1787 Federalist 18 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 18

2The Same Subject Continued:

3The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation

4to Preserve the Union

5For the Independent Journal.

6HAMILTON AND MADISON

7To the People of the State of New York:

8AMONG the confederacies of antiquity,

9 the most considerable was that

10 of the Grecian republics,

11 associated under the Amphictyonic council.

12From the best accounts transmitted

13 of this celebrated institution,

14 it bore a very instructive analogy

15 to the present Confederation

16 of the American States.

17The members retained the character

18 of independent and sovereign states,

19 and had equal votes in the federal council.

20This council had a general authority

21 to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary

22 for the common welfare of Greece;

23 to declare and carry on war;

24 to decide, in the last resort,

25 all controversies between the members;

26 to fine the aggressing party;

27 to employ the whole force of the confederacy

28 against the disobedient;

29 to admit new members.

30The Amphictyons were the guardians of religion,

31 and of the immense riches

32 belonging to the temple of Delphos,

33 where they had the right of jurisdiction

34 in controversies between the inhabitants

35 and those who came to consult the oracle.

36As a further provision for the efficacy

37 of the federal powers,

38 they took an oath mutually to defend and protect

39 the united cities,

40 to punish the violators of this oath,

41 and to inflict vengeance

42 on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.

43In theory, and upon paper,

44 this apparatus of powers seems amply sufficient

45 for all general purposes.

46In several material instances,

47 they exceed the powers enumerated

48 in the articles of confederation.

49The Amphictyons had in their hands

50 the superstition of the times,

51 one of the principal engines

52 by which government was then maintained;

53 they had a declared authority

54 to use coercion against refractory cities,

55 and were bound by oath to exert this authority

56 on the necessary occasions.

57Very different, nevertheless,

58 was the experiment from the theory.

59The powers, like those of the present Congress,

60 were administered by deputies

61 appointed wholly by the cities

62 in their political capacities;

63 and exercised over them in the same capacities.

64Hence the weakness, the disorders,

65 and finally the destruction of the confederacy.

66The more powerful members,

67 instead of being kept in awe and subordination,

68 tyrannized successively over all the rest.

69Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes,

70 was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years.

71The Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-nine years;

72 at a subsequent period, after the battle of Leuctra,

73 the Thebans had their turn of domination.

74It happened but too often, according to Plutarch,

75 that the deputies of the strongest cities

76 awed and corrupted those of the weaker;

77 and that judgment went in favor

78 of the most powerful party.

79Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars

80 with Persia and Macedon,

81 the members never acted in concert,

82 and were, more or fewer of them,

83 eternally the dupes or the hirelings

84 of the common enemy.

85The intervals of foreign war were filled up

86 by domestic vicissitudes convulsions, and carnage.

87After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes,

88 it appears that the Lacedaemonians required

89 that a number of the cities

90 should be turned out of the confederacy

91 for the unfaithful part they had acted.

92The Athenians, finding that the Lacedaemonians

93 would lose fewer partisans by such a measure

94 than themselves,

95 and would become masters of the public deliberations,

96 vigorously opposed and defeated the attempt.

97This piece of history proves at once

98 the inefficiency of the union,

99 the ambition and jealousy of its most powerful members,

100 and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest.

101The smaller members,

102 though entitled by the theory of their system

103 to revolve in equal pride and majesty

104 around the common center,

105 had become, in fact,

106 satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude.

107Had the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot,

108 been as wise as they were courageous,

109 they would have been admonished by experience

110 of the necessity of a closer union,

111 and would have availed themselves of the peace

112 which followed their success

113 against the Persian arms,

114 to establish such a reformation.

115Instead of this obvious policy,

116 Athens and Sparta,

117 inflated with the victories and the glory

118 they had acquired,

119 became first rivals and then enemies;

120 and did each other infinitely more mischief

121 than they had suffered from Xerxes.

122Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries

123 ended in the celebrated Peloponnesian war;

124 which itself ended in the ruin and slavery

125 of the Athenians who had begun it.

126As a weak government, when not at war,

127 is ever agitated by internal dissentions,

128 so these never fail to bring on fresh calamities

129 from abroad.

130The Phocians having ploughed up some consecrated ground

131 belonging to the temple of Apollo,

132 the Amphictyonic council,

133 according to the superstition of the age,

134 imposed a fine on the sacrilegious offenders.

135The Phocians, being abetted by Athens and Sparta,

136 refused to submit to the decree.

137The Thebans, with others of the cities,

138 undertook to maintain the authority of the Amphictyons,

139 and to avenge the violated god.

140The latter, being the weaker party,

141 invited the assistance of Philip of Macedon,

142 who had secretly fostered the contest.

143Philip gladly seized the opportunity

144 of executing the designs

145 he had long planned

146 against the liberties of Greece.

147By his intrigues and bribes

148 he won over to his interests

149 the popular leaders of several cities;

150 by their influence and votes,

151 gained admission into the Amphictyonic council;

152 and by his arts and his arms,

153 made himself master of the confederacy.

154Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle

155 on which this interesting establishment was founded.

156Had Greece, says a judicious observer on her fate,

157 been united by a stricter confederation,

158 and persevered in her union,

159 she would never have worn the chains of Macedon;

160 and might have proved a barrier

161 to the vast projects of Rome.

162The Achaean league, as it is called,

163 was another society of Grecian republics,

164 which supplies us with valuable instruction.

165The Union here was far more intimate,

166 and its organization much wiser,

167 than in the preceding instance.

168It will accordingly appear,

169 that though not exempt from a similar catastrophe,

170 it by no means equally deserved it.

171The cities composing this league

172 retained their municipal jurisdiction,

173 appointed their own officers,

174 and enjoyed a perfect equality.

175The senate, in which they were represented,

176 had the sole and exclusive right of peace and war;

177 of sending and receiving ambassadors;

178 of entering into treaties and alliances;

179 of appointing a chief magistrate or praetor,

180 as he was called,

181 who commanded their armies,

182 and who, with the advice and consent

183 of ten of the senators,

184 not only administered the government

185 in the recess of the senate,

186 but had a great share in its deliberations,

187 when assembled.

188According to the primitive constitution,

189 there were two praetors associated

190 in the administration;

191 but on trial a single one was preferred.

192It appears that the cities had all the same laws

193 and customs, the same weights and measures,

194 and the same money.

195But how far this effect proceeded

196 from the authority of the federal council

197 is left in uncertainty.

198It is said only that the cities were in a manner compelled

199 to receive the same laws and usages.

200When Lacedaemon was brought into the league by Philopoemen,

201 it was attended with an abolition

202 of the institutions and laws of Lycurgus,

203 and an adoption of those of the Achaeans.

204The Amphictyonic confederacy,

205 of which she had been a member,

206 left her in the full exercise

207 of her government and her legislation.

208This circumstance alone proves

209 a very material difference

210 in the genius of the two systems.

211It is much to be regretted

212 that such imperfect monuments remain

213 of this curious political fabric.

214Could its interior structure and regular operation

215 be ascertained,

216 it is probable that more light would be thrown by it

217 on the science of federal government,

218 than by any of the like experiments

219 with which we are acquainted.

220One important fact seems to be witnessed

221 by all the historians who take notice

222 of Achaean affairs.

223It is, that as well after the renovation of the league

224 by Aratus,

225 as before its dissolution by the arts of Macedon,

226 there was infinitely more of moderation and justice

227 in the administration of its government,

228 and less of violence and sedition in the people,

229 than were to be found in any of the cities

230 exercising SINGLY all the prerogatives

231 of sovereignty.

232The Abbe Mably, in his observations on Greece, says

233 that the popular government,

234 which was so tempestuous elsewhere,

235 caused no disorders in the members

236 of the Achaean republic,

237 BECAUSE IT WAS THERE TEMPERED

238 BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY

239 AND LAWS OF THE CONFEDERACY.

240We are not to conclude too hastily, however,

241 that faction did not, in a certain degree,

242 agitate the particular cities;

243 much less that a due subordination and harmony

244 reigned in the general system.

245The contrary is sufficiently displayed

246 in the vicissitudes and fate of the republic.

247Whilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained,

248 that of the Achaeans,

249 which comprehended the less important cities only,

250 made little figure on the theatre of Greece.

251When the former became a victim to Macedon,

252 the latter was spared

253 by the policy of Philip and Alexander.

254Under the successors of these princes, however,

255 a different policy prevailed.

256The arts of division were practiced among the Achaeans.

257Each city was seduced into a separate interest;

258 the union was dissolved.

259Some of the cities fell under the tyranny

260 of Macedonian garrisons;

261 others under that of usurpers

262 springing out of their own confusions.

263Shame and oppression erelong awaken their love of liberty.

264A few cities reunited.

265Their example was followed by others,

266 as opportunities were found

267 of cutting off their tyrants.

268The league soon embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus.

269Macedon saw its progress;

270 but was hindered by internal dissensions

271 from stopping it.

272All Greece caught the enthusiasm

273 and seemed ready to unite in one confederacy,

274 when the jealousy and envy in Sparta and Athens,

275 of the rising glory of the Achaeans,

276 threw a fatal damp on the enterprise.

277The dread of the Macedonian power

278 induced the league to court the alliance

279 of the Kings of Egypt and Syria,

280 who, as successors of Alexander,

281 were rivals of the king of Macedon.

282This policy was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta,

283 who was led by his ambition

284 to make an unprovoked attack

285 on his neighbors, the Achaeans,

286 and who, as an enemy to Macedon,

287 had interest enough with the Egyptian

288 and Syrian princes

289 to effect a breach of their engagements

290 with the league.

291The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma

292 of submitting to Cleomenes,

293 or of supplicating the aid of Macedon,

294 its former oppressor.

295The latter expedient was adopted.

296The contests of the Greeks always afforded

297 a pleasing opportunity to that powerful neighbor

298 of intermeddling in their affairs.

299A Macedonian army quickly appeared.

300Cleomenes was vanquished.

301The Achaeans soon experienced, as often happens,

302 that a victorious and powerful ally

303 is but another name for a master.

304All that their most abject compliances

305 could obtain from him

306 was a toleration of the exercise of their laws.

307Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon,

308 soon provoked by his tyrannies,

309 fresh combinations among the Greeks.

310The Achaeans, though weakenened by internal dissensions

311 and by the revolt of Messene, one of its members,

312 being joined by the AEtolians and Athenians,

313 erected the standard of opposition.

314Finding themselves, though thus supported,

315 unequal to the undertaking,

316 they once more had recourse to the dangerous expedient

317 of introducing the succor of foreign arms.

318The Romans, to whom the invitation was made,

319 eagerly embraced it.

320Philip was conquered; Macedon subdued.

321A new crisis ensued to the league.

322Dissensions broke out among it members.

323These the Romans fostered.

324Callicrates and other popular leaders

325 became mercenary instruments

326 for inveigling their countrymen.

327The more effectually to nourish discord and disorder

328 the Romans had,

329 to the astonishment of those

330 who confided in their sincerity,

331 already proclaimed universal liberty[1]

332 throughout Greece.

333With the same insidious views,

334 they now seduced the members from the league,

335 by representing to their pride

336 the violation it committed on their sovereignty.

337By these arts this union,

338 the last hope of Greece,

339 the last hope of ancient liberty,

340 was torn into pieces;

341 and such imbecility and distraction introduced,

342 that the arms of Rome found little difficulty

343 in completing the ruin

344 which their arts had commenced.

345The Achaeans were cut to pieces,

346 and Achaia loaded with chains,

347 under which it is groaning at this hour.

348I have thought it not superfluous

349 to give the outlines of this important portion

350 of history;

351 both because it teaches more than one lesson,

352 and because, as a supplement

353 to the outlines of the Achaean constitution,

354 it emphatically illustrates the tendency

355 of federal bodies

356 rather to anarchy among the members,

357 than to tyranny in the head.

358PUBLIUS.

359[1] This was but another name more specious

360 for the independence of the members

361 on the federal head.