1787 Federalist 13 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 13

2Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government

3For the Independent Journal.

4HAMILTON

5To the People of the State of New York:

6As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue,

7 we may with propriety consider that of economy.

8The money saved from one object

9 may be usefully applied to another,

10 and there will be so much the less

11 to be drawn from the pockets of the people.

12If the States are united under one government,

13 there will be but one national civil list to support;

14 if they are divided into several confederacies,

15 there will be as many different national civil lists

16 to be provided for--

17 and each of them, as to the principal departments,

18 coextensive with that which would be necessary

19 for a government of the whole.

20The entire separation of the States

21 into thirteen unconnected sovereignties

22 is a project too extravagant

23 and too replete with danger

24 to have many advocates.

25The ideas of men who speculate

26 upon the dismemberment of the empire

27 seem generally turned toward three confederacies--

28 one consisting of the four Northern,

29 another of the four Middle,

30 and a third of the five Southern States.

31There is little probability

32 that there would be a greater number.

33According to this distribution,

34 each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory

35 larger than that of the kingdom of Great Britain.

36No well-informed man will suppose

37 that the affairs of such a confederacy

38 can be properly regulated

39 by a government less comprehensive

40 in its organs or institutions

41 than that which has been proposed

42 by the convention.

43When the dimensions of a State attain

44 to a certain magnitude,

45 it requires the same energy of government

46 and the same forms of administration

47 which are requisite in one of much greater extent.

48This idea admits not of precise demonstration,

49 because there is no rule by which we can measure

50 the momentum of civil power necessary

51 to the government of any given number

52 of individuals;

53 but when we consider that the island of Britain,

54 nearly commensurate

55 with each of the supposed confederacies,

56 contains about eight millions of people,

57 and when we reflect upon the degree of authority

58 required to direct the passions

59 of so large a society

60 to the public good,

61 we shall see no reason to doubt

62 that the like portion of power would be sufficient

63 to perform the same task

64 in a society far more numerous.

65Civil power, properly organized and exerted,

66 is capable of diffusing its force

67 to a very great extent;

68 and can, in a manner, reproduce itself

69 in every part of a great empire

70 by a judicious arrangement

71 of subordinate institutions.

72The supposition that each confederacy

73 into which the States would be likely to be divided

74 would require a government not less comprehensive

75 than the one proposed,

76 will be strengthened by another supposition,

77 more probable than that

78 which presents us with three confederacies

79 as the alternative to a general Union.

80If we attend carefully

81 to geographical and commercial considerations,

82 in conjunction with the habits and prejudices

83 of the different States,

84 we shall be led to conclude

85 that in case of disunion

86 they will most naturally league themselves

87 under two governments.

88The four Eastern States,

89 from all the causes that form the links

90 of national sympathy and connection,

91 may with certainty be expected to unite.

92New York, situated as she is,

93 would never be unwise enough

94 to oppose a feeble and unsupported flank

95 to the weight of that confederacy.

96There are other obvious reasons

97 that would facilitate her accession to it.

98New Jersey is too small a State

99 to think of being a frontier,

100 in opposition to this still more powerful

101 combination;

102 nor do there appear to be any obstacles

103 to her admission into it.

104Even Pennsylvania would have strong inducements

105 to join the Northern league.

106An active foreign commerce,

107 on the basis of her own navigation,

108 is her true policy,

109 and coincides with the opinions and dispositions

110 of her citizens.

111The more Southern States, from various circumstances,

112 may not think themselves much interested

113 in the encouragement of navigation.

114They may prefer a system

115 which would give unlimited scope to all nations

116 to be the carriers as well as the purchasers

117 of their commodities.

118Pennsylvania may not choose to confound her interests

119 in a connection so adverse to her policy.

120As she must at all events be a frontier,

121 she may deem it most consistent with her safety

122 to have her exposed side turned

123 towards the weaker power of the Southern,

124 rather than towards the stronger power

125 of the Northern, Confederacy.

126This would give her the fairest chance

127 to avoid being the Flanders of America.

128Whatever may be the determination of Pennsylvania,

129 if the Northern Confederacy includes New Jersey,

130 there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy

131 to the south of that State.

132Nothing can be more evident

133 than that the thirteen States

134 will be able to support a national government

135 better than one half, or one third,

136 or any number less than the whole.

137This reflection must have great weight

138 in obviating that objection to the proposed plan,

139 which is founded on the principle of expense;

140 an objection, however,

141 which, when we come to take a nearer view of it,

142 will appear in every light

143 to stand on mistaken ground.

144If, in addition to the consideration

145 of a plurality of civil lists,

146 we take into view the number of persons

147 who must necessarily be employed

148 to guard the inland communication

149 between the different confederacies

150 against illicit trade,

151 and who in time will infallibly spring up

152 out of the necessities of revenue;

153 and if we also take into view

154 the military establishments

155 which it has been shown would unavoidably result

156 from the jealousies and conflicts

157 of the several nations

158 into which the States would be divided,

159 we shall clearly discover

160 that a separation would be not less injurious

161 to the economy,

162 than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue,

163 and liberty of every part.

164PUBLIUS.