1787 Federalist 21 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 21

2Other Defects of the Present Confederation

3For the Independent Journal.

4HAMILTON

5To the People of the State of New York:

6HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review

7 of the principal circumstances and events

8 which have depicted the genius and fate

9 of other confederate governments,

10 I shall now proceed in the enumeration

11 of the most important of those defects

12 which have hitherto disappointed our hopes

13 from the system established among ourselves.

14To form a safe and satisfactory judgment

15 of the proper remedy,

16 it is absolutely necessary

17 that we should be well acquainted

18 with the extent and malignity of the disease.

19The next most palpable defect

20 of the subsisting Confederation,

21 is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws.

22The United States, as now composed,

23 have no powers to exact obedience,

24 or punish disobedience to their resolutions,

25 either by pecuniary mulcts,

26 by a suspension or divestiture of privileges,

27 or by any other constitutional mode.

28There is no express delegation of authority to them

29 to use force against delinquent members;

30 and if such a right should be ascribed

31 to the federal head,

32 as resulting from the nature

33 of the social compact between the States,

34 it must be by inference and construction,

35 in the face of that part of the second article,

36 by which it is declared,

37 "that each State shall retain every power,

38 jurisdiction, and right,

39 not EXPRESSLY delegated

40 to the United States

41 in Congress assembled."

42There is, doubtless, a striking absurdity

43 in supposing that a right of this kind

44 does not exist,

45 but we are reduced to the dilemma

46 either of embracing that supposition,

47 preposterous as it may seem,

48 or of contravening or explaining away

49 a provision,

50 which has been of late a repeated theme

51 of the eulogies of those

52 who oppose the new Constitution;

53 and the want of which, in that plan,

54 has been the subject

55 of much plausible animadversion,

56 and severe criticism.

57If we are unwilling to impair the force

58 of this applauded provision,

59 we shall be obliged to conclude,

60 that the United States afford

61 the extraordinary spectacle

62 of a government

63 destitute even of the shadow

64 of constitutional power

65 to enforce the execution of its own laws.

66It will appear,

67 from the specimens which have been cited,

68 that the American Confederacy,

69 in this particular,

70 stands discriminated

71 from every other institution

72 of a similar kind,

73 and exhibits a new

74 and unexampled phenomenon

75 in the political world.

76The want of a mutual guaranty

77 of the State governments

78 is another capital imperfection

79 in the federal plan.

80There is nothing of this kind declared

81 in the articles that compose it;

82 and to imply a tacit guaranty

83 from considerations of utility,

84 would be a still more flagrant departure

85 from the clause which has been mentioned,

86 than to imply a tacit power of coercion

87 from the like considerations.

88The want of a guaranty,

89 though it might in its consequences

90 endanger the Union,

91 does not so immediately attack its existence

92 as the want of a constitutional sanction

93 to its laws.

94Without a guaranty

95 the assistance to be derived from the Union

96 in repelling those domestic dangers

97 which may sometimes threaten the existence

98 of the State constitutions,

99 must be renounced.

100Usurpation may rear its crest in each State,

101 and trample upon the liberties of the people,

102 while the national government

103 could legally do nothing more

104 than behold its encroachments

105 with indignation and regret.

106A successful faction may erect a tyranny

107 on the ruins of order and law,

108 while no succor could constitutionally be afforded

109 by the Union

110 to the friends and supporters

111 of the government.

112The tempestuous situation

113 from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged,

114 evinces that dangers of this kind

115 are not merely speculative.

116Who can determine what might have been the issue

117 of her late convulsions,

118 if the malcontents had been headed

119 by a Caesar or by a Cromwell?

120Who can predict what effect a despotism,

121 established in Massachusetts,

122 would have upon the liberties

123 of New Hampshire or Rhode Island,

124 of Connecticut or New York?

125The inordinate pride of State importance

126 has suggested to some minds an objection

127 to the principle of a guaranty

128 in the federal government,

129 as involving an officious interference

130 in the domestic concerns of the members.

131A scruple of this kind would deprive us

132 of one of the principal advantages

133 to be expected from union,

134 and can only flow from a misapprehension

135 of the nature of the provision itself.

136It could be no impediment

137 to reforms of the State constitution

138 by a majority of the people

139 in a legal and peaceable mode.

140This right would remain undiminished.

141The guaranty could only operate against changes

142 to be effected by violence.

143Towards the preventions of calamities of this kind,

144 too many checks cannot be provided.

145The peace of society

146 and the stability of government

147 depend absolutely on the efficacy

148 of the precautions adopted on this head.

149Where the whole power of the government

150 is in the hands of the people,

151 there is the less pretense

152 for the use of violent remedies

153 in partial or occasional distempers

154 of the State.

155The natural cure for an ill-administration,

156 in a popular or representative constitution,

157 is a change of men.

158A guaranty by the national authority

159 would be as much levelled

160 against the usurpations of rulers

161 as against the ferments and outrages

162 of faction and sedition in the community.

163The principle of regulating the contributions

164 of the States

165 to the common treasury by QUOTAS

166 is another fundamental error

167 in the Confederation.

168Its repugnancy to an adequate supply

169 of the national exigencies

170 has been already pointed out,

171 and has sufficiently appeared

172 from the trial which has been made of it.

173I speak of it now solely with a view

174 to equality among the States.

175Those who have been accustomed to contemplate

176 the circumstances which produce and constitute

177 national wealth,

178 must be satisfied

179 that there is no common standard

180 or barometer

181 by which the degrees of it

182 can be ascertained.

183Neither the value of lands,

184 nor the numbers of the people,

185 which have been successively proposed

186 as the rule of State contributions,

187 has any pretension

188 to being a just representative.

189If we compare the wealth

190 of the United Netherlands

191 with that of Russia or Germany,

192 or even of France,

193 and if we at the same time compare

194 the total value of the lands

195 and the aggregate population

196 of that contracted district

197 with the total value of the lands

198 and the aggregate population

199 of the immense regions

200 of either of the three last-mentioned countries,

201 we shall at once discover

202 that there is no comparison

203 between the proportion

204 of either of these two objects

205 and that of the relative wealth

206 of those nations.

207If the like parallel were to be run

208 between several of the American States,

209 it would furnish a like result.

210Let Virginia be contrasted with North Carolina,

211 Pennsylvania with Connecticut,

212 or Maryland with New Jersey,

213 and we shall be convinced

214 that the respective abilities

215 of those States,

216 in relation to revenue,

217 bear little or no analogy

218 to their comparative stock in lands

219 or to their comparative population.

220The position may be equally illustrated

221 by a similar process between the counties

222 of the same State.

223No man who is acquainted

224 with the State of New York

225 will doubt that the active wealth

226 of King's County

227 bears a much greater proportion

228 to that of Montgomery

229 than it would appear to be

230 if we should take either

231 the total value of the lands

232 or the total number of the people

233 as a criterion!

234The wealth of nations depends

235 upon an infinite variety of causes.

236Situation, soil, climate,

237 the nature of the productions,

238 the nature of the government,

239 the genius of the citizens,

240 the degree of information they possess,

241 the state of commerce, of arts, of industry,

242 these circumstances and many more,

243 too complex, minute, or adventitious

244 to admit of a particular specification,

245 occasion differences hardly conceivable

246 in the relative opulence and riches

247 of different countries.

248The consequence clearly is

249 that there can be no common measure

250 of national wealth,

251 and, of course, no general or stationary rule

252 by which the ability of a state

253 to pay taxes

254 can be determined.

255The attempt, therefore,

256 to regulate the contributions of the members

257 of a confederacy by any such rule,

258 cannot fail to be productive

259 of glaring inequality

260 and extreme oppression.

261This inequality would of itself be sufficient

262 in America

263 to work the eventual destruction of the Union,

264 if any mode of enforcing a compliance

265 with its requisitions could be devised.

266The suffering States would not long consent

267 to remain associated upon a principle

268 which distributes the public burdens

269 with so unequal a hand,

270 and which was calculated

271 to impoverish and oppress

272 the citizens of some States,

273 while those of others

274 would scarcely be conscious

275 of the small proportion of the weight

276 they were required to sustain.

277This, however, is an evil inseparable

278 from the principle of quotas and requisitions.

279There is no method of steering clear

280 of this inconvenience,

281 but by authorizing the national government

282 to raise its own revenues in its own way.

283Imposts, excises, and, in general,

284 all duties upon articles of consumption,

285 may be compared to a fluid,

286 which will, in time,

287 find its level

288 with the means of paying them.

289The amount to be contributed by each citizen

290 will in a degree be at his own option,

291 and can be regulated

292 by an attention to his resources.

293The rich may be extravagant,

294 the poor can be frugal;

295 and private oppression may always be avoided

296 by a judicious selection of objects

297 proper for such impositions.

298If inequalities should arise in some States

299 from duties on particular objects,

300 these will, in all probability, be counterbalanced

301 by proportional inequalities

302 in other States,

303 from the duties on other objects.

304In the course of time and things,

305 an equilibrium,

306 as far as it is attainable

307 in so complicated a subject,

308 will be established everywhere.

309Or, if inequalities should still exist,

310 they would neither be so great in their degree,

311 so uniform in their operation,

312 nor so odious in their appearance,

313 as those which would necessarily spring

314 from quotas,

315 upon any scale

316 that can possibly be devised.

317It is a signal advantage of taxes

318 on articles of consumption,

319 that they contain in their own nature

320 a security against excess.

321They prescribe their own limit;

322 which cannot be exceeded

323 without defeating the end proposed,

324 that is, an extension of the revenue.

325When applied to this object,

326 the saying is as just as it is witty, that,

327 "in political arithmetic,

328 two and two do not always make four."

329If duties are too high,

330 they lessen the consumption;

331 the collection is eluded;

332 and the product to the treasury is not so great

333 as when they are confined

334 within proper and moderate bounds.

335This forms a complete barrier

336 against any material oppression of the citizens

337 by taxes of this class,

338 and is itself a natural limitation

339 of the power of imposing them.

340Impositions of this kind usually fall

341 under the denomination of indirect taxes,

342 and must for a long time constitute the chief part

343 of the revenue raised in this country.

344Those of the direct kind,

345 which principally relate to land and buildings,

346 may admit of a rule of apportionment.

347Either the value of land,

348 or the number of the people,

349 may serve as a standard.

350The state of agriculture

351 and the populousness of a country

352 have been considered as nearly connected

353 with each other.

354And, as a rule, for the purpose intended,

355 numbers, in the view of simplicity and certainty,

356 are entitled to a preference.

357In every country it is a herculean task

358 to obtain a valuation of the land;

359 in a country imperfectly settled

360 and progressive in improvement,

361 the difficulties are increased

362 almost to impracticability.

363The expense of an accurate valuation is,

364 in all situations, a formidable objection.

365In a branch of taxation

366 where no limits to the discretion

367 of the government

368 are to be found in the nature of things,

369 the establishment of a fixed rule,

370 not incompatible with the end,

371 may be attended with fewer inconveniences

372 than to leave that discretion

373 altogether at large.

374PUBLIUS.