1787 Federalist 8 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 8

2The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States

3From the New York Packet.

4Tuesday, November 20, 1787.

5HAMILTON

6To the People of the State of New York:

7ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth

8 that the several States, in case of disunion,

9 or such combinations of them

10 as might happen to be formed

11 out of the wreck of the general Confederacy,

12 would be subject to those vicissitudes

13 of peace and war, of friendship and enmity,

14 with each other,

15 which have fallen to the lot of all neighboring nations

16 not united under one government,

17 let us enter into a concise detail

18 of some of the consequences

19 that would attend such a situation.

20War between the States,

21 in the first period of their separate existence,

22 would be accompanied with much greater distresses

23 than it commonly is in those countries

24 where regular military establishments

25 have long obtained.

26The disciplined armies always kept on foot

27 on the continent of Europe,

28 though they bear a malignant aspect

29 to liberty and economy,

30 have, notwithstanding, been productive

31 of the signal advantage

32 of rendering sudden conquests impracticable,

33 and of preventing that rapid desolation

34 which used to mark the progress of war

35 prior to their introduction.

36The art of fortification

37 has contributed to the same ends.

38The nations of Europe are encircled

39 with chains of fortified places,

40 which mutually obstruct invasion.

41Campaigns are wasted

42 in reducing two or three frontier garrisons,

43 to gain admittance into an enemy's country.

44Similar impediments occur at every step,

45 to exhaust the strength

46 and delay the progress of an invader.

47Formerly, an invading army would penetrate

48 into the heart of a neighboring country

49 almost as soon as intelligence of its approach

50 could be received;

51 but now a comparatively small force

52 of disciplined troops,

53 acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts,

54 is able to impede, and finally to frustrate,

55 the enterprises of one much more considerable.

56The history of war, in that quarter of the globe,

57 is no longer a history of nations subdued

58 and empires overturned,

59 but of towns taken and retaken;

60 of battles that decide nothing;

61 of retreats more beneficial than victories;

62 of much effort and little acquisition.

63In this country the scene would be altogether reversed.

64The jealousy of military establishments

65 would postpone them as long as possible.

66The want of fortifications,

67 leaving the frontiers of one state open to another,

68 would facilitate inroads.

69The populous States would, with little difficulty,

70 overrun their less populous neighbors.

71Conquests would be as easy to be made

72 as difficult to be retained.

73War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory.

74PLUNDER and devastation

75 ever march in the train of irregulars.

76The calamities of individuals

77 would make the principal figure

78 in the events which would characterize

79 our military exploits.

80This picture is not too highly wrought;

81 though, I confess, it would not long remain a just one.

82Safety from external danger

83 is the most powerful director of national conduct.

84Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time,

85 give way to its dictates.

86The violent destruction of life and property

87 incident to war,

88 the continual effort and alarm

89 attendant on a state of continual danger,

90 will compel nations the most attached to liberty

91 to resort for repose and security

92 to institutions which have a tendency

93 to destroy their civil and political rights.

94To be more safe,

95 they at length become willing

96 to run the risk of being less free.

97The institutions chiefly alluded to

98 are STANDING ARMIES

99 and the correspondent appendages

100 of military establishments.

101Standing armies, it is said,

102 are not provided against in the new Constitution;

103 and it is therefore inferred

104 that they may exist under it.[1]

105Their existence, however,

106 from the very terms of the proposition,

107 is, at most, problematical and uncertain.

108But standing armies, it may be replied,

109 must inevitably result

110 from a dissolution of the Confederacy.

111Frequent war and constant apprehension,

112 which require a state of as constant preparation,

113 will infallibly produce them.

114The weaker States or confederacies

115 would first have recourse to them,

116 to put themselves upon an equality

117 with their more potent neighbors.

118They would endeavor to supply the inferiority

119 of population and resources

120 by a more regular and effective system of defense,

121 by disciplined troops, and by fortifications.

122They would, at the same time,

123 be necessitated to strengthen

124 the executive arm of government,

125 in doing which their constitutions would acquire

126 a progressive direction toward monarchy.

127It is of the nature of war

128 to increase the executive

129 at the expense of the legislative authority.

130The expedients which have been mentioned

131 would soon give the States or confederacies

132 that made use of them

133 a superiority over their neighbors.

134Small states, or states of less natural strength,

135 under vigorous governments,

136 and with the assistance of disciplined armies,

137 have often triumphed over large states,

138 or states of greater natural strength,

139 which have been destitute of these advantages.

140Neither the pride nor the safety

141 of the more important States or confederacies

142 would permit them long to submit

143 to this mortifying and adventitious superiority.

144They would quickly resort to means similar

145 to those by which it had been effected,

146 to reinstate themselves in their lost pre-eminence.

147Thus, we should, in a little time,

148 see established in every part of this country

149 the same engines of despotism

150 which have been the scourge of the Old World.

151This, at least, would be the natural course of things;

152 and our reasonings will be the more likely to be just,

153 in proportion as they are accommodated

154 to this standard.

155These are not vague inferences

156 drawn from supposed or speculative defects

157 in a Constitution,

158 the whole power of which is lodged

159 in the hands of a people,

160 or their representatives and delegates,

161 but they are solid conclusions,

162 drawn from the natural and necessary progress

163 of human affairs.

164It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this,

165 why did not standing armies spring up

166 out of the contentions

167 which so often distracted

168 the ancient republics of Greece?

169Different answers, equally satisfactory,

170 may be given to this question.

171The industrious habits of the people of the present day,

172 absorbed in the pursuits of gain,

173 and devoted to the improvements

174 of agriculture and commerce,

175 are incompatible with the condition

176 of a nation of soldiers,

177 which was the true condition

178 of the people of those republics.

179The means of revenue,

180 which have been so greatly multiplied

181 by the increase of gold and silver

182 and of the arts of industry,

183 and the science of finance,

184 which is the offspring of modern times,

185 concurring with the habits of nations,

186 have produced an entire revolution

187 in the system of war,

188 and have rendered disciplined armies,

189 distinct from the body of the citizens,

190 the inseparable companions of frequent hostility.

191There is a wide difference, also,

192 between military establishments

193 in a country seldom exposed by its situation

194 to internal invasions,

195 and in one which is often subject to them,

196 and always apprehensive of them.

197The rulers of the former can have a good pretext,

198 if they are even so inclined,

199 to keep on foot armies so numerous

200 as must of necessity be maintained in the latter.

201These armies being, in the first case,

202 rarely, if at all, called into activity

203 for interior defense,

204 the people are in no danger

205 of being broken to military subordination.

206The laws are not accustomed to relaxations,

207 in favor of military exigencies;

208 the civil state remains in full vigor,

209 neither corrupted,

210 nor confounded with the principles or propensities

211 of the other state.

212The smallness of the army

213 renders the natural strength of the community

214 an over-match for it;

215 and the citizens, not habituated

216 to look up to the military power for protection,

217 or to submit to its oppressions,

218 neither love nor fear the soldiery;

219 they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence

220 in a necessary evil,

221 and stand ready to resist a power

222 which they suppose may be exerted

223 to the prejudice of their rights.

224The army under such circumstances

225 may usefully aid the magistrate

226 to suppress a small faction,

227 or an occasional mob, or insurrection;

228 but it will be unable to enforce encroachments

229 against the united efforts

230 of the great body of the people.

231In a country in the predicament last described,

232 the contrary of all this happens.

233The perpetual menacings of danger

234 oblige the government to be always prepared

235 to repel it;

236 its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense.

237The continual necessity for their services

238 enhances the importance of the soldier,

239 and proportionably degrades

240 the condition of the citizen.

241The military state becomes elevated above the civil.

242The inhabitants of territories,

243 often the theatre of war,

244 are unavoidably subjected

245 to frequent infringements on their rights,

246 which serve to weaken their sense of those rights;

247 and by degrees the people are brought to consider

248 the soldiery not only as their protectors,

249 but as their superiors.

250The transition from this disposition

251 to that of considering them masters,

252 is neither remote nor difficult;

253 but it is very difficult

254 to prevail upon a people under such impressions,

255 to make a bold or effectual resistance

256 to usurpations supported by the military power.

257The kingdom of Great Britain

258 falls within the first description.

259An insular situation, and a powerful marine,

260 guarding it in a great measure

261 against the possibility of foreign invasion,

262 supersede the necessity of a numerous army

263 within the kingdom.

264A sufficient force to make head against a sudden descent,

265 till the militia could have time to rally and embody,

266 is all that has been deemed requisite.

267No motive of national policy has demanded,

268 nor would public opinion have tolerated,

269 a larger number of troops

270 upon its domestic establishment.

271There has been, for a long time past,

272 little room for the operation of the other causes,

273 which have been enumerated

274 as the consequences of internal war.

275This peculiar felicity of situation has, in a great degree,

276 contributed to preserve the liberty

277 which that country to this day enjoys,

278 in spite of the prevalent venality and corruption.

279If, on the contrary, Britain had been situated

280 on the continent,

281 and had been compelled, as she would have been,

282 by that situation,

283 to make her military establishments at home

284 coextensive with those of the other great powers

285 of Europe,

286 she, like them, would in all probability be,

287 at this day,

288 a victim to the absolute power of a single man.

289'T is possible, though not easy,

290 that the people of that island may be enslaved

291 from other causes;

292 but it cannot be by the prowess of an army

293 so inconsiderable as that

294 which has been usually kept up within the kingdom.

295If we are wise enough to preserve the Union

296 we may for ages enjoy an advantage

297 similar to that of an insulated situation.

298Europe is at a great distance from us.

299Her colonies in our vicinity

300 will be likely to continue too much disproportioned

301 in strength

302 to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance.

303Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position,

304 be necessary to our security.

305But if we should be disunited,

306 and the integral parts should either remain separated,

307 or, which is most probable,

308 should be thrown together

309 into two or three confederacies,

310 we should be, in a short course of time,

311 in the predicament of the continental powers

312 of Europe--

313 our liberties would be a prey

314 to the means of defending ourselves

315 against the ambition and jealousy of each other.

316This is an idea not superficial or futile,

317 but solid and weighty.

318It deserves the most serious and mature consideration

319 of every prudent and honest man of whatever party.

320If such men will make a firm and solemn pause,

321 and meditate dispassionately

322 on the importance of this interesting idea;

323 if they will contemplate it in all its attitudes,

324 and trace it to all its consequences,

325 they will not hesitate to part with trivial objections

326 to a Constitution,

327 the rejection of which would in all probability

328 put a final period to the Union.

329The airy phantoms that flit before

330 the distempered imaginations of some of its adversaries

331 would quickly give place

332 to the more substantial forms of dangers,

333 real, certain, and formidable.

334PUBLIUS.

335[1] This objection will be fully examined

336 in its proper place,

337 and it will be shown

338 that the only natural precaution

339 which could have been taken on this subject

340 has been taken;

341 and a much better one than is to be found

342 in any constitution that has been heretofore framed

343 in America,

344 most of which contain no guard at all

345 on this subject.