1787 Federalist 16 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 16

2The Same Subject Continued:

3The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation

4to Preserve the Union

5From the New York Packet.

6Tuesday, December 4, 1787.

7HAMILTON

8To the People of the State of New York:

9THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States,

10 or communities, in their political capacities,

11 as it has been exemplified by the experiment

12 we have made of it,

13 is equally attested by the events

14 which have befallen all other governments

15 of the confederate kind,

16 of which we have any account,

17 in exact proportion to its prevalence

18 in those systems.

19The confirmations of this fact

20 will be worthy of a distinct

21 and particular examination.

22I shall content myself with barely observing here,

23 that of all the confederacies of antiquity,

24 which history has handed down to us,

25 the Lycian and Achaean leagues,

26 as far as there remain vestiges of them,

27 appear to have been most free

28 from the fetters of that mistaken principle,

29 and were accordingly those

30 which have best deserved,

31 and have most liberally received,

32 the applauding suffrages of political writers.

33This exceptionable principle may,

34 as truly as emphatically,

35 be styled the parent of anarchy:

36It has been seen that delinquencies

37 in the members of the Union

38 are its natural and necessary offspring;

39 and that whenever they happen,

40 the only constitutional remedy is force,

41 and the immediate effect of the use of it,

42 civil war.

43It remains to inquire

44 how far so odious an engine of government,

45 in its application to us,

46 would even be capable of answering its end.

47If there should not be a large army constantly

48 at the disposal of the national government

49 it would either not be able to employ force at all,

50 or, when this could be done,

51 it would amount to a war between parts

52 of the Confederacy

53 concerning the infractions of a league,

54 in which the strongest combination

55 would be most likely to prevail,

56 whether it consisted of those who supported

57 or of those who resisted the general authority.

58It would rarely happen

59 that the delinquency to be redressed

60 would be confined to a single member,

61 and if there were more than one

62 who had neglected their duty,

63 similarity of situation would induce them

64 to unite for common defense.

65Independent of this motive of sympathy,

66 if a large and influential State

67 should happen to be the aggressing member,

68 it would commonly have weight enough with its neighbors

69 to win over some of them

70 as associates to its cause.

71Specious arguments of danger to the common liberty

72 could easily be contrived;

73 plausible excuses for the deficiencies of the party

74 could, without difficulty, be invented

75 to alarm the apprehensions,

76 inflame the passions,

77 and conciliate the good-will,

78 even of those States

79 which were not chargeable

80 with any violation or omission of duty.

81This would be the more likely to take place,

82 as the delinquencies of the larger members

83 might be expected sometimes to proceed

84 from an ambitious premeditation in their rulers,

85 with a view to getting rid of all external control

86 upon their designs of personal aggrandizement;

87 the better to effect which it is presumable

88 they would tamper beforehand

89 with leading individuals in the adjacent States.

90If associates could not be found at home,

91 recourse would be had to the aid of foreign powers,

92 who would seldom be disinclined

93 to encouraging the dissensions of a Confederacy,

94 from the firm union of which

95 they had so much to fear.

96When the sword is once drawn,

97 the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation.

98The suggestions of wounded pride,

99 the instigations of irritated resentment,

100 would be apt to carry the States

101 against which the arms of the Union were exerted,

102 to any extremes necessary to avenge the affront

103 or to avoid the disgrace of submission.

104The first war of this kind

105 would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union.

106This may be considered as the violent death

107 of the Confederacy.

108Its more natural death is what we now seem

109 to be on the point of experiencing,

110 if the federal system be not speedily renovated

111 in a more substantial form.

112It is not probable, considering the genius of this country,

113 that the complying States would often be inclined

114 to support the authority of the Union

115 by engaging in a war

116 against the non-complying States.

117They would always be more ready to pursue the milder course

118 of putting themselves upon an equal footing

119 with the delinquent members

120 by an imitation of their example.

121And the guilt of all would thus become the security of all.

122Our past experience has exhibited the operation

123 of this spirit in its full light.

124There would, in fact, be an insuperable difficulty

125 in ascertaining when force could with propriety

126 be employed.

127In the article of pecuniary contribution,

128 which would be the most usual source of delinquency,

129 it would often be impossible to decide

130 whether it had proceeded from disinclination

131 or inability.

132The pretense of the latter would always be at hand.

133And the case must be very flagrant

134 in which its fallacy could be detected

135 with sufficient certainty

136 to justify the harsh expedient of compulsion.

137It is easy to see that this problem alone,

138 as often as it should occur,

139 would open a wide field

140 for the exercise of factious views,

141 of partiality, and of oppression,

142 in the majority that happened to prevail

143 in the national council.

144It seems to require no pains to prove

145 that the States ought not to prefer

146 a national Constitution

147 which could only be kept in motion

148 by the instrumentality of a large army

149 continually on foot

150 to execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees

151 of the government.

152And yet this is the plain alternative involved

153 by those who wish to deny it the power

154 of extending its operations to individuals.

155Such a scheme, if practicable at all,

156 would instantly degenerate into a military despotism;

157 but it will be found in every light impracticable.

158The resources of the Union would not be equal

159 to the maintenance of an army

160 considerable enough to confine the larger States

161 within the limits of their duty;

162 nor would the means ever be furnished

163 of forming such an army in the first instance.

164Whoever considers the populousness and strength

165 of several of these States singly

166 at the present juncture,

167 and looks forward to what they will become,

168 even at the distance of half a century,

169 will at once dismiss as idle and visionary

170 any scheme which aims at regulating their movements

171 by laws to operate upon them

172 in their collective capacities,

173 and to be executed by a coercion

174 applicable to them in the same capacities.

175A project of this kind is little less romantic

176 than the monster-taming spirit

177 which is attributed to the fabulous heroes

178 and demi-gods of antiquity.

179Even in those confederacies

180 which have been composed of members

181 smaller than many of our counties,

182 the principle of legislation for sovereign States,

183 supported by military coercion,

184 has never been found effectual.

185It has rarely been attempted to be employed,

186 but against the weaker members;

187 and in most instances

188 attempts to coerce the refractory and disobedient

189 have been the signals of bloody wars,

190 in which one half of the confederacy

191 has displayed its banners against the other half.

192The result of these observations

193 to an intelligent mind must be clearly this,

194 that if it be possible at any rate

195 to construct a federal government

196 capable of regulating the common concerns

197 and preserving the general tranquillity,

198 it must be founded, as to the objects

199 committed to its care,

200 upon the reverse of the principle contended for

201 by the opponents of the proposed Constitution.

202It must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens.

203It must stand in need of no intermediate legislations;

204 but must itself be empowered

205 to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate

206 to execute its own resolutions.

207The majesty of the national authority

208 must be manifested through the medium

209 of the courts of justice.

210The government of the Union, like that of each State,

211 must be able to address itself immediately

212 to the hopes and fears of individuals;

213 and to attract to its support those passions

214 which have the strongest influence

215 upon the human heart.

216It must, in short, possess all the means,

217 and have aright to resort to all the methods,

218 of executing the powers with which it is intrusted,

219 that are possessed and exercised

220 by the government of the particular States.

221To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected,

222 that if any State should be disaffected

223 to the authority of the Union,

224 it could at any time obstruct

225 the execution of its laws,

226 and bring the matter to the same issue of force,

227 with the necessity of which

228 the opposite scheme is reproached.

229The pausibility of this objection will vanish

230 the moment we advert to the essential difference

231 between a mere NON-COMPLIANCE

232 and a DIRECT and ACTIVE RESISTANCE.

233If the interposition of the State legislatures

234 be necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union,

235 they have only NOT TO ACT, or to ACT EVASIVELY,

236 and the measure is defeated.

237This neglect of duty may be disguised

238 under affected but unsubstantial provisions,

239 so as not to appear,

240 and of course not to excite any alarm in the people

241 for the safety of the Constitution.

242The State leaders may even make a merit

243 of their surreptitious invasions of it

244 on the ground of some temporary convenience,

245 exemption, or advantage.

246But if the execution of the laws

247 of the national government

248 should not require the intervention

249 of the State legislatures,

250 if they were to pass into immediate operation

251 upon the citizens themselves,

252 the particular governments could not interrupt

253 their progress

254 without an open and violent exertion

255 of an unconstitutional power.

256No omissions nor evasions would answer the end.

257They would be obliged to act,

258 and in such a manner as would leave no doubt

259 that they had encroached on the national rights.

260An experiment of this nature would always be hazardous

261 in the face of a constitution

262 in any degree competent to its own defense,

263 and of a people enlightened enough to distinguish

264 between a legal exercise

265 and an illegal usurpation of authority.

266The success of it would require

267 not merely a factious majority in the legislature,

268 but the concurrence of the courts of justice

269 and of the body of the people.

270If the judges were not embarked in a conspiracy

271 with the legislature,

272 they would pronounce the resolutions of such a majority

273 to be contrary to the supreme law of the land,

274 unconstitutional, and void.

275If the people were not tainted

276 with the spirit of their State representatives,

277 they, as the natural guardians of the Constitution,

278 would throw their weight into the national scale

279 and give it a decided preponderancy in the contest.

280Attempts of this kind would not often be made

281 with levity or rashness,

282 because they could seldom be made without danger

283 to the authors,

284 unless in cases of a tyrannical exercise

285 of the federal authority.

286If opposition to the national government should arise

287 from the disorderly conduct

288 of refractory or seditious individuals,

289 it could be overcome by the same means

290 which are daily employed against the same evil

291 under the State governments.

292The magistracy, being equally the ministers

293 of the law of the land,

294 from whatever source it might emanate,

295 would doubtless be as ready

296 to guard the national as the local regulations

297 from the inroads of private licentiousness.

298As to those partial commotions and insurrections,

299 which sometimes disquiet society,

300 from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction,

301 or from sudden or occasional illhumors

302 that do not infect the great body of the community

303 the general government could command

304 more extensive resources

305 for the suppression of disturbances of that kind

306 than would be in the power of any single member.

307And as to those mortal feuds which,

308 in certain conjunctures,

309 spread a conflagration through a whole nation,

310 or through a very large proportion of it,

311 proceeding either from weighty causes of discontent

312 given by the government

313 or from the contagion

314 of some violent popular paroxysm,

315 they do not fall within any ordinary rules

316 of calculation.

317When they happen, they commonly amount

318 to revolutions and dismemberments of empire.

319No form of government can always

320 either avoid or control them.

321It is in vain to hope to guard against events

322 too mighty for human foresight or precaution,

323 and it would be idle to object to a government

324 because it could not perform impossibilities.

325PUBLIUS.