1787 Federalist 4 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 4

2The Same Subject Continued:

3Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence

4For the Independent Journal.

5JAY

6To the People of the State of New York:

7MY LAST paper assigned several reasons

8 why the safety of the people would be best secured

9 by union against the danger it may be exposed to

10 by JUST causes of war given to other nations;

11 and those reasons show

12 that such causes would not only

13 be more rarely given,

14 but would also be more easily accommodated,

15 by a national government

16 than either by the State governments

17 or the proposed little confederacies.

18But the safety of the people of America

19 against dangers from FOREIGN force

20 depends not only on their forbearing

21 to give JUST causes of war to other nations,

22 but also on their placing and continuing themselves

23 in such a situation as not to INVITE

24 hostility or insult;

25 for it need not be observed

26 that there are PRETENDED as well as just

27 causes of war.

28It is too true,

29 however disgraceful it may be

30 to human nature,

31 that nations in general will make war

32 whenever they have a prospect

33 of getting anything by it;

34 nay, absolute monarchs will often make war

35 when their nations are to get nothing by it,

36 but for the purposes and objects merely personal,

37 such as thirst for military glory,

38 revenge for personal affronts,

39 ambition,

40 or private compacts to aggrandize or support

41 their particular families or partisans.

42These and a variety of other motives,

43 which affect only the mind of the sovereign,

44 often lead him to engage in wars

45 not sanctified by justice

46 or the voice and interests of his people.

47But, independent of these inducements to war,

48 which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies,

49 but which well deserve our attention,

50 there are others which affect nations

51 as often as kings;

52 and some of them will on examination be found

53 to grow out of our relative situation

54 and circumstances.

55With France and with Britain

56 we are rivals in the fisheries,

57 and can supply their markets cheaper

58 than they can themselves,

59 notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it

60 by bounties on their own

61 or duties on foreign fish.

62With them and with most other European nations

63 we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade;

64 and we shall deceive ourselves

65 if we suppose that any of them

66 will rejoice to see it flourish;

67 for, as our carrying trade cannot increase

68 without in some degree diminishing theirs,

69 it is more their interest,

70 and will be more their policy,

71 to restrain than to promote it.

72In the trade to China and India,

73 we interfere with more than one nation,

74 inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages

75 which they had in a manner monopolized,

76 and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities

77 which we used to purchase from them.

78The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels

79 cannot give pleasure to any nations

80 who possess territories on or near this continent,

81 because the cheapness and excellence

82 of our productions,

83 added to the circumstance of vicinity,

84 and the enterprise and address

85 of our merchants and navigators,

86 will give us a greater share in the advantages

87 which those territories afford,

88 than consists with the wishes or policy

89 of their respective sovereigns.

90Spain thinks it convenient

91 to shut the Mississippi against us on the one side,

92 and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence

93 on the other;

94 nor will either of them permit the other waters

95 which are between them and us

96 to become the means of mutual intercourse

97 and traffic.

98From these and such like considerations,

99 which might,

100 if consistent with prudence,

101 be more amplified and detailed,

102 it is easy to see

103 that jealousies and uneasinesses

104 may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets

105 of other nations,

106 and that we are not to expect

107 that they should regard our advancement

108 in union, in power and consequence

109 by land and by sea,

110 with an eye of indifference and composure.

111The people of America are aware

112 that inducements to war may arise

113 out of these circumstances,

114 as well as from others not so obvious at present,

115 and that whenever such inducements may find

116 fit time and opportunity for operation,

117 pretenses to color and justify them

118 will not be wanting.

119Wisely, therefore, do they consider union

120 and a good national government

121 as necessary to put and keep them

122 in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war,

123 will tend to repress and discourage it.

124That situation consists

125 in the best possible state of defense,

126 and necessarily depends on the government,

127 the arms, and the resources of the country.

128As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole,

129 and cannot be provided for without government,

130 either one or more or many,

131 let us inquire whether one good government

132 is not, relative to the object in question,

133 more competent than any other

134 given number whatever.

135One government can collect and avail itself

136 of the talents and experience of the ablest men,

137 in whatever part of the Union they may be found.

138It can move on uniform principles of policy.

139It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect

140 the several parts and members,

141 and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions

142 to each.

143In the formation of treaties,

144 it will regard the interest of the whole,

145 and the particular interests of the parts

146 as connected with that of the whole.

147It can apply the resources and power of the whole

148 to the defense of any particular part,

149 and that more easily and expeditiously

150 than State governments or separate confederacies

151 can possibly do,

152 for want of concert and unity of system.

153It can place the militia under one plan of discipline,

154 and, by putting their officers

155 in a proper line of subordination

156 to the Chief Magistrate,

157 will, as it were,

158 consolidate them into one corps,

159 and thereby render them more efficient

160 than if divided into thirteen

161 or into three or four distinct

162 independent companies.

163What would the militia of Britain be

164 if the English militia obeyed

165 the government of England,

166 if the Scotch militia obeyed

167 the government of Scotland,

168 and if the Welsh militia obeyed

169 the government of Wales?

170Suppose an invasion;

171 would those three governments

172 (if they agreed at all)

173 be able, with all their respective forces,

174 to operate against the enemy so effectually

175 as the single government of Great Britain would?

176We have heard much of the fleets of Britain,

177 and the time may come,

178 if we are wise,

179 when the fleets of America may engage attention.

180But if one national government, had not so regulated

181 the navigation of Britain

182 as to make it a nursery for seamen--

183 if one national government had not called forth

184 all the national means and materials

185 for forming fleets,

186 their prowess and their thunder

187 would never have been celebrated.

188Let England have its navigation and fleet--

189 let Scotland have its navigation and fleet--

190 let Wales have its navigation and fleet--

191 let Ireland have its navigation and fleet--

192 let those four of the constituent parts

193 of the British empire be be

194 under four independent governments,

195 and it is easy to perceive

196 how soon they would each dwindle

197 into comparative insignificance.

198Apply these facts to our own case.

199Leave America divided into thirteen

200 or, if you please,

201 into three or four independent governments--

202 what armies could they raise and pay--

203 what fleets could they ever hope to have?

204If one was attacked,

205 would the others fly to its succor,

206 and spend their blood and money in its defense?

207Would there be no danger

208 of their being flattered into neutrality

209 by its specious promises,

210 or seduced by a too great fondness for peace

211 to decline hazarding their tranquillity

212 and present safety

213 for the sake of neighbors,

214 of whom perhaps they have been jealous,

215 and whose importance they are content

216 to see diminished?

217Although such conduct would not be wise,

218 it would, nevertheless, be natural.

219The history of the states of Greece,

220 and of other countries,

221 abounds with such instances,

222 and it is not improbable

223 that what has so often happened

224 would, under similar circumstances, happen again.

225But admit that they might be willing

226 to help the invaded State or confederacy.

227How, and when, and in what proportion

228 shall aids of men and money be afforded?

229Who shall command the allied armies,

230 and from which of them shall he receive his orders?

231Who shall settle the terms of peace,

232 and in case of disputes

233 what umpire shall decide between them

234 and compel acquiescence?

235Various difficulties and inconveniences

236 would be inseparable from such a situation;

237 whereas one government,

238 watching over the general and common interests,

239 and combining and directing

240 the powers and resources of the whole,

241 would be free from all these embarrassments,

242 and conduce far more to the safety of the people.

243But whatever may be our situation,

244 whether firmly united under one national government,

245 or split into a number of confederacies,

246 certain it is,

247 that foreign nations will know and view it

248 exactly as it is;

249 and they will act toward us accordingly.

250If they see that our national government

251 is efficient and well administered,

252 our trade prudently regulated,

253 our militia properly organized and disciplined,

254 our resources and finances discreetly managed,

255 our credit re-established,

256 our people free, contented, and united,

257 they will be much more disposed

258 to cultivate our friendship

259 than provoke our resentment.

260If, on the other hand,

261 they find us either destitute

262 of an effectual government

263 (each State doing right or wrong,

264 as to its rulers may seem convenient),

265 or split into three or four independent

266 and probably discordant republics or confederacies,

267 one inclining to Britain,

268 another to France,

269 and a third to Spain,

270 and perhaps played off against each other

271 by the three,

272 what a poor, pitiful figure

273 will America make in their eyes!

274How liable would she become

275 not only to their contempt but to their outrage,

276 and how soon would dear-bought experience proclaim

277 that when a people or family so divide,

278 it never fails to be against themselves.

279PUBLIUS.