1787 Federalist 17 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 17

2The Same Subject Continued:

3The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation

4to Preserve the Union

5For the Independent Journal.

6HAMILTON

7To the People of the State of New York:

8AN OBJECTION, of a nature different

9 from that which has been stated and answered,

10 in my last address,

11 may perhaps be likewise urged

12 against the principle of legislation

13 for the individual citizens of America.

14It may be said that it would tend

15 to render the government of the Union too powerful,

16 and to enable it to absorb those residuary authorities,

17 which it might be judged proper

18 to leave with the States for local purposes.

19Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power

20 which any reasonable man can require,

21 I confess I am at a loss to discover

22 what temptation the persons

23 intrusted with the administration

24 of the general government

25 could ever feel to divest the States

26 of the authorities of that description.

27The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State

28 appears to me to hold out slender allurements

29 to ambition.

30Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war

31 seem to comprehend all the objects

32 which have charms for minds

33 governed by that passion;

34 and all the powers necessary to those objects

35 ought, in the first instance,

36 to be lodged in the national depository.

37The administration of private justice

38 between the citizens of the same State,

39 the supervision of agriculture

40 and of other concerns of a similar nature,

41 all those things, in short,

42 which are proper to be provided for

43 by local legislation,

44 can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction.

45It is therefore improbable

46 that there should exist a disposition

47 in the federal councils

48 to usurp the powers with which they are connected;

49 because the attempt to exercise those powers

50 would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory;

51 and the possession of them, for that reason,

52 would contribute nothing to the dignity,

53 to the importance,

54 or to the splendor of the national government.

55But let it be admitted, for argument's sake,

56 that mere wantonness and lust of domination

57 would be sufficient to beget that disposition;

58 still it may be safely affirmed,

59 that the sense of the constituent body

60 of the national representatives,

61 or, in other words,

62 the people of the several States,

63 would control the indulgence

64 of so extravagant an appetite.

65It will always be far more easy

66 for the State governments to encroach

67 upon the national authorities

68 than for the national government to encroach

69 upon the State authorities.

70The proof of this proposition turns

71 upon the greater degree of influence

72 which the State governments

73 if they administer their affairs

74 with uprightness and prudence,

75 will generally possess over the people;

76 a circumstance which at the same time teaches us

77 that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness

78 in all federal constitutions;

79 and that too much pains cannot be taken

80 in their organization,

81 to give them all the force

82 which is compatible with the principles of liberty.

83The superiority of influence

84 in favor of the particular governments

85 would result partly from the diffusive construction

86 of the national government,

87 but chiefly from the nature of the objects

88 to which the attention of the State administrations

89 would be directed.

90It is a known fact in human nature,

91 that its affections are commonly weak

92 in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness

93 of the object.

94Upon the same principle

95 that a man is more attached to his family

96 than to his neighborhood,

97 to his neighborhood than to the community at large,

98 the people of each State would be apt

99 to feel a stronger bias

100 towards their local governments

101 than towards the government of the Union;

102 unless the force of that principle should be destroyed

103 by a much better administration of the latter.

104This strong propensity of the human heart

105 would find powerful auxiliaries

106 in the objects of State regulation.

107The variety of more minute interests,

108 which will necessarily fall under the superintendence

109 of the local administrations,

110 and which will form so many rivulets of influence,

111 running through every part of the society,

112 cannot be particularized,

113 without involving a detail

114 too tedious and uninteresting

115 to compensate for the instruction it might afford.

116There is one transcendant advantage

117 belonging to the province of the State governments,

118 which alone suffices to place the matter

119 in a clear and satisfactory light,--

120 I mean the ordinary administration

121 of criminal and civil justice.

122This, of all others, is the most powerful,

123 most universal, and most attractive source

124 of popular obedience and attachment.

125It is that which,

126 being the immediate and visible guardian

127 of life and property,

128 having its benefits and its terrors

129 in constant activity before the public eye,

130 regulating all those personal interests

131 and familiar concerns

132 to which the sensibility of individuals

133 is more immediately awake,

134 contributes, more than any other circumstance,

135 to impressing upon the minds of the people,

136 affection, esteem, and reverence

137 towards the government.

138This great cement of society,

139 which will diffuse itself almost wholly

140 through the channels of the particular governments,

141 independent of all other causes of influence,

142 would insure them so decided an empire

143 over their respective citizens

144 as to render them at all times

145 a complete counterpoise,

146 and, not unfrequently,

147 dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.

148The operations of the national government,

149 on the other hand,

150 falling less immediately under the observation

151 of the mass of the citizens,

152 the benefits derived from it

153 will chiefly be perceived and attended to

154 by speculative men.

155Relating to more general interests,

156 they will be less apt to come home

157 to the feelings of the people;

158 and, in proportion, less likely

159 to inspire an habitual sense of obligation,

160 and an active sentiment of attachment.

161The reasoning on this head

162 has been abundantly exemplified

163 by the experience of all federal constitutions

164 with which we are acquainted,

165 and of all others

166 which have borne the least analogy to them.

167Though the ancient feudal systems were not,

168 strictly speaking, confederacies,

169 yet they partook of the nature

170 of that species of association.

171There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign,

172 whose authority extended over the whole nation;

173 and a number of subordinate vassals, or feudatories,

174 who had large portions of land allotted to them,

175 and numerous trains of INFERIOR

176 vassals or retainers,

177 who occupied and cultivated that land

178 upon the tenure of fealty or obedience,

179 to the persons of whom they held it.

180Each principal vassal was a kind of sovereign,

181 within his particular demesnes.

182The consequences of this situation

183 were a continual opposition

184 to authority of the sovereign,

185 and frequent wars between the great barons

186 or chief feudatories themselves.

187The power of the head of the nation

188 was commonly too weak,

189 either to preserve the public peace,

190 or to protect the people

191 against the oppressions of their immediate lords.

192This period of European affairs

193 is emphatically styled by historians,

194 the times of feudal anarchy.

195When the sovereign happened to be a man

196 of vigorous and warlike temper

197 and of superior abilities,

198 he would acquire a personal weight and influence,

199 which answered, for the time,

200 the purpose of a more regular authority.

201But in general, the power of the barons

202 triumphed over that of the prince;

203 and in many instances his dominion

204 was entirely thrown off,

205 and the great fiefs were erected

206 into independent principalities or States.

207In those instances in which the monarch

208 finally prevailed over his vassals,

209 his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny

210 of those vassals over their dependents.

211The barons, or nobles,

212 equally the enemies of the sovereign

213 and the oppressors of the common people,

214 were dreaded and detested by both;

215 till mutual danger and mutual interest

216 effected a union between them

217 fatal to the power of the aristocracy.

218Had the nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice,

219 preserved the fidelity and devotion

220 of their retainers and followers,

221 the contests between them and the prince

222 must almost always have ended in their favor,

223 and in the abridgment or subversion

224 of the royal authority.

225This is not an assertion founded merely

226 in speculation or conjecture.

227Among other illustrations of its truth

228 which might be cited,

229 Scotland will furnish a cogent example.

230The spirit of clanship which was, at an early day,

231 introduced into that kingdom,

232 uniting the nobles and their dependants

233 by ties equivalent to those of kindred,

234 rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch

235 for the power of the monarch,

236 till the incorporation with England

237 subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit,

238 and reduced it within those rules of subordination

239 which a more rational and more energetic system

240 of civil polity had previously established

241 in the latter kingdom.

242The separate governments in a confederacy

243 may aptly be compared with the feudal baronies;

244 with this advantage in their favor,

245 that from the reasons already explained,

246 they will generally possess

247 the confidence and good-will of the people,

248 and with so important a support,

249 will be able effectually to oppose

250 all encroachments of the national government.

251It will be well if they are not able

252 to counteract its legitimate and necessary authority.

253The points of similitude consist

254 in the rivalship of power, applicable to both,

255 and in the CONCENTRATION

256 of large portions of the strength of the community

257 into particular DEPOSITS,

258 in one case at the disposal of individuals,

259 in the other case at the disposal

260 of political bodies.

261A concise review of the events

262 that have attended confederate governments

263 will further illustrate this important doctrine;

264 an inattention to which

265 has been the great source

266 of our political mistakes,

267 and has given our jealousy a direction

268 to the wrong side.

269This review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.

270PUBLIUS.