1787 Federalist 9 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 9

2The Union as a Safeguard

3Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection

4For the Independent Journal.

5HAMILTON

6To the People of the State of New York:

7A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment

8 to the peace and liberty of the States,

9 as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection.

10It is impossible to read the history

11 of the petty republics of Greece and Italy

12 without feeling sensations of horror and disgust

13 at the distractions

14 with which they were continually agitated,

15 and at the rapid succession of revolutions

16 by which they were kept in a state

17 of perpetual vibration

18 between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy.

19If they exhibit occasional calms,

20 these only serve as short-lived contrast

21 to the furious storms that are to succeed.

22If now and then intervals of felicity open to view,

23 we behold them with a mixture of regret,

24 arising from the reflection

25 that the pleasing scenes before us

26 are soon to be overwhelmed

27 by the tempestuous waves

28 of sedition and party rage.

29If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom,

30 while they dazzle us

31 with a transient and fleeting brilliancy,

32 they at the same time admonish us to lament

33 that the vices of government should pervert

34 the direction and tarnish the lustre

35 of those bright talents and exalted endowments

36 for which the favored soils that produced them

37 have been so justly celebrated.

38From the disorders that disfigure the annals

39 of those republics

40 the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments,

41 not only against the forms

42 of republican government,

43 but against the very principles of civil liberty.

44They have decried all free government

45 as inconsistent with the order of society,

46 and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation

47 over its friends and partisans.

48Happily for mankind,

49 stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty,

50 which have flourished for ages,

51 have, in a few glorious instances,

52 refuted their gloomy sophisms.

53And, I trust, America will be

54 the broad and solid foundation

55 of other edifices, not less magnificent,

56 which will be equally permanent monuments

57 of their errors.

58But it is not to be denied

59 that the portraits they have sketched

60 of republican government

61 were too just copies of the originals

62 from which they were taken.

63If it had been found impracticable

64 to have devised models of a more perfect structure,

65 the enlightened friends to liberty

66 would have been obliged to abandon the cause

67 of that species of government as indefensible.

68The science of politics, however,

69 like most other sciences,

70 has received great improvement.

71The efficacy of various principles is now well understood,

72 which were either not known at all,

73 or imperfectly known to the ancients.

74The regular distribution of power

75 into distinct departments;

76 the introduction of legislative balances and checks;

77 the institution of courts composed of judges

78 holding their offices during good behavior;

79 the representation of the people in the legislature

80 by deputies of their own election:

81 these are wholly new discoveries,

82 or have made their principal progress

83 towards perfection in modern times.

84They are means, and powerful means,

85 by which the excellences of republican government

86 may be retained

87 and its imperfections lessened or avoided.

88To this catalogue of circumstances

89 that tend to the amelioration

90 of popular systems of civil government,

91 I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some,

92 to add one more,

93 on a principle which has been made the foundation

94 of an objection to the new Constitution;

95 I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT

96 within which such systems are to revolve,

97 either in respect to the dimensions

98 of a single State

99 or to the consolidation of several smaller States

100 into one great Confederacy.

101The latter is that which immediately concerns

102 the object under consideration.

103It will, however, be of use to examine the principle

104 in its application to a single State,

105 which shall be attended to in another place.

106The utility of a Confederacy,

107 as well to suppress faction

108 and to guard the internal tranquillity of States,

109 as to increase their external force and security,

110 is in reality not a new idea.

111It has been practiced upon

112 in different countries and ages,

113 and has received the sanction

114 of the most approved writers

115 on the subject of politics.

116The opponents of the plan proposed have,

117 with great assiduity,

118 cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu

119 on the necessity of a contracted territory

120 for a republican government.

121But they seem not to have been apprised

122 of the sentiments of that great man

123 expressed in another part of his work,

124 nor to have adverted to the consequences

125 of the principle

126 to which they subscribe

127 with such ready acquiescence.

128When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics,

129 the standards he had in view

130 were of dimensions far short of the limits

131 of almost every one of these States.

132Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,

133 New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia

134 can by any means be compared

135 with the models from which he reasoned

136 and to which the terms of his description apply.

137If we therefore take his ideas on this point

138 as the criterion of truth,

139 we shall be driven to the alternative

140 either of taking refuge at once

141 in the arms of monarchy,

142 or of splitting ourselves into an infinity

143 of little, jealous, clashing,

144 tumultuous commonwealths,

145 the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord,

146 and the miserable objects

147 of universal pity or contempt.

148Some of the writers who have come forward

149 on the other side of the question

150 seem to have been aware of the dilemma;

151 and have even been bold enough to hint

152 at the division of the larger States

153 as a desirable thing.

154Such an infatuated policy,

155 such a desperate expedient,

156 might, by the multiplication of petty offices,

157 answer the views of men

158 who possess not qualifications

159 to extend their influence

160 beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue,

161 but it could never promote

162 the greatness or happiness

163 of the people of America.

164Referring the examination of the principle itself

165 to another place, as has been already mentioned,

166 it will be sufficient to remark here

167 that, in the sense of the author

168 who has been most emphatically quoted

169 upon the occasion,

170 it would only dictate a reduction of the SIZE

171 of the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union,

172 but would not militate against their being all

173 comprehended in one confederate government.

174And this is the true question,

175 in the discussion of which

176 we are at present interested.

177So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu

178 from standing in opposition

179 to a general Union of the States,

180 that he explicitly treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC

181 as the expedient for extending the sphere

182 of popular government,

183 and reconciling the advantages of monarchy

184 with those of republicanism.

185"It is very probable,"

186 (says he[1])

187 "that mankind would have been obliged at length

188 to live constantly under the government

189 of a single person,

190 had they not contrived a kind of constitution

191 that has all the internal advantages

192 of a republican,

193 together with the external force

194 of a monarchical government.

195I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC.

196"This form of government is a convention

197 by which several smaller STATES

198 agree to become members of a larger ONE,

199 which they intend to form.

200It is a kind of assemblage of societies

201 that constitute a new one,

202 capable of increasing, by means of new associations,

203 till they arrive to such a degree of power

204 as to be able to provide

205 for the security of the united body.

206"A republic of this kind,

207 able to withstand an external force,

208 may support itself without any internal corruptions.

209The form of this society

210 prevents all manner of inconveniences.

211"If a single member should attempt

212 to usurp the supreme authority,

213 he could not be supposed to have an equal authority

214 and credit in all the confederate states.

215Were he to have too great influence over one,

216 this would alarm the rest.

217Were he to subdue a part,

218 that which would still remain free might oppose him

219 with forces independent of those

220 which he had usurped

221 and overpower him

222 before he could be settled in his usurpation.

223"Should a popular insurrection happen

224 in one of the confederate states

225 the others are able to quell it.

226Should abuses creep into one part,

227 they are reformed by those that remain sound.

228The state may be destroyed on one side,

229 and not on the other;

230 the confederacy may be dissolved,

231 and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.

232"As this government is composed of small republics,

233 it enjoys the internal happiness of each;

234 and with respect to its external situation,

235 it is possessed, by means of the association,

236 of all the advantages of large monarchies."

237I have thought it proper to quote at length

238 these interesting passages,

239 because they contain a luminous abridgment

240 of the principal arguments in favor of the Union,

241 and must effectually remove the false impressions

242 which a misapplication of other parts of the work

243 was calculated to make.

244They have, at the same time,

245 an intimate connection

246 with the more immediate design of this paper;

247 which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union

248 to repress domestic faction and insurrection.

249A distinction, more subtle than accurate,

250 has been raised between a CONFEDERACY

251 and a CONSOLIDATION of the States.

252The essential characteristic of the first is said to be,

253 the restriction of its authority

254 to the members in their collective capacities,

255 without reaching to the individuals

256 of whom they are composed.

257It is contended that the national council

258 ought to have no concern

259 with any object of internal administration.

260An exact equality of suffrage between the members

261 has also been insisted upon

262 as a leading feature of a confederate government.

263These positions are, in the main, arbitrary;

264 they are supported neither by principle nor precedent.

265It has indeed happened,

266 that governments of this kind have generally operated

267 in the manner which the distinction

268 taken notice of, supposes to be inherent

269 in their nature;

270 but there have been in most of them

271 extensive exceptions to the practice,

272 which serve to prove, as far as example will go,

273 that there is no absolute rule on the subject.

274And it will be clearly shown

275 in the course of this investigation

276 that as far as the principle contended for

277 has prevailed,

278 it has been the cause of incurable disorder

279 and imbecility in the government.

280The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC

281 seems simply to be "an assemblage of societies,"

282 or an association of two or more states into one state.

283The extent, modifications, and objects

284 of the federal authority

285 are mere matters of discretion.

286So long as the separate organization of the members

287 be not abolished;

288 so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity,

289 for local purposes;

290 though it should be in perfect subordination

291 to the general authority of the union,

292 it would still be, in fact and in theory,

293 an association of states, or a confederacy.

294The proposed Constitution,

295 so far from implying an abolition

296 of the State governments,

297 makes them constituent parts

298 of the national sovereignty,

299 by allowing them a direct representation

300 in the Senate,

301 and leaves in their possession

302 certain exclusive and very important portions

303 of sovereign power.

304This fully corresponds,

305 in every rational import of the terms,

306 with the idea of a federal government.

307In the Lycian confederacy,

308 which consisted of twenty-three CITIES or republics,

309 the largest were entitled to THREE votes

310 in the COMMON COUNCIL,

311 those of the middle class to TWO,

312 and the smallest to ONE.

313The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment

314 of all the judges and magistrates

315 of the respective CITIES.

316This was certainly the most, delicate species

317 of interference in their internal administration;

318 for if there be any thing that seems exclusively

319 appropriated to the local jurisdictions,

320 it is the appointment of their own officers.

321Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association, says:

322 "Were I to give a model

323 of an excellent Confederate Republic,

324 it would be that of Lycia."

325Thus we perceive that the distinctions insisted upon

326 were not within the contemplation

327 of this enlightened civilian;

328 and we shall be led to conclude,

329 that they are the novel refinements

330 of an erroneous theory.

331PUBLIUS.

332[1] "Spirit of Laws," vol. i., book ix., chap. i.