1787 Federalist 10 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 10

2The Same Subject Continued:

3The Union as a Safeguard

4Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

5From the New York Packet.

6Friday, November 23, 1787.

7MADISON

8To the People of the State of New York:

9AMONG the numerous advantages promised

10 by a wellconstructed Union,

11 none deserves to be more accurately developed

12 than its tendency to break and control

13 the violence of faction.

14The friend of popular governments

15 never finds himself so much alarmed

16 for their character and fate,

17 as when he contemplates their propensity

18 to this dangerous vice.

19He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value

20 on any plan which, without violating the principles

21 to which he is attached,

22 provides a proper cure for it.

23The instability, injustice, and confusion

24 introduced into the public councils,

25 have, in truth, been the mortal diseases

26 under which popular governments

27 have everywhere perished;

28 as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics

29 from which the adversaries to liberty

30 derive their most specious declamations.

31The valuable improvements made

32 by the American constitutions

33 on the popular models, both ancient and modern,

34 cannot certainly be too much admired;

35 but it would be an unwarrantable partiality,

36 to contend that they have as effectually obviated

37 the danger on this side,

38 as was wished and expected.

39Complaints are everywhere heard

40 from our most considerate and virtuous citizens,

41 equally the friends of public and private faith,

42 and of public and personal liberty,

43 that our governments are too unstable,

44 that the public good is disregarded

45 in the conflicts of rival parties,

46 and that measures are too often decided,

47 not according to the rules of justice

48 and the rights of the minor party,

49 but by the superior force

50 of an interested and overbearing majority.

51However anxiously we may wish

52 that these complaints had no foundation,

53 the evidence, of known facts will not permit us

54 to deny that they are in some degree true.

55It will be found, indeed, on a candid review

56 of our situation,

57 that some of the distresses under which we labor

58 have been erroneously charged

59 on the operation of our governments;

60 but it will be found, at the same time,

61 that other causes will not alone account

62 for many of our heaviest misfortunes;

63 and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing

64 distrust of public engagements,

65 and alarm for private rights,

66 which are echoed from one end of the continent

67 to the other.

68These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects

69 of the unsteadiness and injustice

70 with which a factious spirit

71 has tainted our public administrations.

72By a faction, I understand a number of citizens,

73 whether amounting to a majority

74 or a minority of the whole,

75 who are united and actuated

76 by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,

77 adversed to the rights of other citizens,

78 or to the permanent and aggregate interests

79 of the community.

80There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction:

81 the one, by removing its causes;

82 the other, by controlling its effects.

83There are again two methods of removing the causes

84 of faction:

85 the one, by destroying the liberty

86 which is essential to its existence;

87 the other, by giving to every citizen

88 the same opinions, the same passions,

89 and the same interests.

90It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy,

91 that it was worse than the disease.

92Liberty is to faction what air is to fire,

93 an aliment without which it instantly expires.

94But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty,

95 which is essential to political life,

96 because it nourishes faction,

97 than it would be to wish the annihilation of air,

98 which is essential to animal life,

99 because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

100The second expedient is as impracticable

101 as the first would be unwise.

102As long as the reason of man continues fallible,

103 and he is at liberty to exercise it,

104 different opinions will be formed.

105As long as the connection subsists

106 between his reason and his self-love,

107 his opinions and his passions will have

108 a reciprocal influence on each other;

109 and the former will be objects

110 to which the latter will attach themselves.

111The diversity in the faculties of men,

112 from which the rights of property originate,

113 is not less an insuperable obstacle

114 to a uniformity of interests.

115The protection of these faculties

116 is the first object of government.

117From the protection of different and unequal faculties

118 of acquiring property,

119 the possession of different degrees

120 and kinds of property

121 immediately results;

122 and from the influence of these

123 on the sentiments and views

124 of the respective proprietors,

125 ensues a division of the society

126 into different interests and parties.

127The latent causes of faction

128 are thus sown in the nature of man;

129 and we see them everywhere brought

130 into different degrees of activity,

131 according to the different circumstances

132 of civil society.

133A zeal for different opinions concerning religion,

134 concerning government, and many other points,

135 as well of speculation as of practice;

136 an attachment to different leaders

137 ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power;

138 or to persons of other descriptions

139 whose fortunes have been interesting

140 to the human passions,

141 have, in turn, divided mankind into parties,

142 inflamed them with mutual animosity,

143 and rendered them much more disposed

144 to vex and oppress each other

145 than to co-operate for their common good.

146So strong is this propensity of mankind

147 to fall into mutual animosities,

148 that where no substantial occasion presents itself,

149 the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions

150 have been sufficient

151 to kindle their unfriendly passions

152 and excite their most violent conflicts.

153But the most common and durable source of factions

154 has been the various and unequal

155 distribution of property.

156Those who hold and those who are without property

157 have ever formed distinct interests in society.

158Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors,

159 fall under a like discrimination.

160A landed interest, a manufacturing interest,

161 a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest,

162 with many lesser interests,

163 grow up of necessity in civilized nations,

164 and divide them into different classes,

165 actuated by different sentiments and views.

166The regulation of these various and interfering interests

167 forms the principal task of modern legislation,

168 and involves the spirit of party and faction

169 in the necessary and ordinary operations

170 of the government.

171No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause,

172 because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,

173 and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.

174With equal, nay with greater reason,

175 a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties

176 at the same time;

177 yet what are many of the most important acts

178 of legislation,

179 but so many judicial determinations,

180 not indeed concerning the rights of single persons,

181 but concerning the rights

182 of large bodies of citizens?

183And what are the different classes of legislators

184 but advocates and parties

185 to the causes which they determine?

186Is a law proposed concerning private debts?

187It is a question to which the creditors are parties

188 on one side and the debtors on the other.

189Justice ought to hold the balance between them.

190Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges;

191 and the most numerous party,

192 or, in other words, the most powerful faction

193 must be expected to prevail.

194Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged,

195 and in what degree,

196 by restrictions on foreign manufactures?

197 are questions which would be differently decided

198 by the landed and the manufacturing classes,

199 and probably by neither

200 with a sole regard to justice and the public good.

201The apportionment of taxes

202 on the various descriptions of property

203 is an act which seems to require

204 the most exact impartiality;

205 yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act

206 in which greater opportunity and temptation

207 are given to a predominant party

208 to trample on the rules of justice.

209Every shilling with which they overburden

210 the inferior number,

211 is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

212It is in vain to say

213 that enlightened statesmen will be able

214 to adjust these clashing interests,

215 and render them all subservient to the public good.

216Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.

217Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all

218 without taking into view

219 indirect and remote considerations,

220 which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest

221 which one party may find

222 in disregarding the rights of another

223 or the good of the whole.

224The inference to which we are brought is,

225 that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed,

226 and that relief is only to be sought

227 in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.

228If a faction consists of less than a majority,

229 relief is supplied by the republican principle,

230 which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views

231 by regular vote.

232It may clog the administration,

233 it may convulse the society;

234 but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence

235 under the forms of the Constitution.

236When a majority is included in a faction,

237 the form of popular government, on the other hand,

238 enables it to sacrifice

239 to its ruling passion or interest

240 both the public good

241 and the rights of other citizens.

242To secure the public good and private rights

243 against the danger of such a faction,

244 and at the same time to preserve the spirit

245 and the form of popular government,

246 is then the great object

247 to which our inquiries are directed.

248Let me add that it is the great desideratum

249 by which this form of government can be rescued

250 from the opprobrium

251 under which it has so long labored,

252 and be recommended to the esteem

253 and adoption of mankind.

254By what means is this object attainable?

255Evidently by one of two only.

256Either the existence of the same passion or interest

257 in a majority at the same time must be prevented,

258 or the majority, having such coexistent

259 passion or interest,

260 must be rendered, by their number and local situation,

261 unable to concert and carry into effect

262 schemes of oppression.

263If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide,

264 we well know that neither moral nor religious motives

265 can be relied on as an adequate control.

266They are not found to be such

267 on the injustice and violence of individuals,

268 and lose their efficacy in proportion

269 to the number combined together,

270 that is, in proportion as their efficacy

271 becomes needful.

272From this view of the subject it may be concluded

273 that a pure democracy,

274 by which I mean a society consisting

275 of a small number of citizens,

276 who assemble and administer

277 the government in person,

278 can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.

279A common passion or interest will, in almost every case,

280 be felt by a majority of the whole;

281 a communication and concert result

282 from the form of government itself;

283 and there is nothing to check the inducements

284 to sacrifice the weaker party

285 or an obnoxious individual.

286Hence it is that such democracies

287 have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention;

288 have ever been found incompatible

289 with personal security or the rights of property;

290 and have in general been as short in their lives

291 as they have been violent in their deaths.

292Theoretic politicians,

293 who have patronized this species of government,

294 have erroneously supposed

295 that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality

296 in their political rights,

297 they would, at the same time,

298 be perfectly equalized and assimilated

299 in their possessions, their opinions,

300 and their passions.

301A republic, by which I mean a government

302 in which the scheme of representation takes place,

303 opens a different prospect,

304 and promises the cure for which we are seeking.

305Let us examine the points

306 in which it varies from pure democracy,

307 and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure

308 and the efficacy which it must derive

309 from the Union.

310The two great points of difference

311 between a democracy and a republic are:

312 first, the delegation of the government, in the latter,

313 to a small number of citizens elected by the rest;

314 secondly, the greater number of citizens,

315 and greater sphere of country,

316 over which the latter may be extended.

317The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand,

318 to refine and enlarge the public views,

319 by passing them through the medium

320 of a chosen body of citizens,

321 whose wisdom may best discern

322 the true interest of their country,

323 and whose patriotism and love of justice

324 will be least likely to sacrifice it

325 to temporary or partial considerations.

326Under such a regulation, it may well happen

327 that the public voice,

328 pronounced by the representatives of the people,

329 will be more consonant to the public good

330 than if pronounced by the people themselves,

331 convened for the purpose.

332On the other hand, the effect may be inverted.

333Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices,

334 or of sinister designs,

335 may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means,

336 first obtain the suffrages,

337 and then betray the interests, of the people.

338The question resulting is,

339 whether small or extensive republics

340 are more favorable to the election

341 of proper guardians of the public weal;

342 and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter

343 by two obvious considerations:

344In the first place, it is to be remarked

345 that, however small the republic may be,

346 the representatives must be raised to a certain number,

347 in order to guard against the cabals of a few;

348 and that, however large it may be,

349 they must be limited to a certain number,

350 in order to guard against the confusion

351 of a multitude.

352Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases

353 not being in proportion

354 to that of the two constituents,

355 and being proportionally greater in the small republic,

356 it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters

357 be not less in the large

358 than in the small republic,

359 the former will present a greater option,

360 and consequently a greater probability

361 of a fit choice.

362In the next place, as each representative will be chosen

363 by a greater number of citizens

364 in the large than in the small republic,

365 it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates

366 to practice with success the vicious arts

367 by which elections are too often carried;

368 and the suffrages of the people being more free,

369 will be more likely to centre in men

370 who possess the most attractive merit

371 and the most diffusive and established characters.

372It must be confessed that in this,

373 as in most other cases,

374 there is a mean,

375 on both sides of which inconveniences

376 will be found to lie.

377By enlarging too much the number of electors,

378 you render the representatives too little acquainted

379 with all their local circumstances

380 and lesser interests;

381 as by reducing it too much,

382 you render him unduly attached to these,

383 and too little fit to comprehend and pursue

384 great and national objects.

385The federal Constitution forms a happy combination

386 in this respect;

387 the great and aggregate interests

388 being referred to the national,

389 the local and particular to the State legislatures.

390The other point of difference is,

391 the greater number of citizens and extent of territory

392 which may be brought within the compass

393 of republican than of democratic government;

394 and it is this circumstance principally

395 which renders factious combinations

396 less to be dreaded

397 in the former than in the latter.

398The smaller the society,

399 the fewer probably will be the distinct parties

400 and interests composing it;

401 the fewer the distinct parties and interests,

402 the more frequently will a majority

403 be found of the same party;

404 and the smaller the number of individuals

405 composing a majority,

406 and the smaller the compass

407 within which they are placed,

408 the more easily will they concert and execute

409 their plans of oppression.

410Extend the sphere,

411 and you take in a greater variety of parties

412 and interests;

413 you make it less probable

414 that a majority of the whole

415 will have a common motive

416 to invade the rights of other citizens;

417 or if such a common motive exists,

418 it will be more difficult for all who feel it

419 to discover their own strength,

420 and to act in unison with each other.

421Besides other impediments, it may be remarked

422 that, where there is a consciousness

423 of unjust or dishonorable purposes,

424 communication is always checked by distrust

425 in proportion to the number

426 whose concurrence is necessary.

427Hence, it clearly appears,

428 that the same advantage which a republic has

429 over a democracy,

430 in controlling the effects of faction,

431 is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--

432 is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it.

433Does the advantage consist in the substitution

434 of representatives whose enlightened views

435 and virtuous sentiments

436 render them superior to local prejudices

437 and schemes of injustice?

438It will not be denied

439 that the representation of the Union

440 will be most likely to possess

441 these requisite endowments.

442Does it consist in the greater security afforded

443 by a greater variety of parties,

444 against the event of any one party

445 being able to outnumber and oppress the rest?

446In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties

447 comprised within the Union, increase this security.

448Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed

449 to the concert and accomplishment

450 of the secret wishes

451 of an unjust and interested majority?

452Here, again, the extent of the Union

453 gives it the most palpable advantage.

454The influence of factious leaders

455 may kindle a flame within their particular States,

456 but will be unable to spread a general conflagration

457 through the other States.

458A religious sect may degenerate

459 into a political faction

460 in a part of the Confederacy;

461 but the variety of sects dispersed

462 over the entire face of it

463 must secure the national councils

464 against any danger from that source.

465A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts,

466 for an equal division of property,

467 or for any other improper or wicked project,

468 will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union

469 than a particular member of it;

470 in the same proportion as such a malady

471 is more likely to taint

472 a particular county or district,

473 than an entire State.

474In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore,

475 we behold a republican remedy

476 for the diseases most incident

477 to republican government.

478And according to the degree of pleasure and pride

479 we feel in being republicans,

480 ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit

481 and supporting the character of Federalists.

482PUBLIUS.