1787 Federalist 20 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 20

2The Same Subject Continued:

3The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation

4to Preserve the Union

5From the New York Packet.

6Tuesday, December 11, 1787.

7HAMILTON AND MADISON

8To the People of the State of New York:

9THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics,

10 or rather of aristocracies

11 of a very remarkable texture,

12 yet confirming all the lessons derived

13 from those which we have already reviewed.

14The union is composed of seven coequal

15 and sovereign states,

16 and each state or province

17 is a composition of equal and independent cities.

18In all important cases,

19 not only the provinces but the cities

20 must be unanimous.

21The sovereignty of the Union is represented

22 by the States-General,

23 consisting usually of about fifty deputies

24 appointed by the provinces.

25They hold their seats, some for life,

26 some for six, three, and one years;

27 from two provinces they continue in appointment

28 during pleasure.

29The States-General have authority

30 to enter into treaties and alliances;

31 to make war and peace;

32 to raise armies and equip fleets;

33 to ascertain quotas and demand contributions.

34In all these cases, however,

35 unanimity and the sanction of their constituents

36 are requisite.

37They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors;

38 to execute treaties and alliances already formed;

39 to provide for the collection of duties

40 on imports and exports;

41 to regulate the mint, with a saving

42 to the provincial rights;

43 to govern as sovereigns the dependent territories.

44The provinces are restrained,

45 unless with the general consent,

46 from entering into foreign treaties;

47 from establishing imposts injurious to others,

48 or charging their neighbors with higher duties

49 than their own subjects.

50A council of state, a chamber of accounts,

51 with five colleges of admiralty,

52 aid and fortify the federal administration.

53The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder,

54 who is now an hereditary prince.

55His principal weight and influence in the republic

56 are derived from this independent title;

57 from his great patrimonial estates;

58 from his family connections

59 with some of the chief potentates of Europe;

60 and, more than all, perhaps,

61 from his being stadtholder

62 in the several provinces,

63 as well as for the union;

64 in which provincial quality

65 he has the appointment of town magistrates

66 under certain regulations,

67 executes provincial decrees,

68 presides when he pleases

69 in the provincial tribunals,

70 and has throughout the power of pardon.

71As stadtholder of the union,

72 he has, however, considerable prerogatives.

73In his political capacity he has authority

74 to settle disputes between the provinces,

75 when other methods fail;

76 to assist at the deliberations of the States-General,

77 and at their particular conferences;

78 to give audiences to foreign ambassadors,

79 and to keep agents for his particular affairs

80 at foreign courts.

81In his military capacity

82 he commands the federal troops,

83 provides for garrisons,

84 and in general regulates military affairs;

85 disposes of all appointments, from colonels to ensigns,

86 and of the governments and posts of fortified towns.

87In his marine capacity he is admiral-general,

88 and superintends and directs every thing

89 relative to naval forces and other naval affairs;

90 presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy;

91 appoints lieutenant-admirals and other officers;

92 and establishes councils of war,

93 whose sentences are not executed

94 till he approves them.

95His revenue, exclusive of his private income,

96 amounts to three hundred thousand florins.

97The standing army which he commands

98 consists of about forty thousand men.

99Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy,

100 as delineated on parchment.

101What are the characters which practice has stamped upon it?

102Imbecility in the government;

103 discord among the provinces;

104 foreign influence and indignities;

105 a precarious existence in peace,

106 and peculiar calamities from war.

107It was long ago remarked by Grotius,

108 that nothing but the hatred of his countrymen

109 to the house of Austria

110 kept them from being ruined

111 by the vices of their constitution.

112The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer,

113 reposes an authority in the States-General,

114 seemingly sufficient to secure harmony,

115 but the jealousy in each province

116 renders the practice very different

117 from the theory.

118The same instrument, says another,

119 obliges each province to levy certain contributions;

120 but this article never could,

121 and probably never will, be executed;

122 because the inland provinces, who have little commerce,

123 cannot pay an equal quota.

124In matters of contribution,

125 it is the practice to waive the articles

126 of the constitution.

127The danger of delay obliges the consenting provinces

128 to furnish their quotas,

129 without waiting for the others;

130 and then to obtain reimbursement from the others,

131 by deputations, which are frequent,

132 or otherwise, as they can.

133The great wealth and influence

134 of the province of Holland

135 enable her to effect both these purposes.

136It has more than once happened,

137 that the deficiencies had to be ultimately collected

138 at the point of the bayonet;

139 a thing practicable, though dreadful,

140 in a confedracy where one of the members

141 exceeds in force all the rest,

142 and where several of them are too small

143 to meditate resistance;

144 but utterly impracticable in one composed of members,

145 several of which are equal to each other

146 in strength and resources,

147 and equal singly

148 to a vigorous and persevering defense.

149Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple,

150 who was himself a foreign minister,

151 elude matters taken ad referendum,

152 by tampering with the provinces and cities.

153In 1726, the treaty of Hanover

154 was delayed by these means a whole year.

155Instances of a like nature are numerous and notorious.

156In critical emergencies,

157 the States-General are often compelled

158 to overleap their constitutional bounds.

159In 1688, they concluded a treaty of themselves

160 at the risk of their heads.

161The treaty of Westphalia, in 1648,

162 by which their independence

163 was formerly and finally recognized,

164 was concluded without the consent of Zealand.

165Even as recently as the last treaty of peace

166 with Great Britain,

167 the constitutional principle of unanimity

168 was departed from.

169A weak constitution must necessarily terminate

170 in dissolution, for want of proper powers,

171 or the usurpation of powers

172 requisite for the public safety.

173Whether the usurpation, when once begun,

174 will stop at the salutary point,

175 or go forward to the dangerous extreme,

176 must depend on the contingencies of the moment.

177Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions

178 of power, called for, on pressing exigencies,

179 by a defective constitution,

180 than out of the full exercise

181 of the largest constitutional authorities.

182Notwithstanding the calamities produced

183 by the stadtholdership,

184 it has been supposed that without his influence

185 in the individual provinces,

186 the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy

187 would long ago have dissolved it.

188"Under such a government,"

189 says the Abbe Mably,

190 "the Union could never have subsisted,

191 if the provinces had not a spring

192 within themselves,

193 capable of quickening their tardiness,

194 and compelling them to the same way of thinking.

195This spring is the stadtholder."

196It is remarked by Sir William Temple,

197 "that in the intermissions of the stadtholdership,

198 Holland, by her riches and her authority,

199 which drew the others into a sort of dependence,

200 supplied the place."

201These are not the only circumstances

202 which have controlled the tendency

203 to anarchy and dissolution.

204The surrounding powers impose an absolute necessity

205 of union to a certain degree,

206 at the same time that they nourish by their intrigues

207 the constitutional vices

208 which keep the republic in some degree

209 always at their mercy.

210The true patriots have long bewailed

211 the fatal tendency of these vices,

212 and have made no less than four regular experiments

213 by EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLIES,

214 convened for the special purpose,

215 to apply a remedy.

216As many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible

217 to UNITE THE PUBLIC COUNCILS

218 in reforming the known, the acknowledged,

219 the fatal evils of the existing constitution.

220Let us pause, my fellow-citizens, for one moment,

221 over this melancholy and monitory lesson of history;

222 and with the tear that drops for the calamities

223 brought on mankind

224 by their adverse opinions and selfish passions,

225 let our gratitude mingle an ejaculation to Heaven,

226 for the propitious concord

227 which has distinguished the consultations

228 for our political happiness.

229A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax

230 to be administered by the federal authority.

231This also had its adversaries and failed.

232This unhappy people seem to be now suffering

233 from popular convulsions,

234 from dissensions among the states,

235 and from the actual invasion of foreign arms,

236 the crisis of their distiny.

237All nations have their eyes fixed on the awful spectacle.

238The first wish prompted by humanity is,

239 that this severe trial may issue

240 in such a revolution of their government

241 as will establish their union,

242 and render it the parent

243 of tranquillity, freedom and happiness:

244The next, that the asylum under which, we trust,

245 the enjoyment of these blessings

246 will speedily be secured in this country,

247 may receive and console them

248 for the catastrophe of their own.

249I make no apology for having dwelt so long

250 on the contemplation of these federal precedents.

251Experience is the oracle of truth;

252 and where its responses are unequivocal,

253 they ought to be conclusive and sacred.

254The important truth,

255 which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case,

256 is that a sovereignty over sovereigns,

257 a government over governments,

258 a legislation for communities,

259 as contradistinguished from individuals,

260 as it is a solecism in theory,

261 so in practice it is subversive

262 of the order and ends of civil polity,

263 by substituting VIOLENCE in place of LAW,

264 or the destructive COERCION of the SWORD

265 in place of the mild and salutary

266 COERCION of the MAGISTRACY.

267PUBLIUS.