very difficulty itself,

309 drawn from the extent of the country,

310 is the strongest argument

311 in favor of an energetic government;

312 for any other can certainly never preserve

313 the Union of so large an empire.

314If we embrace the tenets of those

315 who oppose the adoption

316 of the proposed Constitution,

317 as the standard of our political creed,

318 we cannot fail to verify the gloomy doctrines

319 which predict the impracticability

320 of a national system

321 pervading entire limits

322 of the present Confederacy.

323PUBLIUS.