1787 Federalist 3 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 3

2The Same Subject Continued:

3Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence

4For the Independent Journal.

5JAY

6To the People of the State of New York:

7IT IS not a new observation

8 that the people of any country

9 (if, like the Americans,

10 intelligent and wellinformed)

11 seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years

12 in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests.

13That consideration naturally tends to create great respect

14 for the high opinion

15 which the people of America

16 have so long and uniformly entertained

17 of the importance of their continuing firmly united

18 under one federal government,

19 vested with sufficient powers

20 for all general and national purposes.

21The more attentively I consider and investigate

22 the reasons which appear to have given birth

23 to this opinion,

24 the more I become convinced

25 that they are cogent and conclusive.

26Among the many objects

27 to which a wise and free people

28 find it necessary to direct their attention,

29 that of providing for their SAFETY

30 seems to be the first.

31The SAFETY of the people doubtless has relation

32 to a great variety of circumstances and considerations,

33 and consequently affords great latitude

34 to those who wish to define it

35 precisely and comprehensively.

36At present I mean only to consider it

37 as it respects security

38 for the preservation of peace and tranquillity,

39 as well as against dangers

40 from FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE,

41 as from dangers of the LIKE KIND

42 arising from domestic causes.

43As the former of these comes first in order,

44 it is proper it should be the first discussed.

45Let us therefore proceed to examine

46 whether the people are not right in their opinion

47 that a cordial Union,

48 under an efficient national government,

49 affords them the best security that can be devised

50 against HOSTILITIES from abroad.

51The number of wars which have happened or will happen

52 in the world

53 will always be found to be in proportion

54 to the number and weight of the causes,

55 whether REAL or PRETENDED,

56 which PROVOKE or INVITE them.

57If this remark be just,

58 it becomes useful to inquire

59 whether so many JUST causes of war

60 are likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA

61 as by DISUNITED America;

62 for if it should turn out

63 that United America will probably give the fewest,

64 then it will follow

65 that in this respect the Union tends most

66 to preserve the people

67 in a state of peace with other nations.

68The JUST causes of war, for the most part,

69 arise either from violation of treaties

70 or from direct violence.

71America has already formed treaties

72 with no less than six foreign nations,

73 and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime,

74 and therefore able to annoy and injure us.

75She has also extensive commerce

76 with Portugal, Spain, and Britain,

77 and, with respect to the two latter,

78 has, in addition,

79 the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.

80It is of high importance to the peace of America

81 that she observe the laws of nations

82 towards all these powers,

83 and to me it appears evident

84 that this will be more perfectly

85 and punctually done

86 by one national government

87 than it could be either by thirteen separate States

88 or by three or four distinct confederacies.

89Because when once an efficient national government

90 is established,

91 the best men in the country

92 will not only consent to serve,

93 but also will generally be appointed to manage it;

94 for, although town or country,

95 or other contracted influence,

96 may place men in State assemblies,

97 or senates, or courts of justice,

98 or executive departments,

99 yet more general and extensive reputation

100 for talents and other qualifications

101 will be necessary to recommend men to offices

102 under the national government,--

103 especially as it will have

104 the widest field for choice,

105 and never experience that want of proper persons

106 which is not uncommon in some of the States.

107Hence, it will result

108 that the administration, the political counsels,

109 and the judicial decisions

110 of the national government

111 will be more wise, systematical, and judicious

112 than those of individual States,

113 and consequently more satisfactory

114 with respect to other nations,

115 as well as more SAFE with respect to us.

116Because, under the national government,

117 treaties and articles of treaties,

118 as well as the laws of nations,

119 will always be expounded in one sense

120 and executed in the same manner,--

121 whereas, adjudications

122 on the same points and questions,

123 in thirteen States,

124 or in three or four confederacies,

125 will not always accord or be consistent;

126 and that, as well from the variety

127 of independent courts and judges

128 appointed by different and independent governments,

129 as from the different local laws and interests

130 which may affect and influence them.

131The wisdom of the convention,

132 in committing such questions

133 to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts

134 appointed by and responsible only

135 to one national government,

136 cannot be too much commended.

137Because the prospect of present loss or advantage

138 may often tempt the governing party

139 in one or two States

140 to swerve from good faith and justice;

141 but those temptations, not reaching the other States,

142 and consequently having little or no influence

143 on the national government,

144 the temptation will be fruitless,

145 and good faith and justice be preserved.

146The case of the treaty of peace with Britain

147 adds great weight to this reasoning.

148Because, even if the governing party in a State

149 should be disposed to resist such temptations,

150 yet as such temptations may,

151 and commonly do,

152 result from circumstances peculiar to the State,

153 and may affect a great number of the inhabitants,

154 the governing party may not always be able,

155 if willing,

156 to prevent the injustice meditated,

157 or to punish the aggressors.

158But the national government,

159 not being affected by those local circumstances,

160 will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves,

161 nor want power or inclination

162 to prevent or punish its commission by others.

163So far, therefore,

164 as either designed or accidental violations

165 of treaties and the laws of nations

166 afford JUST causes of war,

167 they are less to be apprehended

168 under one general government

169 than under several lesser ones,

170 and in that respect the former most favors

171 the SAFETY of the people.

172As to those just causes of war

173 which proceed from direct and unlawful violence,

174 it appears equally clear to me

175 that one good national government

176 affords vastly more security against dangers

177 of that sort

178 than can be derived from any other quarter.

179Because such violences are more frequently caused

180 by the passions and interests of a part

181 than of the whole;

182 of one or two States than of the Union.

183Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned

184 by aggressions of the present federal government,

185 feeble as it is;

186 but there are several instances of Indian hostilities

187 having been provoked

188 by the improper conduct of individual States,

189 who, either unable or unwilling

190 to restrain or punish offenses,

191 have given occasion to the slaughter

192 of many innocent inhabitants.

193The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories,

194 bordering on some States and not on others,

195 naturally confines the causes of quarrel

196 more immediately to the borderers.

197The bordering States, if any, will be those who,

198 under the impulse of sudden irritation,

199 and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury,

200 will be most likely, by direct violence,

201 to excite war with these nations;

202 and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger

203 as a national government,

204 whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished

205 by the passions which actuate

206 the parties immediately interested.

207But not only fewer just causes of war

208 will be given by the national government,

209 but it will also be more in their power

210 to accommodate and settle them amicably.

211They will be more temperate and cool,

212 and in that respect,

213 as well as in others,

214 will be more in capacity to act advisedly

215 than the offending State.

216The pride of states,

217 as well as of men,

218 naturally disposes them to justify all their actions,

219 and opposes their acknowledging, correcting,

220 or repairing their errors and offenses.

221The national government, in such cases,

222 will not be affected by this pride,

223 but will proceed with moderation and candor

224 to consider and decide on the means most proper

225 to extricate them from the difficulties

226 which threaten them.

227Besides, it is well known

228 that acknowledgments, explanations, and compensations

229 are often accepted as satisfactory

230 from a strong united nation,

231 which would be rejected as unsatisfactory

232 if offered by a State or confederacy

233 of little consideration or power.

234In the year 1685,

235 the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,

236 endeavored to appease him.

237He demanded that they should send their Doge,

238 or chief magistrate,

239 accompanied by four of their senators,

240 to FRANCE,

241 to ask his pardon and receive his terms.

242They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace.

243Would he on any occasion either have demanded

244 or have received the like humiliation

245 from Spain, or Britain,

246 or any other POWERFUL nation?

247PUBLIUS.