1787 Federalist 1 · Founding Made Plain

11787 Federalist No. 1

2General Introduction

3For the Independent Journal.

4HAMILTON

5To the People of the State of New York:

6AFTER an unequivocal experience

7 of the inefficiency

8 of the subsisting federal government,

9 you are called upon to deliberate

10 on a new Constitution

11 for the United States of America.

12The subject speaks its own importance;

13 comprehending in its consequences

14 nothing less than the existence of the UNION,

15 the safety and welfare of the parts

16 of which it is composed,

17 the fate of an empire

18 in many respects the most interesting

19 in the world.

20It has been frequently remarked

21 that it seems to have been reserved

22 to the people of this country,

23 by their conduct and example,

24 to decide the important question,

25 whether societies of men

26 are really capable or not

27 of establishing good government

28 from reflection and choice,

29 or whether they are forever destined

30 to depend for their political constitutions

31 on accident and force.

32If there be any truth in the remark,

33 the crisis at which we are arrived

34 may with propriety be regarded as the era

35 in which that decision is to be made;

36 and a wrong election of the part we shall act

37 may, in this view, deserve to be considered

38 as the general misfortune of mankind.

39This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy

40 to those of patriotism,

41 to heighten the solicitude

42 which all considerate and good men

43 must feel for the event.

44Happy will it be

45 if our choice should be directed

46 by a judicious estimate of our true interests,

47 unperplexed and unbiased by considerations

48 not connected with the public good.

49But this is a thing more ardently to be wished

50 than seriously to be expected.

51The plan offered to our deliberations

52 affects too many particular interests,

53 innovates upon too many local institutions,

54 not to involve in its discussion

55 a variety of objects foreign to its merits,

56 and of views, passions and prejudices

57 little favorable to the discovery of truth.

58Among the most formidable of the obstacles

59 which the new Constitution will have to encounter

60 may readily be distinguished

61 the obvious interest of a certain class of men

62 in every State

63 to resist all changes

64 which may hazard a diminution

65 of the power, emolument, and consequence

66 of the offices they hold

67 under the State establishments;

68 and the perverted ambition

69 of another class of men,

70 who will either hope to aggrandize themselves

71 by the confusions of their country,

72 or will flatter themselves

73 with fairer prospects of elevation

74 from the subdivision of the empire

75 into several partial confederacies

76 than from its union under one government.

77It is not, however, my design

78 to dwell upon observations of this nature.

79I am well aware

80 that it would be disingenuous

81 to resolve indiscriminately

82 the opposition of any set of men

83 (merely because their situations

84 might subject them to suspicion)

85 into interested or ambitious views.

86Candor will oblige us to admit

87 that even such men may be actuated

88 by upright intentions;

89and it cannot be doubted

90 that much of the opposition

91 which has made its appearance,

92 or may hereafter make its appearance,

93 will spring from sources,

94 blameless at least, if not respectable--

95 the honest errors of minds led astray

96 by preconceived jealousies and fears.

97So numerous indeed and so powerful

98 are the causes which serve

99 to give a false bias to the judgment,

100 that we, upon many occasions,

101 see wise and good men

102 on the wrong as well as on the right side

103 of questions of the first magnitude

104 to society.

105This circumstance,

106 if duly attended to,

107 would furnish a lesson of moderation

108 to those who are ever so much persuaded

109 of their being in the right

110 in any controversy.

111And a further reason for caution,

112 in this respect,

113 might be drawn from the reflection

114 that we are not always sure

115 that those who advocate the truth

116 are influenced by purer principles

117 than their antagonists.

118Ambition, avarice, personal animosity,

119 party opposition,

120 and many other motives

121 not more laudable than these,

122 are apt to operate as well

123 upon those who support

124 as those who oppose

125 the right side of a question.

126Were there not even these inducements

127 to moderation,

128 nothing could be more ill-judged

129 than that intolerant spirit

130 which has, at all times,

131 characterized political parties.

132For in politics, as in religion,

133 it is equally absurd

134 to aim at making proselytes

135 by fire and sword.

136Heresies in either

137 can rarely be cured by persecution.

138And yet, however just these sentiments

139 will be allowed to be,

140 we have already sufficient indications

141 that it will happen in this

142 as in all former cases

143 of great national discussion.

144A torrent of angry and malignant passions

145 will be let loose.

146To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties,

147 we shall be led to conclude

148 that they will mutually hope

149 to evince the justness of their opinions,

150 and to increase the number of their converts

151 by the loudness of their declamations

152 and the bitterness of their invectives.

153An enlightened zeal

154 for the energy and efficiency of government

155 will be stigmatized

156 as the offspring of a temper

157 fond of despotic power

158 and hostile to the principles of liberty.

159An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger

160 to the rights of the people,

161 which is more commonly the fault of the head

162 than of the heart,

163 will be represented as mere pretense and artifice,

164 the stale bait for popularity

165 at the expense of the public good.

166It will be forgotten, on the one hand,

167 that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love,

168 and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty

169 is apt to be infected

170 with a spirit of narrow and illiberal distrust.

171On the other hand, it will be equally forgotten

172 that the vigor of government

173 is essential to the security of liberty;

174 that, in the contemplation

175 of a sound and well-informed judgment,

176 their interest can never be separated;

177 and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks

178 behind the specious mask of zeal

179 for the rights of the people

180 than under the forbidden appearance of zeal

181 for the firmness and efficiency of government.

182History will teach us

183 that the former has been found

184 a much more certain road

185 to the introduction of despotism

186 than the latter,

187 and that of those men

188 who have overturned the liberties of republics,

189 the greatest number have begun their career

190 by paying an obsequious court to the people;

191 commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.

192In the course of the preceding observations,

193 I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens,

194 to putting you upon your guard

195 against all attempts, from whatever quarter,

196 to influence your decision

197 in a matter of the utmost moment

198 to your welfare,

199 by any impressions other than those

200 which may result from the evidence of truth.

201You will, no doubt, at the same time,

202 have collected from the general scope of them,

203 that they proceed from a source

204 not unfriendly to the new Constitution.

205Yes, my countrymen,

206 I own to you that,

207 after having given it an attentive consideration,

208 I am clearly of opinion

209 it is your interest to adopt it.

210I am convinced

211 that this is the safest course

212 for your liberty, your dignity,

213 and your happiness.

214I affect not reserves

215 which I do not feel.

216I will not amuse you

217 with an appearance of deliberation

218 when I have decided.

219I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions,

220 and I will freely lay before you

221 the reasons on which they are founded.

222The consciousness of good intentions

223 disdains ambiguity.

224I shall not, however, multiply professions

225 on this head.

226My motives must remain

227 in the depository of my own breast.

228My arguments will be open to all,

229 and may be judged of by all.

230They shall at least be offered in a spirit

231 which will not disgrace the cause of truth.

232I propose, in a series of papers,

233 to discuss the following interesting particulars:

234THE UTILITY OF THE UNION

235 TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY

236THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION

237 TO PRESERVE THAT UNION

238THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT

239 AT LEAST EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED,

240 TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECT

241THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION

242 TO THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT

243ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION

244and lastly,

245THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS ADOPTION WILL AFFORD

246 TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT,

247 TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.

248In the progress of this discussion

249 I shall endeavor to give a satisfactory answer

250 to all the objections

251 which shall have made their appearance,

252 that may seem to have any claim

253 to your attention.

254It may perhaps be thought superfluous

255 to offer arguments to prove the utility

256 of the UNION,

257 a point, no doubt, deeply engraved

258 on the hearts of the great body of the people

259 in every State,

260 and one, which it may be imagined,

261 has no adversaries.

262But the fact is,

263 that we already hear it whispered

264 in the private circles of those

265 who oppose the new Constitution,

266 that the thirteen States are of too great extent

267 for any general system,

268 and that we must of necessity resort

269 to separate confederacies

270 of distinct portions of the whole.[1]

271This doctrine will, in all probability,

272 be gradually propagated,

273 till it has votaries enough

274 to countenance an open avowal of it.

275For nothing can be more evident,

276 to those who are able to take an enlarged view

277 of the subject,

278 than the alternative of an adoption

279 of the new Constitution

280 or a dismemberment of the Union.

281It will therefore be of use to begin

282 by examining the advantages of that Union,

283 the certain evils, and the probable dangers,

284 to which every State will be exposed

285 from its dissolution.

286This shall accordingly constitute

287 the subject of my next address.

288PUBLIUS.

289[1] The same idea,

290 tracing the arguments to their consequences,

291 is held out in several of the late publications

292 against the new Constitution.